795B.00/5–1054: Telegram

DeanBriggsRhee Meeting, Seoul, May 10, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

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1140. Sent niact USDel Geneva 65, repeated information Tokyo 675. Department for Secretary, Geneva for Smith from Dean. Tokyo [Page 240] pass CINCUNC. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister Cho this morning.

Explained that demand for complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces would be accompanied by demand for phased withdrawal all UN troops and if sudden Communist attack occurred such complete withdrawal might permit Communist penetration considerably south of Seoul-Inchon line whereas if number of troops suggested could remain until after elections were completed, we could probably hold approximately present line until aid brought in from Okinawa.

President said whatever the military consequences to his country or people he could not agree to one single Chinese Communist soldier remaining in Korea before elections, that we should demand Communist aggressors get out of Korea and we should not agree phased withdrawal which constitutes surrender to aggressors.

We explained alternatives faced at Geneva, cited substances paragraph 3 Geneva’s 58,1 but did not tell him which one we favor but did say Plan B without US and ROK support or Plan A with only US and ROK support would be tremendous victory for Communists at Geneva and that we were carefully considering necessity putting forward Plan B.

We suggested we should put forward Plan B with the other 15 nations and if ROK could not agree they should maintain silence. President said he would maintain silence provided we agreed secretly in writing that if Communists accepted our proposal rather than rejected as we expect, we would join ROK in attack on Communists. We said that was out of question. Note, if they do maintain silence and Communists were to accept what do we do then?

As to withdrawal or surrender North Korea Communists, he visualizes moment agreement reached at Geneva to hold free elections that his army will be able to go north and take surrender North Korea Communist army. We explained why we did not think this could occur but nothing we could say would deter him from that position. Otherwise he regards elections as complete farce with Communist Government remaining in north. What, he asks, would ever induce them to surrender and how can we govern even if elections are held?

We told him we had discussed with Generals Van Fleet and Taylor2 and they concurred Plan B should be put forward with ROK approval. He again flatly refused and said we were recognizing Communist Government in north.

General Hull has offered to come over tomorrow to discuss military situation with him if that will help. We may go Tokyo confer with him.

[Page 241]

President said he had cabled to Pyun statement he gave me Saturday (Embtel 1137, repeated Geneva 62)3 and Pyun was authorized to negotiate with American delegation within framework that statement and to wire his recommendations to Rhee. Gained impression President would like to get strong wire from Pyun and believe if considerable pressure placed on Pyun he might be induced to wire support Plan B which would help materially or at minimum to maintain silence when that plan put forward though consider latter not very realistic. Definitely believe Rhee wants promise ROK build-up.

Explained great regret our inability to arrive agreement and explained fear such disunity at Geneva would materially affect American public opinion, seriously jeopardize what we were trying to do in cooperation with Korea and encourage Communists.

President launched into long speech that we did not have courage to fight Communists and therefore he would have to stand alone and free world would fall. Commented only that our plans would defeat Communists and must stand together. President very firm and said his position was final and no further discussion could change him although indicated again he would like Pyun’s recommendations.

Dean would like to leave in any event not later than Friday4 this week and unless you instruct contrary plans to leave earlier if possible in connection urgent matters at office.5

Briggs
  1. Same as telegram Secto 149, May 8, p. 230.
  2. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.
  3. Dated May 8, p. 233.
  4. May 14.
  5. In telegram 906, May 10, to Seoul, Secretary Dulles asked Dean to stay on until Friday by which time agreement might be reached on Plan B. Dean replied in telegram 1158, May 12, from Seoul saying that he would stay on at least through Friday. (795.00/5–1054, 5–1254)