740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–2245: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:29 p.m.]
2887. For Matthews. Following are excerpts from minutes of a meeting between General Eisenhower and the Prime Minister on May 16 at London. Complete text follows by mail.77
Eisenhower asked concerning the possibility of the Allied Control Council for Germany being set up in the near future. He mentioned that the Council would serve as a clearing house for the settlement of many urgent problems and, even if the Russian representative had to refer everything to Moscow, the Council at least would provide a rapid means of communication with the Russian authorities.
Prime Minister said he did not think the Allies should assume full responsibility for Germany but should be responsible only for seeing that she never was in a position to start another war. German problems should be handled by Germans. He was not averse to making use of suitably qualified Germans to deal with and reorganize German internal problems. Some of the German Generals in our hands already, who were suitably qualified and whom the German people would obey, might be employed for this purpose. The Prime Minister felt that the control of Germany should remain a SHAEF responsibility until some other body was able to take it over.
Sir Alan Brooke78 agreed that for the time being SHAEF should continue to be responsible for the control of Germany.
Eisenhower mentioned that the Allied Commander’s authority did not extend to matters of detailed administration. Though the work of administration was now being coordinated at his headquarters the staff handling it was divided into US and British sections. Both the British and the Americans were prepared to set up the Control Council elements and to get them quickly working.
The Prime Minister referred to a memorandum from the Foreign Office pointing out that the proposals in SCAF 392 (my telegram 2675, May 16, 4 p.m.79) could not be adopted without consulting the French and the Russians.80 If it were wished to keep SHAEF in [Page 303] being then the declaration regarding the defeated Germany would have to be made by SHAEF on behalf of the Allied Governments. The Russians, if this were proposed, would be offered an opportunity of pressing for the immediate withdrawal of all forces to the zones of occupation agreed upon. It was considered better, under the circumstances, to leave the situation as it was. The Foreign Office memorandum pointed out that the need to establish some German government was becoming ever more apparent. The Prime Minister said he agreed that the setting up of the Control Council was of great importance and that the question should receive urgent consideration.
Other points from the interview included a statement by the Prime Minister [General Eisenhower] that he had issued instructions that rations for non-working prisoners of war should be immediately reduced to 2,000 calories. He would examine the matter further to ascertain whether further reduction was possible. With reference to enemy equipment, especially aircraft, the Prime Minister said he had been concerned to learn that it was our policy to destroy such equipment and he did not agree and he thought we should save all the enemy equipment we could as we might need it to equip the liberated nations. The Prime Minister thought it possible that we could transfer enemy plants and set up our own factories to maintain such equipment.
- Transmitted to the Department by the United States Political Adviser for Germany as an enclosure to despatch 404, May 23, 1945, not printed. This meeting also included the following members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee: Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Air Marshal Sir Douglas Evill, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, and General Sir Hastings Ismay (740.00119–Control (Germany)/5–2345).↩
- British Field Marshal, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.↩
- Not printed; SCAF was a military communications indicator.↩
- For a discussion of General Eisenhower’s proposal to prolong the existence of SHAEF, see Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 511.↩