Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 Council/9–2445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winamt)

Washington, September 24, 1945—4 p.m.

8369. Secdel 108. From Clayton for Secretary of State. We have following comment to make on Austrian supply problem with reference to telegrams from General Clark conveying Allied Council recommendations and his personal views.

1. It is evident in this and other issues that the Russian view with respect to the economic treatment of Austria differs considerably from ours. If you judge it appropriate to raise this general question, we would explain our view on the treatment as follows. The Moscow Declaration of Nov 1, 1943 on Austria and the necessity of creating strong support in Austria for continued independence from Germany impels us to assimilate Austria to the status of a liberated country and to make a clear-cut distinction between treatment of Germany and treatment of Austria. Essential to this treatment is development of broad rehabilitation program which in turn involves (1) food supplies sufficient for a proper dietary standard in Austria, with all the occupying powers contributing a fair share to such supplies (2) supplies of raw materials and equipment, furnished either through UNRRA or directly by the occupying powers jointly, which will permit reactivation of the Austrian economy and enable Austria ultimately to do without external assistance, and (3) a restrictive application of claims by occupying powers to German property in Austria in such a way as to avoid removals of equipment essential to a sound Austrian economy and prevent a drain on essential Austrian resources by uncompensated transfers of the profits and products of German enterprises taken over by any of the occupying powers. In recent weeks Russian action under (1) and (3) has run counter to our view.

2. If you regard it as not useful to raise this general question, the alternatives appear: (a) to accept any real contribution to Austrian relief the Russians can be persuaded to make, even if it necessitates a somewhat disproportionate contribution by the other occupying powers, or a somewhat lower dietary standard for Austria as a whole than we regard as desirable, or both; or (b) to set up in our own zone, perhaps in conjunction with the British and the French zones, a separate economic unit. Since the latter course would delay the transfer of responsibility for internal administration to an Austrian Government, extend the period and degree of American military government commitment, and prejudice the eventual establishment of a unified, independent Austria, it is not advocated by us. It would be less disadvantageous for us to accept a disproportionate share of the relief burden for Austria as a whole than to attempt to operate Western Austria as a separate unit.

3. We agree with General Clark that present insistence on obtaining imports from prewar normal sources of supply is largely academic since apparently no overall surpluses available southeast and east Europe. In few cases such as Zecho sugar it may be possible to arrange for procurement in neighboring countries.

4. We consider that all occupying powers should make supply commitment along above lines for at least 6 to 12 months. We must point out, however, that as long as external supplies to Austria are confined to food, Austrian economy will have to remain on relief basis. Austria must be given means to procure raw materials and some capital equipment to reactivate industry so that it can produce for own needs and export enough to pay for essential imports. Suggest therefore Allied Council be asked immediately to invite UNRRA to send experts to Austria to survey requirements.

5. Foregoing has been informally discussed with CAD,¹⁵ War Dept. Their view is that we should insist strongly in Council of Foreign Ministers on (1) full Russian contribution to Austrian relief on basis of relief standards advocated by us, and (2) principle of reliance on normal pre-war supply sources. Consequently, War Dept. is not in accord with paras. 2 and 3 of this telegram. [Clayton.]

Acheson

15. Civil Affairs Division.