851R.24/8½

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Memorandum

1.
In view of the anxiety of the United States Government that, for humanitarian and political reasons, supplies should be sent to occupied [unoccupied] France and French North Africa, His Majesty’s Government have for some time been considering how far and under what conditions this economic assistance could be given. Admiral Darlan’s recent threat to convoy supplies across the Atlantic has of course rendered it much more difficult for His Majesty’s Government to agree to any offer being made to the French Government, but they are so deeply impressed by the dangers of the present situation that they have resolved to make one last attempt to stop the French Government drifting towards full collaboration with Germany.
2.
His Majesty’s Government feel that the most immediate danger is the penetration by German experts of French North Africa, which [Page 267] they know is being actively pursued and which, they fear, will pave the way either for the entry of German troops into French North Africa from Tripoli or for the collapse of Spanish resistance to Germany. His Majesty’s Government think that the latter would certainly occur if Spain felt that Germany had succeeded in taking her in the rear, and there are already signs that Spanish resistance to German pressure is likely to weaken if German infiltration into the Mediterranean area is permitted to continue. In such an event the Spanish army would be at one with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in thinking that Spain should throw in her lot with Germany so as to make sure of obtaining her share of Morocco.
3.
His Majesty’s Government believe that the United States Government would be willing to exercise all pressure at their command to prevent enemy occupation of ports in French Morocco and Senegal, and enemy control of the complete Atlantic seaboard of the Continent of Europe.
4.
The Department of State have given the Embassy to understand that they do not contemplate the conclusion of any hard and fast agreement laying down the nature and quantity of supplies to be sent to North Africa, but that what the Department have in mind, apart from fixing the general conditions as regards control, etc., on which any supplies would be sent, is something much less formal by which North Africa would be kept on a string and its needs met as circumstances and the occasion might require. His Majesty’s Government fear that this procedure would not be adequate to induce the French to accept the conditions which His Majesty’s Government feel would have to be attached to any offer of economic assistance. They think that hand to mouth supplies of every consignment which would have to be considered as each request for a navicert was made, would not offer the French Government any certainty that if they were to pluck up their courage and concede the requests made to them the French people would receive solid benefits in exchange.
5.
His Majesty’s Government would prefer to concert with the United States Government a positive offer to the French Government whereby the latter would be assured reasonable supplies of principal commodities, with guarantees against re-export, and of navicert facilities for 5/8,000,000 bushels of wheat for unoccupied France, a request for which has recently, it is understood, been put to the State Department by the French Embassy. If the French Government were to refuse an offer of this kind, the position would be clarified, and the French people could then be told that their leaders preferred collaboration with Germany to securing bread for unoccupied France, supplies for French North Africa, and the maintenance of the Empire and fleet.
6.
His Majesty’s Government consider that the following indispensable conditions should be attached to the making of such a far-reaching offer as that described above:—
(a)
that Marshal Petain should prevent further Axis infiltration into French North Africa, and in particular the entry of uniformed or armed Germans or Italians.
(b)
that an adequate number of American observers should be sent to unoccupied France, and to French North Africa, and that a British observer or observers should be allowed to accompany the Americans sent to North Africa, or alternatively that British Consular Officers should be re-admitted to their former posts in French North Africa.
7.
Neither of the above conditions would conflict with the French Government’s obligations under the Armistice and supplies would go forward progressively so long as these conditions were observed, but would have to cease if they were departed from.
8.
His Majesty’s Government would also desire that French naval units now in French metropolitan ports should gradually be sent to African Atlantic ports, e. g. Casablanca and Dakar, and should remain there.
9.
Lord Halifax has received most urgent instructions to request the views of the United States Government on this proposal and in doing so to emphasize that verbal assurances from Marshal Petain and General Weygand about German infiltration into French Africa would not be sufficient to remove the deadly menace to the common interest involved in a collapse of our present policy towards Spain and the occupation by the enemy of French African ports. His Majesty’s Government feel that if this danger is to be removed the French must be shaken out of their lethargy and obliged to take certain specific measures. It is essential that it be made clear to them that the arrival of supplies will depend on the remorseless carrying out of the steps enumerated above. His Majesty’s Government hope that the United States Government would arrange to send the greatest possible number of American observers to French North Africa, and that some of these officials would be of sufficient standing to counteract German infiltration and to discuss with the French the possibility of armed resistance.
10.
Finally, His Majesty’s Government suggest, if the United States Government agree to the offer being made to the French Government, that it should be indicated to the latter that a definite reply must be received within a week. His Majesty’s Government could not afford to let the negotiations drift on while the Germans were consolidating their position in French Africa and increasing their military forces in Tripoli.