740.0011 European War 1939/11523: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 31—1:45 p.m.]
187. Clarac, French Consul in Tetuán, whom I have known for some years, lunched with me today and spoke at length of the North African situation.
He said Noguès was very anti-German (Noguès it must be remembered is an appointee of the Popular Front and is or was a Freemason) and that his one concern is that of preserving Morocco and French North Africa for the French. Noguès and Weygand do not like one another and the reason given me was that Weygand is a soldier, strongly Catholic, with a distrust of politicians while Noguès is very politically minded and knows how to make his way by political combinations.
It was emphasized that both Noguès and Weygand had shown the greatest suppleness in their dealings with Vichy and the Germans. They had been able to obtain the approval of Vichy to the plan for economic assistance on the score that an exchange of goods with the United States is essential to the maintenance of French North African economy. Noguès has successfully resisted hitherto the advent of private Germans and the French Secret Service is now tailing all the members of the German Armistice Commission in Morocco to observe their movements. If the plan for economic assistance falls through all the efforts which Noguès and Weygand have made to use American aid as their shield against Vichy and the Germans will have failed.
I said that I did not know what decision had been reached in Washington on the subject, that there were many factors which would enter into the decision beyond my ken, but that on the basis of those with which I was acquainted I was personally strongly in favor of the continuance of the plan. I pointed out, however, that some of those who had supported the plan had been disappointed by the failure of the French authorities to check the increase in the German Armistice Commission and more recently by the policy of Vichy and events in Syria.
The answer was that France is under terrific pressure from the Germans. There were few Frenchmen who did not hope and pray for a British victory, but France had to live. After all, it was something to France’s credit that for almost a year the French colonies had been preserved from the Germans.
I interposed with mention of Syria. The reply was made that might it not be that Germany had deliberately sought to embroil Franco-British relations by landing planes there. That was so evidently the [Page 357] German game and it was to be expected that Germany would do everything in the way of almost inhuman pressure to force France to accept German conditions which France wished to avoid but could not in its present helpless position. For instance, German planes could easily fly direct from bases in Greece to Iraq.
I said it seemed to me France had to draw the line somewhere, that I thought the Marshal’s policy had been one of holding Germany to a strict adherence to the Armistice terms. The answer was that France could not live divided as it was.
Reference was made by Clarac to the unfortunate influence of the French émigrés in London. Émigrés throughout history had shown themselves unable to appreciate the psychology of their fellow countrymen at home. They were the worst kind of counsellors. Ninety percent of the French wanted a British victory, but that did not mean the same percentage would be willing to risk rising against the Germans at this time under present hopeless odds. It was absurd, he continued, for the British to expect that French North Africa was in a position to take active measures against the Germans at this time or to do more than was being done in the face of all the difficulties confronting Noguès and Weygand. The British should show more imagination and realize that much was to be gained by keeping French North Africa from being used by the Germans, but the Germans could only be kept from making use thereof by the realization of American aid. If that were withheld the arguments Weygand and Noguès had used with Vichy and the Germans in favor of American rather than German collaboration in North Africa would no longer be effective.
Despite the weakness of many of Clarac’s arguments (and I assume he is repeating those of Noguès whom he saw a few days ago) there is one consideration which appears of prime importance and that is that our aid should serve to reduce to a minimum German use of French North Africa or at least to delay the extension of such use. It is my opinion that it is worth being continued so long as these important negative results are realizable.