740.00119 EAC/53

Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang)62

EAC (44) 2

Military Occupation of Germany

1.
The Commission has decided to begin its work by examining the group of questions relating to Germany indicated in paragraph 3 of its terms of reference, namely the elaboration of the terms of surrender to be imposed on Germany and of the machinery required to ensure the fulfilment of those terms.
2.
The Commission will therefore have to draft an instrument of surrender for submission to the three Governments. It will also have to advise on the constitution and functions of the various Allied or United Nations bodies, such, for example, as a Control Commission, required for enforcing the terms of surrender upon Germany.
3.
There is, however, one measure which is fundamental for this latter purpose, and is indeed the indispensable condition for the enforcement of the terms of surrender upon Germany, namely military occupation.
4.
The Commission will recall that the question of the military occupation of Germany appears in the item about Germany which was [Page 140] placed on the agenda of the Moscow Conference (Item No. 7) by the United Kingdom Government, (see Section 3 of E.A.C. (P)43/2 of the 20th December 1943) and was subsequently referred by the Conference to the European Advisory Commission for detailed study.
5.
In the paper on Germany circulated at the Moscow Conference by the United States Delegation it was recommended that, for the purpose of securing the execution of surrender terms and ensuring the creation of conditions for a permanent system of security, the occupation of Germany should be effected by contingents of British, Soviet and American forces. During the discussion of this question at the Conference at its 7th meeting on October 25th,63 Mr. Eden64 said that he agreed generally with the American proposal. He suggested that the scheme might be worked out by experts chosen from the members of the London Commission. According to the records of the Conference prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation, M. Molotov65 and Mr. Hull66 agreed to this.
6.
The annexed memorandum on the military occupation of Germany is circulated by the United Kingdom Representative as a contribution to the discussion of this question by the Commission.
7.
It should be understood that the boundaries of the zones of occupation of the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet forces suggested in Part IV of the annexed memorandum and shown in the map are put forward tentatively and may have to be reviewed in the light of any examination of this question by the military staffs. The United Kingdom Government should not be regarded as being committed to them.
W[illiam] S[trang]
[Annex]

Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation to the European Advisory Commission

the military occupation of germany

Part I

Assumptions and Definitions

1. Throughout the present memorandum the following assumptions have been made:—

(a)
That the war against Japan will continue for some time after the defeat of Germany.
(b)
That, although widespread rioting and disorder are to be expected in Germany after her defeat, and although Ministers and high officials must be presumed to have fled or to have been removed, yet there will exist, at any rate for some considerable time, some kind of central administration (although not necessarily a central government) as well as local authorities, both civil and military, with whom it is possible to deal.
(c)
That the bulk of the troops needed for the occupation of Germany will be provided, at any rate for a considerable time, by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, preferably in substantially equal shares.
(d)
That other Allied States whose territory borders on Germany will wish to participate in the task of occupation as soon as they are in a position to do so, beginning by sending token contingents, and later making a more substantial contribution.
(e)
That Austria will not form part of Germany after the war.
(f)
That East Prussia and Danzig, and possibly other areas, will ultimately be given to Poland.
(g)
That it will be the policy to confine Germany elsewhere within frontiers no wider than those which obtained in 1937.
(h)
That, if a “Zoning” plan is agreed on as the basis of the allied occupation of Germany, the boundaries of the zones will have been agreed on before hostilities cease, and will consequently not depend on the positions which the forces of the three principal allies respectively may have reached before the fighting stops.

2. Throughout the present memorandum the following phrases have been used in the senses set opposite to them respectively:—

“Total Military Occupation” The right to move forces into any part of Germany. (N.B. This does not imply that there would be Allied troops in every part of the country at all times.)
“Partial Military Occupation” The right to move forces into certain specified areas only.

Part II

The Case For and Against Total Occupation

3. The object of this part of the memorandum is to set out the arguments for and against total occupation, and to arrive at a conclusion whether this is necessary or not. The memorandum also considers the extent to which air forces could replace land forces in carrying out the military occupation of Germany, and the degree to which it will be necessary to employ land forces, notwithstanding the development of Air Power since 1918.

United Nations Objectives.

4. When hostilities against Germany cease, the objectives of the United Nations should be:—

(a)
to prevent or, at least, minimise disorder in Germany;
(b)
ensure the rapid and total disarmament of Germany and the break-up of the German military machine;
(c)
to complete the destruction of the Nazi Organisation;
(d)
to bring home to every German the realisation that Germany has suffered complete military defeat;
(e)
to ensure that tolerable living conditions for the German people are restored, in order to promote objective (a).

Arguments in favour of Total Occupation.

5. These five objectives are considered below in relation to the question how far total military occupation of Germany will help towards their attainment:—

(a) and (e) Prevention of Disorder and Restoration of Tolerable Living Conditions.

Order must be maintained. Without an orderly Germany, there cannot be an orderly Europe. Without order in Germany tolerable living conditions for the German people cannot be brought about.

Immediately after the last war, it was found that the ordinary German police were inadequate to deal with various disorders and, in the absence of an Allied army occupying more than a small fraction of the country, voluntary bodies composed of the “toughest” ex-soldiers were called upon by the German Government to maintain order. They defended the frontiers in the East, and suppressed disturbances at home, thereby regaining some of the prestige which the army had lost through defeat in war.

Moreover, in the early days, before the new Reichswehr67 was constituted, Germany was able to build up considerable local paramilitary forces such as the various “Wehrverbände” which were ostensibly formed for purposes of local self-defence. Thus, the German General Staff were able to begin the reconstruction of the German military machine.

After the present war the prospects of riot and disorder in Germany will be greater than in 1918, and it is reasonable to suppose that similar problems will arise but in a more acute form. This time, however, no German armed forces will be available to restore order since complete disarmament of all German military and para-military forces will be necessary. Accordingly, responsibility for the suppression of disorder will rest on the forces of the United Nations alone and unaided: total allied occupation of the country is, therefore, essential.

(b) Disarmament.

The effective and rapid disarmament of Germany must depend on the efficient working of the Control Commission. The Reports of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which operated in Germany from 1920 onwards show how their tasks were made more difficult [Page 143] by the lack of military force behind them. There were many evasions and much obstruction, and these led to delays and difficulties in enforcing the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.68 In the result, many concessions had eventually to be made. These conditions should not be tolerated again; and it seems clear that only the presence of adequate armed forces distributed throughout Germany and the will to use them firmly when necessary, will suffice to ensure speedy and complete disarmament.

It is of the utmost importance that effective disarmament should be carried through with the least possible delay since, until this has been done, it will be impossible to begin working for the reconstruction of Germany as a reasonable and pacific member of the comity of nations.

(c) Destruction of the Nazi Machine.

The essential pre-requisite for the abolition of the Nazi system is the conviction in the minds of all Germans that this system has failed in the military field as elsewhere, and there can be little doubt but that the most effective means of bringing this failure home to the minds of the ordinary German will be a foreign military occupation of his country.

(d) Realisation of Defeat.

After the last war, the visible signs of military defeat were not apparent to the German people except in one small area in the west. This fact made it easy for the German military class to develop the legend of the “stab in the back,” and many people were genuinely brought to believe that the German army had never been beaten in the field. It is most important that this time no room should be left for the legend of German military invincibility, and that the military “caste” should be discredited in the eyes of every German.

Only total military occupation on a substantial scale can achieve this end. Such occupation, however, had best not be prolonged beyond the period needed to achieve complete disarmament, since this might check any possible development towards a healthy and pacific German State, or even encourage a swing back towards militarism and the preparation of a war of revenge.

6. There are two further considerations which suggest that total military occupation of Germany by the United Nations is desirable:—

(i)
Once the smaller nations of Europe are freed from the fear of Germany, they will become less amenable to pressure from the Great Powers, and they will almost inevitably march in to fill any vacuum not already filled by military forces.
(ii)
Frontier adjustments will have to be carried out, e.g., East Prussia and Austria. In some cases, large-scale transfers of population [Page 144] may also be necessary. Although mere frontier adjustments might well be carried through by Commissions working with the ultimate sanction of forces in the background, large-scale transfers of population will be impossible unless substantial military forces are present.

Arguments against Total Occupation.

7. The chief argument which is likely to be advanced against total occupation and in support of a policy of partial occupation is that of economy. Such a partial occupation, it may be urged, would be less costly in material, and in men. It can hardly be doubted that, within a very few months of a German collapse, there will be a strong demand for the release of troops, both for the war in the Far East and to provide for the release of man-power to industry. Clearly, the smaller the army of occupation in Germany, the easier it will be to meet these other demands. Moreover, conditions have changed a great deal since 1918. Vast strides have been made in the development of air power, and the mobility of land forces has also very greatly increased. The striking power of weapons is also far greater than it was twenty years ago. It may, therefore, be argued that once Germany is thoroughly disarmed the control of a few air bases might be sufficient to ensure effective Allied control of the country.

8. Another argument which it is possible to raise against total occupation, at any rate for more than a short time, is that, whilst it is important to bring home to every German that the “Wehrmacht”69 has been utterly defeated, it would be a political error to prolong the humiliation of Germany unduly, with the risk of driving the whole German people into the Nationalist camp. In support of this argument it may be urged that the sense of injustice created in the minds of the younger generation of Germans by the Ruhr occupation of 1923 was one of the main causes of the swing of German opinion from the social democratic to the Nazi camp. It may also be argued that psychological factors of this kind were at least as important as the economic and general policy of the Allies in undermining the authority of the Liberal elements of the Weimar Republic, and preventing a cooperative German Government from striking firm roots.

The Alternative to Total Occupation.

9. The alternative to total occupation would be to exclude certain areas from the scope of the occupation. These would inevitably become breeding grounds for subversive activities, or even deliberately fomented disorders, which would, as happened after 1918, lead to a demand by the German Government for permission to maintain military forces for the preservation of order. Underground military activities are traditional in a defeated Germany, and total occupation [Page 145] constitutes the only means by which these activities can be effectively countered.

Moreover, should disorders break out in an unoccupied area, our lines of communication leading through that area would inevitably become imperilled, and any stoppage of traffic might seriously prejudice the security of some part of the Allied forces. Finally, if we were to begin by partial occupation, it might be difficult to pass on to total occupation at a later stage if this should prove to be necessary. It would be very much easier to begin with total occupation and then to modify the system if this should prove practicable. Thus, total occupation at the beginning may very well prove the more economical course in the long run.

Conclusion on Total or Partial Occupation.

10. On balance, the conclusion reached is that the only satisfactory solution of the problem, at any rate in the earlier stages, is total occupation.

Stages of Occupation.

11. The stages by which the military occupation and control of Germany shall proceed will now be considered. This occupation falls naturally into four stages:—

(a) Stage 1. (The immediate aftermath of hostilities.)

At the moment when fighting ceases, the Allies will probably have in or near Germany very large land forces, a large proportion of which will be available, at any rate for a short period, for occupation duties. Indeed, for administrative reasons alone, it might not be possible to remove any substantial proportion of the troops involved immediately after the “cease fire,” even if this were desired.

During this stage, therefore, total occupation presents no grave manpower difficulties.

(b) Stage 2. (The first stage of disarmament.)

This stage covers the period between the date on which the work of disarmament begins and the time when, although disarmament and the destruction of war industries are not complete, yet such substantial progress has been made that Germany has been deprived of the capacity for any effective military action. Towards the end of this period, as conditions settle down, and when the disarmament and demobilisation of German forces are nearing completion, it may, perhaps, be possible to reduce the strength of the occupying army, though forces should still be stationed at the more important centres throughout the country.

It is estimated that, if proper steps are taken, the first two stages might be completed within some two years.

(c) Stage 3. (The period during which the disarmament of Germany and the destruction of her armament industry will be completed.)

During this stage air forces could probably be used to an increasing extent to reduce the number of land forces needed to support the authority of the Control Commission.

[Page 146]

(d) Stage 4. (An indefinite period running from the moment when Germany has been totally disarmed until the time when the new German Government has become sufficiently established and the Allied Powers are convinced that its peaceful intentions are such as to render it possible to withdraw entirely the forces of occupation.)

When the disarming of Germany and the destruction of her armament industries are complete, and the problem has become one of ensuring that the work accomplished by the Control Commission is not undone by renewed attempts to create a war potential, it might be possible to provide the necessary backing for the Control Commission by the use of air forces alone, operating either from bases in Germany or, perhaps, from bases in neighbouring United Nations territory, including the United Kingdom. In any case, it may be hoped that during this last stage the number of land forces required would be small.

During the last two stages the speed with and the extent to which it will be possible to reduce the size of the forces of occupation must largely depend on the progress made in the political re-education of Germany. Only when it becomes clear that the spirits of militarism and revenge are dead, and that a sincere desire for peaceful co-operation exists, will it be wise to abandon all methods of control and, notably, some form of occupation.

Use of Air Forces.

12. The question how far air forces could replace land forces in achieving the necessary degree of control has been carefully considered. During the earlier stages a state of disorder is likely to exist which, coupled with the existence of large German forces to be disarmed and controlled, will make it essential for substantial Allied land forces to be present. No doubt air forces will be able to give great help, and their presence will make it possible effectively to occupy Germany with far fewer land forces than would otherwise be the case, but during this period control by air forces alone would almost certainly not be a completely effective substitute.

It is to be noted that considerable moral effect could be produced during this period by periodical mass formation flights of Allied aircraft over the territory. Such flights would serve to impress upon the population the fact that the German Air Force no less than the German Army has been defeated.

Use of Naval Forces.

13. Just as occupation by land forces will bring home to the Germans the defeat of their army, and flights by Allied air forces will make clear the failure of their Air Force, so also steps should be taken, at least during the earlier period of occupation, to demonstrate the failure of the German navy and of the U-boat campaign.

[Page 147]

This could probably best be done by basing a small number of Allied warships and shore-based personnel at certain major German ports from which frequent visits should be made to the remainder.

conclusions on part ii

14. The conclusions of the memorandum on the question of total versus partial occupation may therefore be summarised as follows:—

(a)
Total occupation of Germany is essential if Germany is to be effectively disarmed and her military spirit broken.
(b)
At first the occupying forces should be as much in evidence as possible so as to bring home to the German public the fact that their armed forces have been utterly defeated. After this object has been achieved and Germany has been disarmed the occupation should be adjusted so as to give Germany a chance of developing along peaceful lines, and so that the continued presence of foreign troops may not be used by German militarists as an argument in favour of planning a war of revenge.
At the same time, we must continue ready at any moment to use force without hesitation at the first sign of any recrudescence of military activity.
(c)
A strong air striking force will be essential at all stages, but control by air forces alone would not be an effective substitute for occupation by land forces under conditions in which internal disorder is the main problem to be faced. Such conditions are likely to obtain during the earlier stages of occupation.
(d)
When the disarming of Germany and the destruction of her armament industries are complete and when internal conditions are more stable, the problem will become one of ensuring that the work accomplished by the Control Commission is not undone by renewed attempts to create a war potential. It may at that stage be possible to provide the necessary sanction by the maintenance of a strong air striking force. In these circumstances the number of land forces required would be small.

Part III

Mixed Allied Forces or Occupation by Zones

The Two Possible Methods.

15. It would be theoretically possible to organise the occupation of Germany on either of two bases. On the one hand, all the troops involved, from whichever of the United Nations they came, could be “mixed up” in small units alongside each other, each district of Germany being occupied by a polyglot force consisting of soldiers of all, or substantially all, the United Nations. On the other hand, Germany might be divided into a number of zones in the occupation of each of which one or other of the Allied Powers would be predominant, although contingents of the forces of the other United Nations might be present in each case.

[Page 148]

The Arguments for Mixed Allied Forces.

16. The main advantages which would appear to result from “mixing” the Allied troops together are:—

(a)
that the entire military occupation would be visibly carried out by the United Nations as a body rather than by any one State;
(b)
that a single policy would presumably be applied throughout the whole of the occupied area;
(c)
that the close liaison which would be necessary at all levels between all ranks of the Allied Forces concerned might be expected to favour the development of habits of co-operation between them, and it might be hoped that these habits once formed might bring about a greater mutual understanding leading to a more confident political co-operation between the peoples concerned;
(d)
the removal of fears of the creation of national “Spheres of Influence.”

The Arguments against Mixed Allied Forces.

17. Against these arguments in favour of “mixing” the Allied Forces, it is necessary to take account of the following disadvantages:—

(a)
Complicated problems of command and liaison would inevitably arise, and considerable friction could hardly be avoided.
(b)
The difficulty of administering and maintaining troops from their home bases would be greatly accentuated, more especially as the weapons, munitions and supplies of the forces concerned, generally differ.
(c)
“Mixed” forces would be less efficient in dealing with any large-scale disturbances. The suppression of such disturbances is in the nature of an operation of war, and cohesion in formations, at any rate up to a certain size, is essential if forces are not to be wastefully employed. For example, it is evident that three battalions found from the armies of different nations, differently armed, equipped, disciplined and administered, do not make a brigade even if they are provided with a joint staff and ancillary services.
(d)
The existence of “mixed” staffs at any but the highest level could hardly fail to lead to trouble and confusion. Not only would the Staff Officers concerned have been trained according to widely different systems, but it would be optimistic to hope that sufficient officers could be found with the necessary linguistic qualifications and knowledge of national characteristics to prevent the lack of these becoming a major obstacle to effective collaboration.
(e)
The “mixing” of forces would inevitably greatly increase the danger of disorder and quarrelling breaking out between the troops of the different nations; the difference in rates of pay alone would be enough to cause discontent and envy. The resulting mutual ill-feeling between Allies, and the disturbances which would probably result, could not fail to supply first-class material for enemy propaganda, quite apart from the serious effect on the prospects of long-term internation co-operation.
(f)
The decreased efficiency of the occupying forces which, for the reasons set out above, might be expected to result from a policy of “mixing” would entail an increase in the total numbers of the forces of occupation.

[Page 149]

Conclusions in Favour of Occupation by Zones.

18. The occupation and control of Germany by the United Nations in the years immediately following the end of hostilities in Europe will, under the best possible conditions, present formidable problems, requiring for their solution very great goodwill, skill and tact on all sides. It would be a mistake to augment these difficulties by “mixing” the troops of the different Allied nations. In 1918, when British, French and Belgian troops had been fighting side by side for more than four years, it was found necessary to organise the occupation of the Rhineland on a basis of separate national zones.

After Waterloo (June 1815) about two-thirds of France was occupied in force by troops of the four principal Powers, the United Kingdom, Prussia, Austria and Russia, assisted by contingents furnished by the smaller Powers. Administrative difficulties and protests by the French Government against abuses and disorders almost immediately led to the adoption of a system of zoning similar in principle to that referred to in this paper.

19. The better part of the advantages which it might be hoped to achieve by a policy of “mixing” could be better and more surely attained under a policy of “zoning” by:—

(a)
control by a United Nations High Commission at the top designed to bring the military policy, actions and behaviour of the contingents of the constituent armies into line:
(b)
the fostering of a spirit of “host” and “guest” between the forces of the predominant nation in each zone and the smaller self-contained Allied contingents stationed there. Experience has shown that this kind of sentiment can most easily be engendered where one party is in a heavy majority.

20. It has been suggested that the division of Germany into zones for the purposes of military occupation might give rise to political difficulties and that it might make difficult the adoption of a common policy towards Germany as a whole. The force of this argument is more apparent than real: subject to the overriding control of the High Commission, the attitude adopted towards the German population will inevitably differ from place to place according to the nationality of the senior allied officer in the area.

The main functions of the forces of occupation will be to preserve law and order, to prevent hostile action and to provide the necessary force to ensure compliance with the orders originating from the Allied Control Commission. Provided these tasks are satisfactorily accomplished, we shall have every reason to be satisfied, whether the methods adopted in different areas to secure, the same results are similar or not.

21. There is one further consideration which may be relevant in deciding whether or not to divide Germany into zones for the purposes of occupation. It is possible that, as occurred after the last war, the [Page 150] defeat of Germany may be the signal for the re-emergence of separatist movements in that country. Whether the United Nations decide forcibly to split Germany up into smaller States, or whether spontaneous movements towards particularism or separatism are merely encouraged by the Allies, there must be an advantage in dividing the country for purposes of occupation into areas whose boundaries approximate to the lines on which such tendencies towards division may be expected to develop.

conclusions on part iii

22. Taking into account all the arguments set out above, the following conclusions have been reached:—

(a)
The Allied forces of occupation should be disposed in three main zones.
(b)
In each zone forces of one of the three Powers (United Kingdom, United States or Soviet Union) should predominate. Each zone should, however, contain contingents from the forces of the other two Powers and of the smaller Powers interested, so that the principle of military occupation by the United Nations may be maintained.
(c)
The boundaries between the zones should, so far as possible, be drawn so as to encourage rather than to prejudice any separatist or particularist tendencies which may develop in Germany after her defeat.

Part IV

Zone Boundaries

Scope of Part IV.

23. On the assumption that, as recommended in Part III above, it is decided that the Allied forces of occupation in Germany should be disposed in three main Zones, it is proposed in this part of the memorandum to consider how these Zones should be delimited.

proposed zones of occupation

Considerations affecting the determination of Zone boundaries.

24. In delimiting the three Zones it is clearly desirable to have regard to the following considerations:—

(a)
That the boundaries between the Zones should, so far as possible, be drawn so as to encourage rather than to prejudice any separatist or particularist tendencies which may develop in Germany after her defeat.
(b)
That the lines of communication and supply to the occupying troops from their home bases should be as convenient as possible.
(c)
That the three Zones should be approximately comparable in size and population.
(d)
That the boundaries between the Zones should, so far as possible, be co-terminous with Military and Civil administrative boundaries in Germany.

[Page 151]

Geographical arrangement of the Zones.

25. The arrangement by which the main Soviet Forces would occupy Eastern Germany, the main British Forces North-West Germany, and the main American Forces South Germany would, on balance, provide the most convenient lines of communication and supply, and there do not appear to be any countervailing factors to justify another solution. Our proposals are, therefore, based on this main sub-division of the area to be occupied.

Boundaries between the Zones.

26. It is not possible to foresee what spontaneous movements (if any) may emerge in Germany tending towards a division of the Reich into separate States or towards a system of regional autonomy. Any such movements will, however, almost certainly be based on the revival of old loyalties to States or Provinces within certain natural internal boundaries dictated by geography, history and economic considerations. An example of an autonomous State which might possibly emerge is afforded by the South German Region south of the Main.

An anti-Prussian bias may well develop in certain areas, and there are strong grounds for weakening the present preponderance of Prussia.

27. The division of Germany into Zones for the purpose of occupation may not, in itself, encourage the development of separatism or particuralism. At the same time, if the boundaries between the Zones were so arranged as to cut across the natural lines of cleavage this could hardly fail to act as a check on spontaneous tendencies towards such developments. Accordingly, as far as possible, the Zone boundaries should be so drawn as not to divide areas in which local autonomous movements are likely to take place.

28. Taking all these considerations into account it is suggested that the most satisfactory Zone boundaries will be those delineated on the attached map, although, for reasons connected with operations and communications, there may be some delay in establishing the Southern Boundary of the British Zone so far South. These boundaries are drawn, as far as possible, in such a way as to follow the former boundaries of German States or Provinces. An exception to the general rule is that Prussia has been divided between two Zones. This has been done intentionally, since the undue preponderance of Prussia in the past has been one of the chief causes of the growth of the aggressive spirit in Germany, and we feel that the division of this State into two halves during the period of occupation is likely to discourage the rebirth of the Prussian military spirit.

[Page 152]

In drawing the Zone boundaries shown on the attached map70 it has been found necessary to cut across the boundaries of certain Wehrkreise (military districts) but, with one exception, the boundaries coincide with those of the administrative areas known as Gaue into which Germany has been divided for certain administrative purposes during the period of the Nazi Régime. We consider that the relatively minor and temporary disadvantages which may result from the discrepancy between the Zone boundaries and the Wehrkreis boundaries are outweighed by the advantages of making the Zone boundaries coincide with the old State or Provincial frontiers.

Size of Zones.

29. The Areas and populations of the three Zones proposed are as follows:—

Area, square miles. Population, millions.
Zone I (North-West Germany)—Mainly British 57,450 22.5
Zone II (Eastern)—Mainly Soviet 76,600 22.3
Zone III (Southern)—Mainly United States 47,100 15.7

These population figures are approximate only, being based on the figures of the census of 1933. The present population figures are not precisely known, and these figures must be regarded as providing only a rough guide to the present position.

30. It will be noticed that under the arrangements proposed the predominantly American Zone is smaller in both area and population than either of the other two Zones. For this reason it is suggested below that the United States might be invited, if they so desire, to assume the preponderant rôle in the occupation of Austria.

The Zone which it is proposed should be predominantly Soviet is the largest in area. The extent of this Zone will, however, be subject to reduction if it is decided to alter the Eastern boundaries of Germany to the benefit of Poland.

Combined Zone.

31. It is considered that, the Berlin area should be a separate Combined Zone occupied by selected troops representing, in due proportions, all the Allied forces of occupation. The principal role of this mixed force would be to support the authority of any Allied Military Government, the Control Commission and other Allied bodies and also to ensure the maintenance of order in the Capital.

East Prussia and Danzig.

32. In view of its special position East Prussia has not been included in the main Zoning system. If it is intended ultimately to hand over

[Page [Map 1]] [Page []] [Page 153]

this territory to Poland, the most satisfactory course would be for the Poles to undertake its occupation from the start. If, however, the Polish Armed Forces available prove inadequate to undertake this commitment, the next best solution would be for East Prussia to be occupied by a mixed inter-Allied force.

It is most desirable that an agreement should be arrived at beforehand as to the occupation and ultimate disposal of East Prussia and other territories in a similar position, such as Danzig and Upper Silesia.

Austria.

33. The three Governments have declared it to be their purpose to restore the independence of Austria. It will accordingly be desirable from the start to make separate arrangements for the occupation of that country.

Having regard to the way in which the Allied forces are disposed under the main Zoning proposals for Germany, and to the fact that the suggested American Zone is considerably smaller than the other two, the United States Government might conveniently be invited, if they so wish, to undertake the main responsibility for the occupation of Austria. The area involved is of some 32,300 square miles and the population (according to the 1938 census) is of some 6.7 millions. The total area of predominantly American occupation would thus amount to some 79,400 square miles, and include a population of some 22.4 millions. This would have the effect of making the American Zones together approximately equal in both territory and population to the proposed Soviet Zone.

In order to establish the fact of United Nations occupation in the minds of the Austrians, it might be desirable to station a British Division in that country, even if the principle is accepted that it is to be a predominantly American Zone.

Part V

Summary of Conclusions

34. To facilitate reference, the main conclusions reached in this memorandum are recapitulated below:—

(a)
Total occupation of Germany by Allied Forces is essential if Germany is to be effectively disarmed and her military spirit broken.
(b)
At first the occupying forces should be as much in evidence as possible, so as to bring home to the German public the fact that their armed forces have been utterly defeated. After this object has been achieved and Germany has been disarmed, the occupation should be adjusted so as to give Germany a chance of developing along peaceful lines, and so that the continued presence of foreign troops [Page 154] may not be used by German militarists as an argument in favour of planning a war of revenge.
At the same time we must continue ready at any moment to use force without hesitation at the first sign of any recrudescence of military activity.
(c)
A strong air striking force will be essential at all stages, but control by air forces alone would not be an effective substitute for occupation by land forces under conditions in which internal disorder is the main problem to be faced. Such conditions are likely to obtain during the earlier stages of occupation.
(d)
When the disarming of Germany and the destruction of her armament industries are complete and when internal conditions are more stable, the problem will become one of ensuring that the work accomplished by the Control Commission is not undone by renewed attempts to create a war potential. It may at that stage be possible to provide the necessary sanction by the maintenance of a strong air striking force. In these circumstances the number of land forces required would be small.
(e)
The Allied Forces of Occupation should be disposed in three main Zones, with a combined Zone round Berlin.
(f)
In each Zone forces of one of the three Powers (United Kingdom, United States or Russia) should predominate. Each Zone should, however, contain contingents from the forces of the other two Powers, and of the smaller Powers interested.
(g)
The boundaries of the three Zones should be those drawn on the attached map, for the reasons given in paras. 24 to 33 above.

  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his despatch 13325, January 15; received January 20. For background on this British proposal, see William M. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin”, World Politics, vol. xvi, No. 1, October 1963, pp. 7–12.
  2. For a summary of the Seventh Regular Session of the Tripartite Conference at Moscow, October 25, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 629.
  3. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  4. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
  5. Cordell Hull.
  6. German Army.
  7. For the text of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xii, p. 57.
  8. German military forces.
  9. See facing page.