501.BC Kashmir/12–1949: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

top secret

1452. Following is text of Indian position as revised in light of McNaughton’s conversation with Bajpai this afternoon.

Revised Pakistan position will follow tomorrow since conversation with Zafrullah terminated too late for copy to be made available to USUN.

“What follows is a brief statement of the attitude taken by the delegation of India in respect of the Kashmir question as understood by the President following the SC’s resolution of Saturday, 14[17] December, under which the President was authorized to consult with the parties and to report subsequently to the Council.1

1.
It is important that the necessary enlargement of the area of agreement take place as soon as possible, so that the necessary basis will be established for dealing with this question if possible before the end of 1949.
2.
The problems to be resolved may be dealt with seriatim under the headings: (a) Azad forces, (b) demilitarization, (c) the northern area. These problems relate basically to the establishment of conditions under which, in the language of Part III of the Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948, ‘the future status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.’
3.
So far as demilitarization is concerned, assuming that the disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces were included, the fullest regard would have to be had to reasonable security considerations.
4.
So far as the ‘Azad Kashmir forces’ are concerned, their disbandment and disarmament must be included in any program for progressive demilitarization.
5.
So far as the ‘northern area’ is concerned, India’s position is that India should have the right to garrison certain points for security reasons; i.e., as a protection against the activities of tribesmen from outside Jammu and Kashmir over whom Pakistan had originally maintained that she could exercise no effective control.
6.
Subject to the provisions of Paragraph 7 below, any future negotiations respecting a settlement of the Kashmir question which may need to be undertaken in the subcontinent should be carried on by a single individual.
7.
Such a representative of the UN, assuming that an agreement in principle may be reached on the basis of demilitarization, etc., should be given broad powers of mediation to enable the two parties to resolve any differences which might arise between them.

Such a UN representative should not have authority to arbitrate matters of military security.”

Austin
  1. For the discussion leading to the adoption on December 17 of a Norwegian proposal that the President of the Security Council (McNaughton) “should meet informally with the two parties and examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem”, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, No. 53, pp. 1–8.