Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United Nations, Volume I

RSC Lot 60–B 224, Box 99: UNCIO Cons Five Min, 18

Minutes of the Eighteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed Amendments, Held at San Francisco, June 8, 1945, 9:30 p.m.

San Francisco, June 8, 1945, 9:30 p.m.

[Informal Notes]

[Here follows list of names of participants, including members of delegations of the United States (15); United Kingdom (4); Soviet Union (3); China (3); and France (2).]

Ambassador Koo opened the meeting at 9:35 p.m., stating that Mr. Stettinius was unable to attend and had asked him to serve as Chairman. He added that the agenda for the meeting consisted of some questions that had been discussed at previous meetings. He asked Mr. Armstrong to make a statement on the question of the holding of a general conference to review the Chart, since he understood that some new developments had taken place in connection with this question.

Mr. Armstrong said that this matter had been under discussion in the Subcommittee meeting for most of the day.⁷¹ The Subcommittee by a vote of nine to six had adopted a provision for the calling of a special conference to review the Charter under Chapter XI, which specified that the conference must be held within a period of five to ten years. He added that in the morning our concession of a three fourths to a two-thirds vote in the calling of the conference had been accepted, but that shortly thereafter this other provision was written in for the mandatory calling of a special conference.

Mr. Dulles asked if definite language had been adopted. Mr. Armstrong explained that no specific text had been adopted, but that in principle it was agreed that a conference must be held within five to ten years. Ambassador Halifax said he understood the situation to be that the Subcommittee had voted by nine to six that there should be a conference within a period of five to ten years. He asked whether the two-thirds rule did not hold in the vote of the subcommittees. Mr. Armstrong replied that unfortunately the subcommittee was a packed committee. In addition to the five powers there were a majority of states that were critical of the sponsoring governments’ amendments, including Belgium, Costa Rica, and Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Armstrong added that Australia, Canada, and Ecuador support the proposition that, when the conference is called, it should be left freedom of choice to determine its own rules of procedure and that this freedom should extend to determining the methods of procedure for ratification. He indicated that this might very well have the effect of eliminating the provision for ratification of amendments by the permanent members. Mr. Armstrong stated that in this connection the Ecuadorian delegate had made the request that the issue of withdrawal be considered. It is apparent that a number of the Latin American countries have provisions in their constitutions which do not let amendments come into effect without ratification of the amendments by those countries. These countries, he said, are now concerned about the possibility of withdrawal. Mr. Armstrong added that withdrawal was raised in connection with the amendment process.

Ambassador Halifax asked if the governments mentioned by Mr. Armstrong were asking for a free right to determine the procedure of the conference to review the Charter and also the procedure of ratification. Mr. Armstrong and Colonel Capel Dunn indicated that this was the case. Senator Vandenberg asked whether the last proposal mentioned by Mr. Armstrong had been voted. Mr. Armstrong replied in the negative. Mr. Tomlinson noted that the Australians had proposed a variation of this proposal, that a three-fourths vote would be required at the conference to determine the rules of procedure and the method by which ratification would take effect. This was assumed to be a concession to us.

Ambassador Koo pointed out that apparently the committee had accepted our concession and then had proceeded to adopt a decision for the calling of a conference within five to ten years that would be allowed to fix its own rules of procedure and adopt the method by which the amendments would come into force. Colonel Capel Dunn pointed out that this last provision had not yet been taken.

Mr. Armstrong said that just before he had come to this meeting he had received a request to postpone tomorrow’s meeting of the Subcommittee.⁷² The Australians wanted to wait until Monday pending the question under discussion in Senator Connally’s Committee on the veto problem.⁷³ The Australians felt that a decision on this matter would affect the decision on amendments.

Mr. Armstrong said it was quite evident that the forces desirous of changing the veto provision were concentrating their efforts on the problems in his committee. He said they were making a very strong argument, and added that we had also made a strong argument. They had argued that they could not be asked to go into an organization in perpetuity that had all the disadvantages of a dictatorship of the Big Five. They said they would have to ask at least that they have an opportunity to review the Charter at a certain time. We argued that this provision would give the Organization a transitional aspect, and tend to make it a temporary organization. We said the proposal came at a bad time and would add to the uncertainty of the future of the Organization. We were willing to modify the method by which the special conference is called, but we do not feel we can go beyond that.

Senator Vandenberg wondered whether the earlier proposal we had made, that the calling of a conference be placed on the agenda of the Assembly after Mi years, would help the situation now. Mr. Armstrong thought that this position had now been overpassed and that this proposal by itself would not satisfy the other powers. Colonel Capel Dunn agreed with Mr. Armstrong’s statement.

Senator Vandenberg asked whether there was a roll call of the vote in the Subcommittee. Mr. Armstrong stated that the five permanent members and Norway had voted on one side and that the opposition included Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, Belgium, Canada, and Australia. He indicated that the most active members were Canada, Australia, Ecuador, and Mexico.

Ambassador Gromyko asked what impression had been caused by our proposal for a change from a three-fourths to a two-thirds vote in the calling of a general conference. Mr. Armstrong replied that this proposal had been well received and had been used as the basis for later arguments. We had claimed that it was better to leave the calling of the general conference to the discretion of a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly rather than to limit the Assembly and require that the calling of a conference shall be at a specific time or within a specific period of time.

Senator Vandenberg asked if the full committee had been surveyed to see how the members on that committee would stand. Mr. Armstrong replied that the situation on the full committee would probably be somewhat better than on the Subcommittee. He said Mr. Notter had made a survey of the situation and thought that we were just short of the votes we would need on the Committee.

Mr. Dulles said it was incredible that we could not block a two-thirds Vote on this matter. Mr. Armstrong replied that it was difficult to get a two-thirds vote for what we wanted. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the opposition in the Subcommittee would need a two-thirds vote of the whole committee. Mr. Armstrong agreed that they would need a two-thirds vote for approval of the Subcommittee report.

Ambassador Halifax said the situation was that we had made a proposal to change the vote from three-fourths to two-thirds and that that had not gotten us very far. Gratitude, he said, does not look back. The amendment for the calling of a conference within five to ten years had been carried in the Subcommittee. The attack now was focused on the method of the ratification of amendments. Also, a claim for the rights of withdrawal was being made. On these two questions we could expect keen debate.

Ambassador Halifax thought that if we were thinking of any priority in these claims, all our minds would be at one in the feeling that the desire to leave the future conference free to determine the procedure for the ratification of amendments, which would presumably lead to the omission of the provision for the concurrent votes of the permanent members, with [was] a more serious demand than the right of withdrawal. If indeed the opposition obtained what they wanted in the way of a modification of the amendment process, they would greatly weaken their own case for withdrawal. The question facing us, he said, was whether, if the difficulty continues to develop as it has been developing, we should trade the right of withdrawal in order to strengthen our position in opposition to giving the conference freedom of action to determine the ratification procedure on amendments coming from the Conference. If there was any force in his argument, he wondered if it would be possible to say: We, the sponsoring powers and France are bound to stand firm on the necessity for the concurring votes of the permanent members for the coming into force of amendments. We realize, however, the difficulty that this position evidently creates. Therefore, we should be prepared to consider the right of withdrawal in the event that an amendment is considered so unpalatable by a state as to change the Charter beyond what that state can accept. Senator Vandenberg stated that everything depended on the way this matter was done. He asked whether the states would be satisfied in the event that the withdrawal provision, associated with amendments, was identified in the committee report rather than in the Charter. Mr. Armstrong replied that possibly some of the Latin American states would accept this.

Senator Vandenberg stated that we had been proceeding on the theory that with no barrier to withdrawal in the Charter the right of withdrawal was left open. This interpretation would be stated in a committee report. If, however, the limited right of withdrawal in connection with amendments was written into the Charter, this would destroy the earlier theory of a general right of withdrawal. It would then only be possible to withdraw from the Organization under Chapter XI. This would remove the right of withdrawal of the permanent members, who, in any event, have to consent to amendments. This, he said, we could not do. It was possible, he said, to include at the end of the committee report a statement to the effect that the absence of any express right of withdrawal did not preclude the right of a member to withdraw if that member found an amendment impossible to accept. He said that the right of withdrawal could be written into the Charter only if it was a complete right. Ambassador Koo stated that under the suggestion offered by Senator Vandenberg there would then be no provision in the Charter for withdrawal and withdrawal would be treated on an ad hoc basis. Senator Vandenberg indicated that the agreement would be embodied in the committee report, and that his argument was that, if a partial right of withdrawal was agreed to in the Charter, the general right of withdrawal would then be destroyed.

Mr. Armstrong said he would like an appraisal of the situation from the Soviet viewpoint. Ho said he, Mr. Zarapkin, and Colonel Capel Dunn had made very strong statements in committee. He had taken the position that the adoption of a provision giving freedom of action to the Conference to decide its rules of procedure would make it difficult for us to ratify the Charter. Senator Vandenberg said it would be practically impossible for us to ratify the Charter with that provision in it.

Ambassador Gromyko said it was clear that some delegations wished to provide for the calling of a conference within a certain period of time and that it was obvious that these delegations considered the present Charter as temporary. They wanted to make the Organization temporary, and did not like to listen to logic. Acceptance of their proposal would in fact mean that the Charter was a temporary document, which is exactly what we are desirous of avoiding at any cost. They had also included a proposal that the next conference when convoked should adopt provisions which would exclude the necessity of unanimity in the adoption of amendments. If this proposal was accepted and included in the Charter, the document would look even more temporary. Ambassador Gromyko said the only thing that remains is to stand absolutely firm and try at all costs to convince the other delegations that it is not in the interests of maintaining international peace and security to accept these proposals. It is not in the interests of a stable charter which is necessary to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security. Only on such a stable document can we have a stable organization.

Ambassador Gromyko commented, with respect to the provision for the calling of a conference within ten years, that we had already made a concession on the calling of the conference by supporting a two-thirds vote. With respect to the adoption of amendments, he said we would have to stand on the position of the four-power amendment.

Ambassador Gromyko said he was not at all certain that the opposition would win on their proposals since to win they would have to have a two-thirds vote. If they failed to get such a vote, their proposal would not be accepted. Ambassador Gromyko thought that it would be possible to win the position he had stated, but he thought it would be well for the representatives on the committee to have the vote postponed so that the question could be considered here again.

Ambassador Gromyko said he would prefer not to make a concession at this immediate moment which would “worsen” the Charter. He thought that at the next meeting the five delegations should send proper representatives to make an explanation of our position and to convince the opposition. We should take the position that in the interests of all nations we are trying to achieve a stable peace, a stable organization on the basis of which we can work.

Ambassador Gromyko said with respect to the proposal on withdrawal that, as he had said at the last meeting,⁷⁴ the Soviet Government wished to make a proposal and was convinced that a provision would be necessary in the Charter. This provision should not be tied up with the question of the unanimity of the five powers but rather with the general question of amendments. Rather than draw attention to the fact that the five powers would have to agree to any amendment, the proposal should be tied to the general amendment process.

Ambassador Halifax said he was not presenting the argument he had made for use before the public, but was rather giving an indication of his own thought on the subject.

Ambassador Gromyko expressed belief in the value of a provision for withdrawal in the Charter. He thought that, if amendments were passed by the five permanent members and a majority of the other members of the Organization that were not acceptable to certain members of the Organization, it would be unreasonable and unfounded to keep such members in the Organization against their will. The Organization should be based on voluntary membership. To force members to stay in would result in the decay of the Organization from within. It would not strengthen but rather would weaken the Organization. Not to provide for voluntary withdrawal would mean keeping members forcibly in the Organization. Ambassador Gromyko stated that he had asked the views of the heads of the four delegations on this proposal at the last meeting.

Senator Vandenberg asked that he be permitted to read the specific language agreed upon without dissent in Subcommittee I/2/C on May 22. This statement would he included in the committee report.⁷⁵ Senator Vandenberg then read as follows:

“The Commission adopts the opinion of the inviting powers that the faculty of withdrawal of the members should neither be provided for nor regulated. Should the Organization, fulfill its functions in the spirit of the Charter, it would be inadmissible that its authority could be weakened by some members deserting the ideal which inspired them when they signed the Charter, or even mocked by aggressor or would-be aggressor states.

“It is obvious, however, that withdrawals or some other forms of dissolution of the Organization would become, inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the expense of law and justice. On account of this risk, inherent of all human enterprises, the Committee abstains from inserting in the Charter a formal clause forbidding withdrawals.”

Senator Vandenberg indicated that this statement had been agreed to in the committee up to this point. He wondered whether the committee would be satisfied if, to the above language, was added the following statement:

“The Committee is also of the opinion that the absence of any express right of withdrawal does not preclude the right of any member to withdraw if the Charter is changed by amendment in which that member has not concurred and which amendment that member finds it impossible to accept.”

Mr. Armstrong thought this, latter statement would satisfy a number of the Latin African states including Ecuador and Brazil. Colonel Capel Dunn thought Belgium also would be satisfied.

Mr. Armstong wondered whether it would be possible to get the right of amendment considered separately from the problem of withdrawal. He thought the two should be separated and then perhaps the opposition would be weakened.

Ambassador Halifax stated that so far as the British were concerned, if the Soviet, French, and Chinese Delegations agreed to accept the addition suggested by Senator Vandenberg, the British would accept it. If the five powers did agree on this, he said he would have thought that, with a united approach, the proposal to put through amendments without the concurrent votes of the permanent members could be defeated. He said he would bet we could get through this proposal if we were united on it. Ambassador Gromyko asked Senator Vandenberg to explain whether the proposal he had just read would be included in the report of the Subcommittee only or also in the report of the Committee to the Commission. He indicated that his proposal was to put the provision for withdrawal in the Charter. He said he would agree with our proposal if it was suggested to include in the report of the Subcommittee to the Committee and in the final report of the Committee to the Commission a proposal that a provision for withdrawal be included in the Charter. He said he would have difficulty, however, if it was intended to substitute a statement in the Committee report for a formal provision in the Charter.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that, if the other four delegations agreed, we should stop short of putting a provision for withdrawal in the Charter. The difficulty, he said, is this: We have been proceeding on the theory that a withdrawal provision would not be included in the Charter. We have provided that so long as the Charter was silent on the question, withdrawal was not foreclosed. Senator Vandenberg said it seemed to him that, if the provision for withdrawal in connection with the amendment process was written into the Charter, we would have robbed ourselves of the general position for withdrawal. He asked Mr. Dulles whether this interpretation was correct.

Mr. Dulles replied that he thought the view was correct, and that it represented the view of the American Delegation. According to a great body of international law, if a multilateral treaty is silent on the question of withdrawal, then the law implies the right of withdrawal under extraordinary circumstances. If the treaty deals at all with withdrawal a limited right would imply the disappearance of the general right. Therefore, if there were in the Charter an express right of withdrawal in connection with the amendment process, since there would be no implied right if the provision for withdrawal in connection with the amendment process was included, we would have to recognize the fact that the position of the permanent members would be less satisfactory than it would be under an implied general right of withdrawal, since there would be no opportunity for withdrawal for permanent members. Therefore it would be our position, that, if there was any withdrawal provision, it should be in a general form along the lines that any state might withdraw on one or two years notice. However, because we did not want to raise the whole matter of withdrawal, we were attempting to cover the question in the Committee report where it would attract less attention.

Ambassador Halifax asked if the difficulty was that, if the right of withdrawal was granted in connection with amendments, this would bestow on the non-permanent members a right which the permanent members did not have. Would this create political difficulties in the United States? Senator Vandenberg said he could speak only for himself, but that if this was the situation he would have to go into the Senate and say that there was no way for the United States to retire from the Organization except as an outlaw, regardless of how impossible the circumstances became. He thought this would be fatal deficiency. He asked Senator Connally for his views on this matter. Senator Connally said he agreed in part with Senator Vandenberg. The proposal would be a difficult one to define and explain. There would be resistance to the idea of joining an Organization if we could never extricate ourselves. Senator Connally said this was his personal reaction and that he was not speaking for the Delegation.

Ambassador Gromyko asked what the status was of the report on withdrawal which Senator Vandenberg had read. Senator Vandenberg replied that the full committee had adopted the position on withdrawal that he had read earlier,⁷⁶ and he was wondering whether the addition of the extra sentence he had proposed would satisfy those states looking for some relief. He pointed out that it was the opinion of some of the delegates serving on the Subcommittee that the matter could perhaps be settled satisfactorily in this way and that it would be better to include the statement on withdrawal in the report than in the text of the Charter. He felt there would be a fatal difficulty with the proposal to include in the Charter a provision on withdrawal limited to amendments.

Mr. Dejean said he was greatly impressed with the positions stated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. He thought the situation would be quite impossible if the general conference to review the Charter had the right to provide for the adoption of amendments without the vote of the permanent members. He added that he understood the pressure for the addition of a provision for withdrawal. He asked why there was reluctance to subscribe to a provision for withdrawal in the Charter if withdrawal was favored. Senator Vandenberg indicated that there was no real reason against a full and frank statement of the general right of withdrawal in the Charter. He said he was only expressing his personal point of view, but he did not think such a general provision would weaken the permanent character of the Organization. Our point was that we would not consent to a partial right of withdrawal spelled out in the Charter as this would destroy the general right.

Ambassador Koo stated that the immediate question was the line of tactics we should pursue the next day. Mr. Armstrong said that, on the request of the Australians that debate be adjourned until the results were known of the vote on the veto power, the meeting the next day had been postponed and debate would be adjourned until Monday. Senator Vandenberg said that we confronted two choices: either to add an additional sentence to the committee report along the lines he had read earlier or to write a general provision for withdrawal in the text of the Charter.

Ambassador Halifax asked if the League of Nations Covenant did not include a provision for withdrawal. Ambassador Halifax then read Article 1, paragraph 3: “Any member of the League may, after two years’ notice of its intention to do so, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.” This provision for flat withdrawal Dr. Koo pointed out was supplemented by the provision in Article 26 that “no such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.” Ambassador Koo noted that both voluntary and compulsory withdrawal were provided under the League Covenant.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that he had been presenting only his personal views, but that he did think he should say that the American Delegation recommended the addition to the committee report of the sentence he had read earlier and that the other comments he had made on other proposals were entirely personal. He said he did not wish to foreclose other statements by his colleagues.

Ambassador Koo indicated that, in view of what had been said regarding the difficulty that would be created with respect to the right of general withdrawal if the limited right was recognized, he thought the proposed sentence to be added to the committee report would probably meet the situation. He said this addition might give satisfaction since it would induce a feeling that a state could escape.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that it would be necessary to make plain at some time that the five powers cannot accept a provision for adoption of amendments that did not include the unanimity of the five powers. This, he said was absolutely out—period. Ambassador Halifax said he associated himself with this sentiment. Senator Vandenberg indicated that the position of the United States was that to add this sentence to the committee report was the least objectionable way of handling the problem.

Ambassador Halifax stated that he was attracted to this statement. He did not want to make withdrawal easy and he realized the force of what was argued here. On balance, he thought that, if the words suggested by Senator Vandenberg were added to the Committee report, we would have a platform on which we could stand without too much difficulty. He hoped that the Soviet Ambassador would feel that his essential point was reasonably met so that we could all stand together.

For a few moments the members of the delegations talked informally with one another.

Senator Vandenberg thought that to include the statement in the Committee report would avoid the possible suggestion that this was not a permanent institution. He thought we could get everything we wanted without including the provision in the Charter. Moreover, to include the statement in the report would not bring it so much to the fore; it would not be an invitation to withdraw, but just a safety valve.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that the question was so important that it was worth mentioning in the Charter. It was next in importance to the question of admission and expulsion. He added that, in the Soviet view, withdrawal and the amendment provision were linked. Mr. Armstrong said he did not wish to get the discussion off the subject, but he wanted to make it perfectly clear that the concessions we were talking about would not meet the principal attack by Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and also the Netherlands and a number of the South American countries who were bent on somehow getting around the permanent veto of the five members. He did not think that their argument could be met on this line. They would fight their position through the committee, through the commission, and on to the floor of the plenary session.

Ambassador Gromyko asked what would be the opinion of the heads of the delegations of any proposal not to tie withdrawal to the amendment process, but to include the provision in a general form; for example, including in the Charter the right to withdraw for one or another reason along the lines of the League of Nations provision. He said he was asking this question for clarification.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that he would have to present this matter to his Delegation, but that he could say the Delegation had already voted against a provision for withdrawal. He did feel that the only two alternatives were to do what Ambassador Gromyko had just suggested or to follow the procedure proposed by the United States Delegation. He asked whether Ambassador Gromyko preferred the general provision for withdrawal. Ambassador Gromyko replied that he preferred mention of withdrawal in the Charter and that he was only putting forward this other matter as a question. The Soviet proposal, he said, was to include withdrawal in the Charter in connection with the amendment process, but that, he added, he was ready to study this other proposal.

Mr. Dejean said it was his personal opinion only, but that he thought it was impossible to reserve for the major powers the right of withdrawal. This would be to reserve the right to destroy the Organization, since the withdrawal of one of the major powers from the Organization would end its life.

Ambassador Halifax suggested that to clear our minds, without taking final positions, he wondered which provision would be preferable to the Soviet Ambassador. If it was granted that provision on withdrawal should be included in the Charter—should it be a general right of withdrawal or a right limited to the amendment process? Ambassador Gromyko stated that his official proposal was that the right should be limited, and in connection with the amendment process. He said he had only put the question of the other possibility which might be studied.

Senator Vandenberg suggested that if this Organization reached the point where one major power would not “play ball”, then it was better to have a clear-cut divorce of that member from the Organization. A recalcitrant major power could destroy the entire Organization from within.

Ambassador Halifax indicated that we also should consider, if a major power reached the point where it wanted to withdraw, how we could prevent it from withdrawing.

Ambassador Koo stated that this had been a very interesting exploratory discussion, that the positions stated had not been final, and that he thought it was time to adjourn to think the problem over before another discussion was held.

Senator Vandenberg indicated that, in view of Ambassador Gromyko’s proposal to wait for 24 hours before further discussion in the Committee, he thought that another final meeting of this group should be held before Monday. Ambassador Koo suggested that we discuss not only the question of withdrawal, but also the other point under discussion in the Subcommittee.

After brief discussion on the recommendation of Mr. Armstrong it was agreed that the next meeting of the Big Five would be scheduled tentatively for Monday at 11:00 a.m.

Ambassador Koo adjourned the meeting at 11:10 p.m.

71. Minutes of fourth meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E, June 8, 10:30 a.m., and fifth meeting, 3:30 p.m., June 8, not printed.
72. The sixth meeting of Subcommittee I/2/E was held June 12, 8:30 p.m.
73. For a summary statement on the status of the work of Committee III/1 with respect to chapter VI, section C, see Doc. 897, III/1/42, June 10, UNCIO Documents, vol. 11, p. 430; for Australian statement on this subject, see ibid., p. 440.
74. See minutes of the sixteenth Five-Power meeting, June 6, 4:40 p.m., p. 1176.
75. Doc. 529, I/2/33, May 23 (UNCIO Documents, vol. 7, p. 86), and Doc. 606, I/2/43, May 26 (ibid., p. 120).
76. Doc. 538, I/2/34, May 24, UNCIO Documents., vol. 7, p. 95.