501.BB Palestine/3—2649: Telegram
The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
most immediate
134. Deptel 37, March 25. While Transjordan representatives in fact signed secret agreement, agreement does not have any validity until it is ratified by Prime Minister who is understood to have raised objections both as to form and substance of negotiations. (It is possible that Prime Minister may resign over agreement and will have to be replaced by another who would be willing to ratify it, probably Fellah Pasha Medadh.)
Abdullah feels strongly about manner in which agreement has been forced on him but realizes implications of failure to ratify. He is convinced, as are all Transjordan representatives participating in current negotiations, that if agreement is not ratified, Israelis will take action to force out Iraqis (which would also involve Legion again) and make by force territorial adjustments which would probably far exceed what they are endeavoring to extort from Abdullah through negotiation. Abdullah also feels that Israelis would succeed in such moves without any effective action being taken by UN, US or UK to stop them.
However, he approved postponement final action on agreement in hopes some way could be urgently devised to prevent Israel from forcing him into this agreement which he also knows will not improve his position, not only re other Arab States but also re his own people and Palestine Arabs. Hence his message to the President (Legtel 132, March 25).1
USG informed Israel that it felt latter should interpose no objections to Transjordan assuming responsibility for Iraqi area before question of secret agreement had arisen. Moreover, Israeli Foreign Minister gave formal assurances to President through Secretary of State that Israel has no intentions whatsoever commencing hostilities on Iraqi frontier. Now, however, USG seem prepared permit Israel force Transjordan into paying excessive price without compensation for privilege of taking over Iraqi areas, while at same time threatening that if price not paid, Israel will exact it anyway.
I fear that Israel has so many times been able to violate truce without consequences that King, if he should order ratification of agreement, [Page 873] would gain little comfort or support from substance last sentence Deptel 37.
If USG does not take strong line now to stop Israel’s constant, defiant and threatening attitude, I venture to suggest that before Palestine peace is concluded, Israel may well have its frontiers on the Jordan. If this does occur, I submit that it will be only because Israel found apathy and appeasement toward its defiant policy.
In view King’s message to President and above, would strongly urge Department reconsider its attitude as expressed in Deptel 37 prior to March 30. Failing this and in event agreement is finally ratified, would then recommend that Department authorize me to inform King, in addition to last sentence Deptel 37, that USG still stands firmly behind its policy enunciated by Jessup in UN on November 20.2
Sent Department repeated Baghdad 30, London 23, Beirut 27 for USDel PCC.