396.1 GE/5–1154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

secret
priority

63. Repeated information Department Secto 168, priority Tokyo 43. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean from USDel. Reference Geneva 681 it is incontestable that UNCURK can exercise only such powers as are delegated and permitted by mutual agreement. This would be as true of Plan A as Plan B. If Communists accept B we are not unaware of difficulties inherent in implementation as they have bad record for keeping agreements. If Communists reject B we would at least be in position before world of having made honest effort to negotiate reasonable settlement without sacrificing either ROK or [Page 249] UN. On other hand it is difficult to see how we can, with straight face, join Rhee in seeking to impose terms of a conqueror—unconditional withdrawal Chinese Communist troops, surrender North Korean Army to ROK, leaving ROK in military control of North Korea before elections and unification. Little more could be demanded if we had won military victory rather than stalemate.

Smith
  1. Same as telegram 1145, May 10, from Seoul, p. 242.