Office of the Historian

891.00/20426/8

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)34

[Washington,] October 20, 1943.

Admiral Leahy courteously came over to see me and stated:

(1)
That if the Department wrote a letter to the War Department asking them to provide a legation guard for Dreyfus, the War Department would be disposed to provide one.
(2)
Likewise, if we can specify what we want, Admiral Leahy believes that we can have men assigned to us from the Charlottesville crowd35 to assist our mission in Iran.
(3)
He is considering whether we cannot assign a two-fisted general to Iran and wonders whether Iran could request us to send a military mission in view of their recent declaration of war. He foresees some opposition from the British; we should have to overcome it.
(4)
This would solve the Connolly angle, since Connolly, properly speaking, is there to do railroading and nothing else.
(5)
He has a general feeling that Dreyfus, while he may have been right, is probably personally inadequate to swing a very wild situation. I told him in this regard that part of it, I thought, represented a campaign against him by British sources, and perhaps also Russian sources, but that we would take his comment into consideration.

Attached, his letter.

A[dolf] A. B[erle], Jr.
[Annex]

Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

Washington, October 20, 1943.

My Dear Mr. Berle: Upon receipt of your letters PA/M and NE 891.24 of October 15th,36 I at once took up with the American Chiefs of Staff the difficulties that your Department is encountering in Iran as enumerated in the above-noted letters.

Some of these difficulties together with others affecting the U. S. Army had already come to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff.

[Page 397]

The situation in Iran which controls action by the American Chiefs of Staff is briefly as follows:

Iran has been accepted for war purposes as a British responsibility.

By agreement with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Army is charged with developing and operating transportation and port facilities in the Persian Corridor. The U. S. Army has no other military function.

The British military force in Iran has agreed to provide the necessary protection.

The American Commander in Iran, General Connolly, has complained of inadequate protection and his complaint was on 17 September brought to the attention of the British Chiefs of Staff. We have as yet received no reply from the British Chiefs of Staff.

It is my understanding that the Commander of British Forces in Iran has full authority to decide upon what material shall be transported by General Connolly’s transportation facilities.

Reports have come to us that this authority has at time interfered with shipment of war material to Russia and has restricted shipments by and to the native inhabitants.

In view of the fact that Iran has definitely been designated a military sphere of British responsibility by the highest political authority, action by the American Chiefs of Staff appears to be precluded, and political complications in that Area would seem to be a problem for diplomatic solution.

It is my personal opinion that the War Department can properly provide a legation guard if requested by the Department of State to do so.

It appears to me also that the Secretary of War on your request might be able to lend to your Department a number of individuals to assist Dr. Millspaugh and your other “American Advisors”.

The American Chiefs of Staff are not informed as to the number or the availability to the War Department of such individuals who might be suitable.

I am informed by officers of the War Department that past experience indicates that cooperation with the United States Minister in Russia [Iran?] has been difficult.

Very truly,

William D. Leahy
  1. Addressed to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Ailing), the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray), and the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius).↩
  2. The United States Army’s School of Military Government.↩
  3. For one of the letters, see p. 394; the other letter not found in Department files.↩