Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/10515

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert D. Murphy¹¹

[Washington, undated.]

[Participants:]	The Secretary
	Lord Halifax
	Mr. David Eccles
	Mr. Atherton
	Mr. Murphy
	Mr. Reber12

The British Ambassador called at his request, accompanied by Mr. Eccles.

The Secretary used the opportunity to outline briefly to Lord Halifax the recent steps taken by the Department to emphasize to Marshal Pétain our apprehension that members of the French Government might be inclined to grant concessions to Germany beyond the minimum obligations of the Armistice Convention; our preoccupation over a report of the possible return to Toulon from Mers-el-Kebir of the Dunkerque; and our active interest in the stories of German infiltration into French Africa. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that he had requested Ambassador Leahy to bring these and other phases of the situation in France to the Marshal’s personal attention, reiterating the confidence which our Government felt in respect of the Marshal himself, and in General Weygand in French Africa.

The Secretary referred to the pending shipment of two cargos of wheat flour to unoccupied France from the United States as a gift of the American Red Cross.¹³ He emphasized that in our approach to the French regarding this and similar shipments both to the unoccupied zone and French Africa, every precaution had been taken to avoid any appearance that our policy conflicted in the slightest with the views of the British Government, or that the American Government entertained any desire to force the hand of the blockade authorities. The Secretary said that it would be exceedingly unfortunate if an impression were created through the press or otherwise that American pressure was forcing the issue of French relief contrary to British wishes. Mr. Hull hoped that the British Government would take measures to inform the public that it was completely in harmony with the American Government thus giving evidence of a solidarity of view and purpose which would facilitate the task in this country and have a happy effect on the French people. The Secretary stressed the importance of bolstering and molding French public opinion as an aid to the Marechal in strengthening his resistance to German exigencies.

The Secretary declared that apparently there are only two key personalities in French public life today who we believe it worth while to support, namely Pétain and Weygand. They appear to constitute the only bulwark against elements such as the Laval^13a and Darlan groups. Unless Pétain and Weygand are given support, they very possibly will fail and be replaced by elements more prone to total collaboration with Germany.

The British Ambassador expressed himself as generally in accord with the foregoing.

The Secretary suggested that he would be glad to hear from the Ambassador his views of the prevailing situation in French Africa. The Ambassador referred to the presence of Mr. Eccles, just arrived from London after recent visits to Tangier and Spanish Morocco, saying that he preferred to have Mr. Eccles give the Secretary the benefit of any information he might have on the subject.

Mr. Eccles stated that opinion in London had undergone considerable evolution in the past month. Before that time Mr. Churchill had come round to the notion that some things should be done for the French. This was a long way from the earlier slogan of “De Gaulle^13b or starve” effective immediately after the armistice. However, the past month had witnessed a radical change in the military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and also the arrival in Libya of two to three German divisions. The question arose whether the program of economic cooperation envisaged for French North Africa is adequate under the circumstances, and whether a further urgent effort should not be made to induce immediate staff talks. If General Weygand would not yield, why then an effort should be made to find among the younger officers in Weygand’s organization some one who would have the courage to undertake such conversations. Mr. Eccles referred to the preoccupation in London over the possibility of a German invasion of French Morocco through Spain, the danger of an attack on Gibraltar and the resultant closing of the western Mediterranean. He also referred to General Wavell’s¹⁴ low opinion of Weygand as a fighting man, saying he was too much of a staff officer.

The Secretary said that it was precisely these and other factors which had led the Department to undertake a study of what might be done to support the French administration and eventually enable it to ward off aggression in French Africa, even possibly looking to a resumption of hostilities by the French. He felt that for this purpose we might have to envisage supplying many things to the French, both economic and even military.

In reply to the Secretary’s request for comment, Mr. Murphy stated that in his opinion the primary consideration is the immediate establishment of a basis of confidence upon which we can eventually build. Under our agreement with General Weygand we have the authorization to establish a comprehensive control organization in French Africa which can be developed to extend Anglo-American influence and it may blaze the trail to the objectives which we know are close to the British heart. It is however capital that a start be made and it is likewise obvious that everything cannot be done at once.

Mr. Murphy was confident that General Wavell’s opinion of Weygand might be classified as curbstone because we know that at the end of January when Algiers was informed through Vatican circles of a rumored attack by German-Italian forces of Tunisia General Weygand immediately flew to Tunis, ordered the mobilization of his air force and made preparations to defend French territory. He informed his associates that he fully expected to be killed in the undertaking. The attack did not materialize but it served to demonstrate that Weygand has not lightly given his word that French Africa will be defended to the extent of his ability against aggression by anyone.

Mr. Murphy also referred to the rumored French desire to move the Dunkerque from Mers-El-Kebir to Toulon for the completion of repairs stating that in his opinion that it should not be inferred without good evidence that this contemplated the eventual surrender of the ship to the Germans. The Dunkerque could be moved out of Toulon or scuttled in the event of a German attempt just as could the Strasbourg and the other naval units now in port at that place. He said also there was some justification for the French statement that even though they could obtain Wiesbaden’s permission to move their fleet from Toulon to West African ports, the latter in their already overcrowded condition would hardly accommodate the additional vessels.

Mr. Murphy also thought that it would be futile to attempt to induce immediate staff talks. At the present stage it would amount to official suicide for Weygand to undertake them.

The Secretary concluded the interview by saying that he hoped that Mr. Eccles would work with the competent services of the Department in outlining the essential details of the program of economic cooperation with French Africa so that valuable time might not be lost. He desired to be kept informed of the progress made.

11. Mr. Murphy was Counselor of Embassy in France on special assignment to French North Africa, temporarily in Washington for consultation.
12. Samuel Reber, Division of European Affairs.
13. For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 89 ff.
14. Pierre Laval, former Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
15. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French.
14. Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Commanding General of the British Forces in the Middle East.