740.00119 PW/5–145

Memorandum by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Memorandum for Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for the Far East

Subject: Summary of United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, April 19, 1945.53

The following comments and suggestions are made by the Military Government Section of the Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. These comments and suggestions concern the April 19th draft of the subject paper, except for part C. Economic, which is understood to have been revised by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the State Department. With respect to C. Economic, the one suggestion that is made is applicable to Draft No. 12–A, dated 24 April.

1. A.I.2. Change to read as follows:

“2. The stripping from the Japanese Empire of all territory except the four main islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, and such minor off-lying islands north of 30 degrees North Latitude as may be agreed upon by the United Nations.”

It is believed that this is a more concise and definite statement of U.S. policy. The disposition of territory taken from Japan is not and need not be covered here.

2. A.II. Change to read as follows:

“II. Unconditional Surrender or Total Defeat

As a consequence of unconditional surrender or total defeat the commander or commanders-in-chief of the occupying forces, acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan, will acquire supreme authority over the domestic and foreign affairs of the Japanese Empire. Simultaneously the constitutional powers of the Emperor shall be suspended. All instrumentalities which participate in the formulation or consideration of national policies shall be suspended, and their functions shall be assumed by military government.[”]

There will probably be no “United Nations Armed Forces”. Supreme power will vest, initially at least, in the Commander-in-Chief of the occupying forces—presumably an American. He will wield these powers in the interest of the United Nations. This is what is done in the case of Germany,—except that there is more than one Commander-in-Chief. “Commander or Commanders-in-Chief” is suggested [Page 537] to take care of a similar situation. For example, the Russians may occupy a part of the Empire and not be under the U.S. Commander-in-Chief. Supreme authority will not vest in the United Nations nor in any special number of them. It will vest in the responsible commander or commanders who actually take over. The commander or commanders will act on behalf of their own governments, and in the interest of the United Nations.

With respect to the suspension of “instrumentalities”, it is suggested that we cannot tell at this time how long they are to be suspended.

3. B. I. Suggest that the last paragraph be omitted. It is largely repetitious of the preceding paragraphs. It is ambiguous because it seems to deal with the Japanese during the “three periods” and during the “occupation”. In addition, it is questioned whether Japanese behavior is the only standard which ought to be used in determining what the treatment is to be.

4. B. II. Delete words “and inflexible” in the first paragraph. The use of the word “strict” seems sufficient. The time may well come when we will want “strict” but not “inflexible” enforcement of the terms imposed upon Japan.

5. B. III. 1. Suggest that the first clause be changed to read:

“Japan’s military and naval forces are to be disarmed and disbanded in such a manner as permanently to prevent their revival or reorganization;”

The idea that something more than current or temporary disarmament and demobilization is emphasized.

6. B. III. 2. Change to read:

“2. Character of Military Government

The measures of military government should be stern, but just.”

It is not necessary to say that they should be effective. Emphasis should be on “stern”.

7. B. III. 3. Change the last sentence to read as follows:

“Military government should in no circumstances allow persons to hold public office, or any other position of responsibility or influence in public or private enterprise, who have been flagrant exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. The administration of affairs in Japan should be directed toward the development of local responsibility.”

It is believed that the “flagrant exponents” should be barred from any position of significance in Japanese life, not only from public office. It is also believed that we should encourage the development of local responsibilitly. A somewhat de-centralized Japan will be less likely to cause trouble in the future.

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8. B. III. 4. (5). Change to read as follows:

The Educational System

Control shall be established over the educational system for the purpose of eliminating Japanese militarism and ultranationalism, including para-military training, and making possible the development of democratic ideas.”

The matter of whether schools are to be kept open for the purpose of maintaining peace and order is not a policy question. It should be left to those who prepare the military government directives and to the commander in the field.

9. B. III. 4. (7). Change to read as follows:

“(7) Japanese Leaders, War Criminals, and Other Dangerous Persons.

War criminals, and all persons who have [authorized, or] participated in planning or carrying out enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested, brought to trial and punished. Japanese leaders and other persons who have been flagrant exponents of militant nationalism and aggression and any other persons hostile, to the objectives of military government shall be arrested and interned.”

The sentence about war criminals is the same as the language in the short German paper54 and in IPCOG 1, the post-defeat directive on Germany.55 The second sentence is added because there is no provision in the present draft as to what should be done with the Japanese who are “flagrant exponents” but not necessarily war criminals. Certainly it should be U. S. policy not to permit these persons to remain at large, even if they go unpunished.

10 B. III. 4. (8). It is not clear whether this paragraph refers to identifiable or unidentifiable property. The latter is mentioned in part C. Economic. If unidentifiable property is meant, is there not an overlapping with the provision in part C. Economic which deals with reparations?

11. C. II. It is suggested that the following paragraph be added at the end of this section:

“In the institution and maintenance of economic controls, Japanese authorities will to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the Japanese people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and for any breakdowns in those controls will rest with themselves and their own authorities.”

This provision from the German short paper expresses a principle which is just as applicable to Japan as it is to Germany. The principle is believed to be a good one.

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Three additional copies of this memorandum are attached for possible use by members of the working group. Copies are also being furnished to Maj. Gen. Strong, Maj. Gen. Brooks and Lt. Col. Fahey.

L. S. Sabin
  1. For text circulated as SWNCC 150 by the Subcommittee on June 11, see p. 549.
  2. See section III, paragraph 5 of draft directive for the treatment of Germany, March 10, 1945, vol. iii, p. 434.
  3. April 26, 1945, ibid., p. 484.