867N.00/1–1249
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State1
Subject: Palestine Developments
| Participants: | Acting Secretary—Mr. Lovett |
| Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel | |
| Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative before the United Nations | |
| NE—Mr. Rockwell |
After presenting Mr. Eban, Mr. Epstein opened the conversation by expressing the thanks of the Provisional Government of Israel for the efforts recently made by the United States Government to promote armistice negotiations between Israel and Egypt and to bring calm to the tense situation in Palestine.
Mr. Epstein then stated that the diplomatic and press campaign being carried on by the British against Israel and British military activities such as the sending of troops to Aqaba and the alerting of the British Mediterranean naval forces were direct and prejudicial British intervention in the Palestine dispute which he feared would have an unfavorable effect on the Israeli elections. Furthermore, Mr. Epstein had just been informed that day by Mr. Shertok that the Provisional Government of Israel had reliable intelligence to the effect that the British were urging the Egyptians to stall during the Rhodes negotiations unless they could obtain terms which would further British objectives in the Negev. Mr. Epstein said that the Provisional Government of Israel hoped that the United States would continue to exert its good influence and would urge the British to cease their attacks on Israel and their intervention in the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Mr. Eban said that he had been instructed by Tel Aviv to present a complaint against the British to the Security Council and to request a Security Council meeting on British “intervention” in Palestine. He had done the first but as yet had not done the second. He desired my advice as to whether it would not be advisable to attempt to obtain from the Security Council a resolution calling upon all governments and authorities concerned to take no action likely to extend the scope of the conflict. He said that the Israeli public was alarmed lest the British be about to send military forces into Palestine and that the Provisional Government of Israel thought that some kind of Security Council action might be helpful in averting this possibility.
[Page 646]At this point, I interrupted and read to Messrs. Epstein and Eban the news ticker account of my press conference that morning quoting my description of the efforts the United States Government had been making to prevent the extension of the scope of the conflict in Palestine and to encourage the parties to enter armistice negotiations, and of discussions between the United States and United Kingdom Governments on the general subject.
I then reviewed the course of United States action on this matter since the Israeli incursion across the Egyptian frontier. I said that in my opinion it had been unfortunate of the British to send aircraft over a battle zone. I said that it was equally unfortunate that the Israelis should have fired upon these planes. However, regardless of who was right and who was wrong in the question of the airplanes, the whole trouble had started when the Israelis crossed the Egyptian frontier. I said that after having been reassured by Mr. Shertok that all Israeli troops had been withdrawn from Egypt and after having informed the British in this sense, the United States Government had been embarrassed by the fact that Israeli forces had subsequently returned to Egypt.
I said that I would look into the question of the alleged British interference with the Egyptian participation in the armistice negotiations at Rhodes but that I simply did not believe that the reports which the Provisional Government of Israel had received on this matter were true. I also said that the Department had received no indication whatsoever that the British were planning aggressive action against Israel and that while of course the United States Government could give the Provisional Government of Israel no assurances in this regard, I thought that it was highly unlikely that the British had any such plans. Although the United States Government had advised the British against sending a force to Aqaba, I thought that they were doing so merely as a safeguard against possible Israeli action similar to that taken against Egypt. I pointed out that Great Britain had treaties with Transjordan and Egypt and said that the Provisional Government of Israel should remember that the British were extremely angry over what had recently happened. I said that I believed the British would take no action if the Israeli forces stayed where they were but that if the Israelis crossed any of the Arab frontiers, Israel would have to realize that it might be getting into a war which would be very different from that which they had been waging against the Arabs.
Mr. Epstein said that the Provisional Government of Israel of course realized this. He added that it would be extremely unfortunate if the Rhodes negotiations should break down, since we were rapidly approaching the point of diminishing returns in peace talks and the [Page 647] Provisional Government could not much longer tolerate the menace of Arab armies so near to Tel Aviv. I said that as I believed Clemenceau one said, there are things which are too important to entrust to the generals. At this particular moment, those who had struggled all their lives for the establishment of a Jewish state were called upon to exercise the highest degree of restraint and statesman ship. In this connection, and in response to Mr. Eban’s question, I believed that it would be unwise for Israel to aggravate the situation by requesting Security Council action. I said that Israel had made its point by tabling a complaint against Great Britain and that this seemed sufficient, particularly in view of the fact that it seemed hardly likely that the British were preparing to take military action against the Jewish state. I stated that it seemed to me that some good progress might be made in the Rhodes conversations if the situation in Palestine remained static, and I reiterated my conviction that the Israelis must not engage in any more aggressive action.
As Messrs. Epstein and Eban were leaving Mr. Epstein told me that the Export-Import Bank had passed favorably on a project loan to Israel and that the matter was now before the National Advisory Council. He asked me to put in a good word with the Council. I said that I hoped to be able to do so within the next day or two.
- Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.↩