501.BB/9–1449: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1131. During course conversation other subjects separately reported with Romulo this afternoon, he raised question our attitude proposed [Page 184] China item (remytel 1106, September 12). I asked Romulo if he could give me fairly precise report conversation he had with Tsiang on this subject.
Romulo said Tsiang had called on him and said he had instructions to take up at first meeting General Committee question proposed violations Sino-Soviet treaty for addition to agenda. He was not sure of action before getting opinion USG and UKG. He wanted meanwhile to learn Romulo’s views as possible president of GA. In response question by Romulo, Tsiang indicated he did not feel free indicate views communicated to him by USG and UKG.
Romulo said he did not, of course, know what views his Government would be. He had observed that Vishinsky1 would simply read US White Paper. He had inquired of Tsiang whether Nationalist Government thinks Communists are capable of organizing government and sending representatives to UN, and whether their motive in proposing item for agenda was “to steal a march on Communists.” In reply my request for clarification, Romulo explained he had in mind in asking this question the idea that if Russians were found guilty of treaty violations, then those who had voted for such a finding could hardly vote for seating Communists in UN, thus Communists would be blocked from representation in UN. No indication nature Tsiang’s reply, if any.
On basis conversations with Hickerson and Jessup, I told Romulo we had had two or three conversations with Tsiang. I indicated nature of three objectives Tsiang first mentioned to us and this subsequent shift of position. Said matter, of course, complex, still under consideration in Department. Said I felt we probably not enthusiastic. Added we did not feel would be appropriate US attempt to discourage Tsiang, mentioning Marshall had told Chinese, Paris, last fall, decision one for Chinese Government to make. Indicated we thought last two objectives (non-recognition Communists and aid to Nationalist Government) could not be achieved by GA and we could not support. Said with regard first objective (Soviet violations treaty) degree and nature of US support would depend on nature of evidence Tsiang could present.
Romulo observed it would be very hard for Nationalist Government to erase impression left by White Paper. He would not like to see Nationalist Government by putting this item on agenda thereby give Russians handle for smearing Nationalist Government with White Paper.
Romulo concluded by observing he thought it would be great mistake to put item on agenda. He thought Tsiang should be discouraged and he intended to discourage Tsiang.
[Page 185]I made no comment.
At Ambassador’s luncheon for visiting Congressmen today, SyG Lie mentioned this item to Hickerson and me. Said he had learned within last day or two (later said from Victor Hoo) that USG was encouraging Tsiang. Hickerson made clear this was not case, but we not in position to discourage. Lie, quite emotional, expressed strong opposition putting item on agenda, said he had passed back to Tsiang they should deal with question if they felt it must be dealt with at all in general debate.
- Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly.↩