740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244

The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

My Dear Admiral Leahy: I enclose for consideration on an urgent basis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of an aide-mémoire67 left with the Under Secretary of State on July 12 by Sir Ronald Campbell.

On political grounds this Department is inclined to accept the plan thus proposed by the British provided it is made clear to both the Turks and to the Russians that the severance of relations between Turkey and Germany is regarded as only a first step towards active belligerency. As you are aware, the American, British and Soviet Governments agreed at Moscow and Tehran that Turkey should come into the war and there is no reason to suppose that, even though action by the Turks has been long delayed, the course agreed to then is less desirable now, taking into account its possible repercussions on the satellite Balkan countries. The Soviet Government urges strongly that Turkey should be pressed to come into the war without further delay.

The reference in paragraph six of the aide-mémoire to the effect that the British Government “would welcome an assurance that the United States Government will share equally with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom the burden of any financial and economic assistance (including the supply of military equipment) which it may be found necessary to give to Turkey” will be of special interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In this connection it should be understood that the Turkish Government has assured Ambassador Steinhardt that the quantity of arms the Turkish Army expects to receive is small. Ambassador Steinhardt estimates the initial quantity as possibly in the neighborhood of 100,000 tons of which the American share would be 50,000 tons or a few boatloads. A part of this quantity might come from the Lend-Lease munitions originally consigned to Turkey but held in Egypt last February. The United States Army is said to be now engaged in repossessing these munitions.

Aside from the political returns from Turkey’s severing immediately all relations with Germany as a step towards entering the war there are likely to be immediate military returns even from the severance of relations. These include:

(a)
Immediate high altitude flights over Turkey en route to Russia—an objective understood to be of considerable interest to the United States Army Air Forces.
(b)
Immediate expulsion from Turkey of some 2,000 Germans and [Page 883] other Axis agents, many of whom are engaged in espionage and other activities inimical to our cause.
(c)
Immediate creation of an attitude among Turkish officials which would result in their giving favorable consideration to a request to use Turkish airfields as bases for strategic bombing. On an earlier occasion General Arnold68 expressed interest in so using Turkish bases.
(d)
Immediate use of Turkish harbors in the course of naval operations.
(e)
Active cooperation by the Turks in furthering the Allied war effort.

As regards the American financial and economic assistance which might be involved, this Department assumes that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced on military grounds of the utility of the course proposed in the aide-mémoire, to the same extent that this Department recommends it on political grounds, the relatively insignificant sums, and certain personnel to handle Turkey’s agreed essential civilian requirements, would be supplied by the Foreign Economic Administration.

The Turkish Government has been waiting since July 3 for a reply to its proposal and further delay might lead the Turkish Government, as well as the Soviet Government, to question American-British good faith in requesting immediate severance of Turkish-German relations.

It is hoped that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be able to make its view available to me at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,

Cordell Hull
  1. Supra.
  2. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces.