840.20/1–649

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

top secret
Participants: Ambassador Tarchiani
Mr. J. D. Hickerson, EUR
Mr. T. C. Achilles, WE
Mr. W. C. Dowling, SE

The Italian Ambassador called this afternoon to leave with me the attached memorandum1 setting forth a request from the Italian Government to participate in the Atlantic Pact. Tarchiani said he was glad to present this request, adding that he realized some doubts had arisen as to Italy’s position but he hoped a second memorandum2 which he was giving me for the confidential information of the Department would explain the Italian Government’s attitude. In brief, he said, De Gasperi’s problem has been to obtain participation in the Atlantic Pact without disrupting his coalition government, and Saragat’s refusal to face realities has made this very difficult.

After reading through the two memoranda, I assured Tarchiani that we would give the Italian request immediate and careful consideration. I added that we might have some further questions to ask him after studying the request, but I wondered if he could tell me now Italy’s attitude toward joining the Brussels Pact. Tarchiani said he thought participation in the Atlantic Pact would mean participation in the Brussels Pact as well. The Italian Government would prefer, however, to join the Atlantic Pact first, as Italian public opinion looked upon it as something concrete, whereas the Brussels Pact was regarded thus far as only a good intention, added that Saragat was still hesitant about the Brussels Pact, but in reply to my question, said he thought there would be no difficulty if Italy entered the two Pacts simultaneously. Asked whether this meant that Saragat intended to remain in the government if Italy were to join the Atlantic Pact, Tarchiani said he felt quite sure that Saragat would do so, having now convinced himself that the Pact would contribute to the maintenance of peace as well as the security of Italy.

In this latter connection, Tarchiani referred to the necessity of increasing the efficiency of the Italian armed forces to ensure internal security as well as an initial defense of Italian frontiers in the event of aggression. When I remarked that Italy’s entry into the Atlantic Pact would not of course mean any change in the treaty military limitations, Tarchiani said he quite understood this, but that he felt an effective force could be built up within these limitations.

[Page 24]

In response to Mr. Achilles’ question as to whether it would be better from the Italian viewpoint for Italy to participate in the Atlantic Pact discussions or to receive an invitation to join after the Pact had been formulated, Tarchiani said emphatically that it would be preferable to participate in the discussions, and the sooner this could be arranged the better it would be. He pointed out that this course would show the Italian people that things were beginning to happen after the recent lengthy discussions, thus crystallizing Italian sentiment, and would also give them a sense of being a part of the Western effort.

As to the effect if Italy were not included in the Atlantic Pact, Tarchiani said that the Communists and left-wing Socialists would have a field day, and the best we could hope for was that political agitation would increase again, with consequent unrest and the loss of any hope of economic recovery and political stability in Italy.

John D. Hickerson
  1. See telegram No. 101, January 10, from Rome, p. 18.
  2. Not printed.