740.00119 PW/1–1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs

Present: Major General George V. Strong
Rear Admiral Harold C. Train
Major General John B. Brooks
Brigadier General Frank S. Clark
Captain H. C. Pence, USN
Colonel E. F. C. Collier, USMC
Colonel B. M. Harloe
J. W. Ballantine
E. H. Dooman
G. H. Blakeslee
H. Borton

Place: New War Department Building

General Strong opened the meeting by presenting the criticisms of his group (presumably the Post-War Planning Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to PWC–284a—Japan: Terms of Surrender: Underlying Principles.34

1. Page one paragraph two.—General Strong stated that they objected to the phrase “they will not oppose any measures” because it is too limiting and that it should be expressed in a positive way. He suggested for same “to assist in the execution of any measures which may be directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces”.

It was pointed out in answer to this criticism that we had suggested the inclusion in the proclamation to be made by the Emperor of a phrase to the effect that the Japanese officials should remain at their posts until specifically relieved by the allied authorities and should obey and enforce all orders of the supreme commander.

2. General Strong pointed out that in the paper the term “theater commander” had been used and that the term “supreme allied high command” or a term such as “supreme allied [United States]34a high command” should be substituted.

3. Page four paragraph two.—Captain Pence noted that the term “on behalf of the United Nations” had been used in contrast to the phrase “in the interest of the United Nations”, the latter having been used in the German document. It was pointed out that the former phrase had been used advisedly as it was felt the other United Nations should assume more responsibility than was inferred by the phrase “in the interest of”. Admiral Train suggested that the phrase “in [Page 519] the interest of” be inserted in the document in brackets to show that an alternative expression was under consideration.

4. Far Eastern Allied Commission.—In reference to the procedure and objectives to be used in determining the policies concerning Japan’s surrender, as outlined on page five, paragraph two and page eleven, section nine, General Strong urged that a Far Eastern High Commission be set up with Great Britain, China and the United States as members, with provision for membership of the Soviet Union if it enters the war in the Pacific. He further stated that the establishment of such a commission had been approved by the Secretary of War35 and the Secretary of the Navy36 and such a suggestion had been submitted to the State Department. He expressed the views of his group when he stated that he hoped steps would be taken by the State Department to initiate the organization of such a commission. General Strong further suggested that the commission have its headquarters in Washington and that after it had reached agreement on topics, they be presented to the smaller United Nations for their consideration as is now being done in the European Advisory Commission.37 It was assumed that such a commission consider problems such as the terms of surrender. It was pointed out that it would be much easier to reach agreement among a smaller group of powers through a commission than through the exchange of documents between each of the nations concerned. General Strong concluded by saying that such a commission might be set up regardless of whether or not a security council was established and that it might simply be called a Far Eastern Advisory Commission if that seemed preferable.

5. Extent of Occupation.—General Strong raised objection to including in the paper a quotation such as that from PWC–110a38 which referred to questions which seemed to be operational in character and hence the responsibility of the theater commander.

It was pointed out that the Department had drafted PWC–110a in direct answer to the following questions from the Civil Affairs Divisions of the War and Navy Departments: “Will all of Japan be occupied?” “If so, what should be the manner of occupation?”39

6. Extent of Authority of Occupant.—General Strong raised objection to the first sentence in the fourth paragraph on page eight, and believed that the thought therein was not clear. It was agreed that this sentence should be expanded to clarify the concept that unconditional surrender would give the occupant more power than that [Page 520] possessed by a military occupant under international law. The thought was also to be included that if there was no unconditional surrender then the supreme allied commander could by proclamation state that he was assuming supreme authority.

7. Post-War Objectives.—General Strong and Admiral Train raised objection to the latter part of the second paragraph on page nine and suggested that all that was needed in the paragraph was the first sentence and that items two and three be deleted. General Strong stated that he believed the basic objectives of the United Nations were a) to defeat and disarm Japan and b) so to restrict Japan and its activities that it would never again become a menace to world peace or act as an aggressor in the Far East. To clarify this paragraph, Mr. Ballantine read from PWC–108b40 and emphasized that the points referred to should be considered in the light of our recommendation that Japan’s post-war position should be considered for three different periods and that the last two items in the paragraph would refer only to the last period. It was suggested that a statement of post-war objectives was not applicable to the question of the formulation of a surrender instrument and consequently might be disregarded in the drafting of such an instrument.

Similar objection was raised by General Strong to the third paragraph on page nine and for the same reason this was to be disregarded for the moment.

8. Value of German Experience.—In connection with the first paragraph on page ten, General Strong questioned whether the German experience would be of any help. He suggested that emphasis be placed on the phrase “where conditions are similar” to avoid the danger of following, regardless of conditions, the same policy for Germany and Japan.

9. Region Where Unconditional Surrender is Applicable.—General Strong noted that the second paragraph on page ten might be interpreted in such a way that the unconditional surrender instrument would be applicable only to the Japanese homeland. He stated that from their point of view if it is required that all Japanese forces surrender unconditionally, and there are those forces either in isolated parts of Japan or overseas which did not comply, then those forces would automatically become outlaws and the Geneva provisions concerning outlaws41 would be applicable. As this suggestion was in no way contrary to the thought in the paper, it was suggested that the paragraph be revised accordingly and that a statement be made to the effect that if forces refused to capitulate, the allied supreme commander should proclaim them as outlaws.

[Page 521]

10. Propaganda Value of Statements by United Nations.—General Strong stated that items under paragraph three on page ten concerned propaganda and were not applicable to a surrender instrument.

It was pointed out that this document contained many items such as this one which were not applicable in their entirety to a surrender instrument and should not be considered as such. It was agreed to emphasize that these items did not concern the surrender instrument specifically. Admiral Train requested that the word “vindictiveness” be omitted and that a statement be made that military government would be enforced in a stern and just manner.

11. Recommendations.—1) It was suggested that the phrase “to offer no opposition” be stated in the affirmative. Recommendation 3) The word “accept” should read “receive”. Recommendation 5) It was assumed that this recommendation would be consistent with the establishment of an Allied Advisory Commission. Recommendation 6) The word “assistance” was to be changed to “collaboration”. Recommendation 9) As previously stated items b and c were to be disregarded for the time being. Recommendation 10) The phrase “all Japanese forces” was to be inserted and reference was to be made to the fact that those who did not surrender would be outlaws.

  1. November 13, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, p. 1275.
  2. Brackets appear in the original.
  3. Henry L. Stimson.
  4. James V. Forrestal.
  5. For documentation on the European Advisory Commission, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
  6. Dated April 17, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, p. 1230.
  7. See memorandum prepared in the War and Navy Departments, February 18, 1944, ibid., p. 1190.
  8. Dated May 4, 1944, ibid., p. 1235; see also Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Washington, 1949), pp. 591–592.
  9. It is not clear to what provisions General Strong referred.