Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/6–1549

Memorandum by Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)¹

secret

[Washington,] June 15, 1949.

The U.S. Delegation at Lausanne wants instruction on the following points:

(1) Recess. In the attached telegram² Hare points way in which a shorter recess can be achieved and still avoid danger that Arabs will not show up at New York.

In the light of his telegram and my own further thinking, what I would suggest is this:

That the American delegation be instructed, unless constructive proposals are forthcoming by the end of next week, to propose a recess in the talks to a date one month before the September Assembly, the Commission to meet then in New York (not at Lake Success).

The Jerusalem committee, technical committee on refugees, and the general political committee be instructed to continue their work.

The Commission to have temporary headquarters at League Palace in Geneva or in Jerusalem and members to be available to consider any new proposals or any other matter at the call of the Chairman.

Agreement to recess on the part of Israel and Arab states is not necessary. Neither side will agree because it will be an admission that they were in some way responsible. The Commission should assume the responsibility and regard it as a form of pressure on both sides.

Both sides should be warned by Commission and by the U.S. that any resort to force in any circumstance would be regarded most seriously.

Both sides should be told that the Commission, as always, welcomes any proposals that either side may make in the interim and that both parties are of course free to have any negotiations, direct or otherwise.

(2) Refugee Plan: You will remember that Eytan proposed to the Commission that the refugee problem be taken out of the context of the negotiations: that is, the United States is to pick up the check. Eytan appeared before the Commission again on Monday of this week and Hare summarizes his position in Palun 204³ as, “Tell me how much you will pay and I will tell you what, if anything, I will sell.”

Israel’s position on refugees has stiffened, rather than modified, since the Tel Aviv conferences. Whereas she said at first that she would be willing to consider the return of refugees within the context of a general peace settlement, she now says (quoting Hare), “Under the circumstances in Israel and elsewhere in the Near East it would be impossible for Israel actually to consider the return of refugees until Israel was informed of a complete scientific, economic and financial plan for the resettlement of refugees. Until the latter was known in detail, Israel would not even be in a position to consider how many refugees could be repatriated to Israel.” In other words, Israel is trying to force us to buy her into accepting her own obligation.

Her new position raises the question whether, having partially conditioned our promises of help on Israel’s fulfillment of her obligation under the resolution to our satisfaction, it would be prudent, helpful to a peace settlement, or possible either with the White House or with Congress, to abandon that position.

Israel’s great burden in accepting refugees is of course apparent, but in her Gaza proposal she admitted the possibility, with help, of absorbing the 230,000 refugees there, the 80,000 normal population and the broken families (estimated at between 35,000 and 140,000 people). In the Gaza proposal she made no such condition as she makes now. She could certainly with help absorb from 200,000 to 250,000 refugees even if she did not get the Gaza strip. If she would make a statement to that effect, hedging it with reservations as to what sort of refugees and under what conditions, we could then get a commitment from the Arab states.

I doubt very much, however, if in buying Israel into that agreement in principle we are satisfying the Arab demand for her to evidence her good faith under the resolution or that we are helping the position of the United States vis-à-vis either Israel or the Arab states. If we are going to buy peace let us make sure that it is to be peace and not disgruntlement which would arise in Arab states from further financial concessions to Israel without requiring her to fulfill the obligations of a UN member. I do not, therefore, think it is either prudent or contributory to peace to accept her conditions.

I leave to the Department the question whether the President or Congress would be willing to modify conditions under which help might be extended in resettlement and repatriation of refugees.

I would suggest, therefore, that you and George McGhee consider this course:

(1) Instruct the American delegation that in view of the fact that the President’s conditions have not been met, the United States is not willing to introduce into the Commission the “McGhee plan”⁴ at this juncture, although it renews the commitment that it is willing to help in the refugee situation under the conditions already outlined to the Israeli and Arab delegations and to the members of the Commission. It should be said, also, that if and when those conditions are met the United States will be willing to introduce the plan.

(2) In the meantime work on a governmental, rather than Commission level, to get acceptance of the conditions.

(3) Recognizing that time is vital, in view of the expiration of UNRPR funds and the approach of the General Assembly, establish an organization that is ready to go quickly into action once it has been approved by the UN. I think it is necessary even to go so far as to have personnel on paper, though that would have to be quietly done.

(4) Make every effort to obtain funds for interim aid, not on a basis of relief, but on a basis of employment. The morale of the refugees is deteriorating daily and becoming more dangerous. If winter comes with no help, there will be an explosive situation in the Middle East. Money will obviously have to be obtained from sources other than Congress for that interim help.

M[ark F.] E[thridge]

1. Mr. Ethridge, on his return to the United States, informed President Truman that “the Arab-Israeli negotiations at Lausanne under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission are ‘deadlocked’ and that both Israeli and Arab representatives must adopt ‘entirely new approaches’ if a formal peace is to be reached.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1949, p. 780) The date of Mr. Ethridge’s interview with the President is not indicated in the Bulletin.
2. Not found attached.
3. Identified also as telegram 577, June 14, from Geneva, p. 1135.
4. This refers, presumably, to Mr. McGhee’s memorandum of April 22 and its several annexes, p. 934.