S/S–Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 30 Series
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
NSC 30
Policy on Atomic Warfare
The question raised by Secretary Royall,1 in Tab B, has never officially
come before the Department. Recently questions involving use of atomic
energy in a possible war with Russia, and particularly the problem of
targets, has been discussed informally with air force planners by Messrs.
Kennan, Bohlen and Thompson.2
Mr. Gullion has prepared a memorandum on this subject which contains his own
personal views (Tab A).
[Page 571]
[Annex A]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Policy on Atomic Warfare
Secretary Royall has circulated the following paper in which he proposes
that a study be undertaken to define the position of the United States
with respect to the initiation of atomic warfare in event of war. (Tab
B)
Mr. Gullion has commented as follows:
“So far as I know little thought has been given to this problem
in this Department. In the secret war-time agreements with the
U.K., the United States was bound to consult with the U.K. on
the use of an atomic weapon.3 In
the Modus Vivendi of January 7,
1948,4 this and all other
political provisions of the war-time accords were eliminated so
that we have a free hand. On the other hand, it is difficult to
conceive of a situation in which we might use the bomb in which
we were not in close contact with the British.
“It is also possible that if, as, and when the United States
participates in strategic planning with the Western European
countries, there may be some dispositions as to the use of the
bomb, disposition of stocks, raw material, etc.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“With respect to Secretary Royall’s Para. 2, we know of no opinion in
the Government which would warrant the Defense Establishment in
ceasing to plan on the use of the bomb. There may be sound reason
for deferring its use or using it initially as an anti-materiel
measure.
“With respect to the locus of authority for the decision to employ,
it is difficult to see where it could be other than with the
President, [National] Security Council and Joint Chiefs. Studies can
surely be undertaken to see that ways are cleared for prompt
decisions.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“Possibly the most important controlling factor would be the
stockpile situation of this country and its allies, and the types
and relative effectiveness of the various atomic weapons at our
disposal. In consideration of these matters the Atomic Energy
Commission, which is not directly represented on the Council, would
have as much a contribution to make as any Department.”
[Page 572]
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That the participation of the Atomic Energy Commission in any
further consideration be sought.
- 2.
- That Secretary Royall’s recommendation be approved.
[Annex B]
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army
(Royall) to the National Security
Council
top secret
[Washington,] 19 May 1948.
Subject: United States Policy on Atomic Warfare
- 1.
- I feel that the United States position with respect to employment
of atomic weapons, and our Governmental organization for expeditious
application of atomic warfare, require early and careful review in
the interest of national security.
- 2.
- It appears necessary, in order to insure a clear understanding on
the part of all agencies responsible for various aspects of United
States security, that a high level decision be taken as to the
intention of the United States to employ atomic weapons in event of
war. While the Department of the Army has been conducting its war
planning on the basis that atomic weapons would be used, I believe
there is some doubt that such employment is a firm United States
Government policy. I understand that in some quarters the
desirability of the United States initiating atomic warfare has been
questioned particularly on the grounds of morality. I recognize that
many considerations other than purely military must be taken into
account in arriving at a decision in this regard.
- 3.
- In addition to the basic question of engaging in or initiating
atomic warfare there arises a question of what agent or agency of
the Government shall be empowered to authorize actual employment.
Employment might be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their
own initiative, or the decision to authorize employment might be
reserved to the President or to some other agent of the Government.
It is important that this authority and responsibility be made
perfectly clear in order that there will be no delay in acting in
event the United States is subjected to sudden attack. Equally
important is a consideration of the time and circumstances under
which atomic weapons might be employed, and the type and character
of targets against which they might be used.
- 4.
- To develop further United States capacity for actual engagement in
atomic warfare, the National Military Establishment must organize
its relatively limited resources in order to gain maximum benefits
from
[Page 573]
its most powerful
single weapon. There are many factors involved in producing an
organization capable of immediate engagement in atomic warfare. Some
of these factors are:
-
a.
- The command structure.
-
b.
- Custody and control of atomic weapons (by Public Law
5855 a responsibility of the
Atomic Energy Commission until transferred to the Military
Establishment by the President).
-
c.
- Proper integration of atomic warfare plans into overall
war plans.
-
d.
- Existence, access to, and maintenance of bases (some of
which are in foreign nations) for launching atomic
attacks.
-
e.
- Proper allocation of industrial, manpower, and raw
material resources for the production of atomic
weapons.
-
f.
- Maintenance of sufficient, appropriate special units and
equipment within the Armed Forces.
- 5.
- In order to insure that the United States is in the best possible
position to make maximum use of its atomic advantages in the
interest of national security, it may be necessary to reorganize
certain Government agencies and to revise certain existing laws or
to enact new ones.
- 6.
- In order that the National Security Council may be in a position
to give careful consideration to this matter and to make appropriate
recommendations to the President, I recommend that the Council,
utilizing such agencies as it deems advisable, including the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, consider the following problem:
“The position of the United States with respect to the
initiation of atomic warfare in event of war, including a
consideration of the time and circumstances of employment,
and the type and character of targets against which it would
be employed; and further, the proper organization within the
National Military Establishment and within such other
executive agencies of the Government as may be involved, to
insure optimum exploitation by the United States of its
capabilities of waging atomic warfare.”
