Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Europe, Volume II

740.0011 European War 1939/7644: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Pell) to the Secretary of State

Lisbon, January 14, 1941—7 p.m.
[Received January 17—3:12 p.m.]

14. For the Under Secretary¹² from Murphy:¹³ In accordance with your instructions I visited what seemed to me the key places in French Africa—viz., Algiers, Dakar, Tunis, Bizerte, Oran, Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, Fez, and also Tangier. I was fortunate in finding General Weygand¹⁴ not only at Algiers, but also at Dakar and Rabat. I had conversations with him, General Noguès,¹⁵ Admiral Esteva,¹⁶ Governor General Boisson,¹⁷ Governor General Chatel,¹⁸ Generals Barrau, Gama, Martin, Lascroux, Lotay, Admirals D’Harcourt, Landriau and Derrien, Secretary General Monick at Rabat,¹⁹ the Comte de Paris and many other French officials and businessmen whom I shall enumerate in my written report.²⁰ I also had talks with some of the natives, such as the Pashas of Fez and Marrakech.

If you approve I shall outline the tenor of these talks and suggest certain conclusions in this telegram, submitting a written and oral report on arrival in Washington. Several separate telegrams on specific matters are being sent with this.

1. General Weygand and his associates are engaged in laying the necessary foundation for substantial independent military action against Germany and Italy. Their program cannot properly be termed a dissident movement as it is being formulated with Marshal Pétain’s^20a approval. It is based on an ardent desire to retain the control of French Africa in the hands of the duly constituted French Government. Should that Government be captured by the Germans as a result of the occupation of all metropolitan France or otherwise deprived of its present limited authority, French Africa will unquestionably provide the springboard for the military rebound which will follow. The Weygand organization is being constructed along sound and substantial lines but its leaders have no desire to plunge into an ill-prepared adventure. They regard French Africa as France’s last trump which must be cautiously and skillfully played. They are all eager for American sympathy and immediate economic cooperation. I believe they merit our interest and practical support in their determination to resist German domination of French Africa.

2. There is no aggressive sentiment against England but definitely a basic sympathy with the British cause. This is especially true of Weygand, the army officers and civilian officials but less true of some of the naval officers.

Weygand in the presence of Boisson told me “Obviously I hope for a British victory. We all do. My primary job, however, is to keep French Africa intact—for France. It is a situation in which the greatest discretion must be exercised. It is a great misfortune that the British feel that everything must be shouted from the rooftops. There are so many ways we could help them in the Tchad and elsewhere if they would only act intelligently.” Many others in Weygand’s entourage and elsewhere expressed admiration for the British people, their courage and tenacity, and the hope that England would win; some, a doubt that victory is possible; others, a suspicion that Britain has long term designs on French Africa. Boisson inquired whether I believe that the British would ever leave French Equatorial Africa.

3. Economically French Africa is hard pressed. Food is plentiful with the exception of sugar and tea (very important for the Arab population) but business is stagnant. Stocks of many commodities are depleted. There is a severe gasoline and coal shortage. Railway, automotive, aviation and road building equipment is deteriorating and there will soon be an urgent need for replacement.

In this connection I wish to make particular reference to French West Africa and French Morocco. The life blood of those areas is gasoline. [Apparent omission] directly from the camel and bullock stage to the automobile and the airplane. Their rail systems are insignificant and totally inadequate for distribution. The bulk of their automotive and agricultural road building machinery is of American manufacture. The British blockade has cut them off from their regular supply of petroleum products. Use of gasoline has long since been stringently limited to the minimum transport of necessities, even on that basis the supply in French Morocco with the exception of 6,000 tons reserved for military use will be exhausted by February. In French West Africa there is possibly a month’s supply.

Monick at Rabat graphically described this situation as dangerous. He said that he is endeavoring to build up around Weygand as much in the way of economic and material support as he can, knowing full well that Weygand is a thorough technician who will not move unless he believes that adequate supplies are available. Monick said that reasonable contentment on the part of native population is essential if there is to be enthusiastic action on their part. He referred, as did Noguès, to the fact that there is a native population of Arabs and Berbers in French Morocco of 6,000,000 as compared with a French population of 150,000. Noguès emphasized that German propaganda is endeavoring to use the growing economic discontent to sow dissension among the natives and destroy their faith in the French. French military authorities have done wonders in conserving their organization intact, developing new strength, and maintaining their authority over the native populations. If they are deprived of the necessities of life, principally because of a breakdown of the transport system, the Germans will be provided again with ground fully prepared for fifth column activity.

Weygand, Monick and others bluntly say that the British must make up their minds: Do the British wish to work for the decomposition of French Africa, thus, in their opinion, playing directly into the hands of the Axis Powers; or do they wish to build up a French Africa which, at a decisive moment, the French hope may play a vital role in the decision of the present European war.

Monick said that he fully understands the considerations which weigh on the British and expressed the wish that he were in London in order that he might persuade his friends there of the urgency of treating French Africa as a friendly element capable of great utility in the future, rather than a dubious force to be dealt with harshly, deprived of means and subjected to adverse propaganda.

Monick also asserted that German action will come within 3 to 4 months or by June 1st at the latest. By that time he feels that it is absolutely necessary that Weygand’s organization be built up to a point of effective usefulness. As matters now stand, with the limited supplies available, effective resistance on the part of French Africa to a combined process of German-Italian attack would be almost impossible. He and others urged that if the United States decides in favor of economic cooperation with French Africa that we bear in mind that speed is of the essence.

4. General Weygand said on the subject of economic guarantees: “I am prepared to give whatever guarantees you wish. What does your Government desire? If an American control commission is desired I am quite in accord. You have your consulates here. You know our normal consumption. The British blockade largely controls exports. In addition I can give you my word of honor that whatever you send will be consumed in French Africa. I hope my word still has a value.”

I am certain that any reasonable arrangement we suggest will be gladly approved.

5. German and Italian control factors in French Africa are limited to two German civilian delegates of the Armistice Commission at Casablanca and a limited number of the Italian delegates in North Africa only. The French attitude is glacial courtesy. The delegates may not proceed anywhere for inspection or visits unless accompanied by a French officer. Contempt for the Italians especially is noticeable. I mentioned to General Weygand’s Air Attaché the other day at Rabat that the General seemed in a rare good humor, and the Attaché replied, “Yes, the Italians had a bad day yesterday.” Weygand repeatedly refers to the Italians as that “execrable nation”.

6. Under General Weygand’s competent direction the military, naval and air establishments are being radically strengthened. Under the Armistice Agreement French Africa was permitted 100,000 effectives. Over 100,000 additional demobilized effectives are now available. There are about 1,500 first class pilots with a corresponding number of mechanics. There are available seven or eight hundred first line fighting planes. French West Africa can provide 400,000 native troops and French Morocco about half that many.

There is a shortage of matériel and I shall cover that matter in another communication. The French are using every possible pretext to persuade the German and Italian Armistice Commission to permit them to increase military effectives in French Africa.

7. French West Africa would welcome establishment of an American trans-Atlantic air service to Dakar. Boisson said that he sincerely hopes that Pan-American will establish a Natal–Dakar service. He promised his cooperation if Pan-American would consider it.

8. Boisson urged that the United States conclude a trade agreement directly with French West Africa. He asserted that he has authority to enter into such an agreement. On my return to Algiers I asked Weygand and Chatel whether they thought such an arrangement possible. Weygand at first doubted but Chatel supported the idea and Weygand finally agreed it could be made.

9. Weygand repeatedly emphasized the need of discretion in our dealing with French Africa under the present circumstances. He said that every time the British radio described him as about to lead an independent movement in Africa it was an added handicap. The Germans requested his recall, he said, about the time of Laval’s fall²¹—in fact that was one of the elements in Laval’s fall, because the Marshal refused.

Weygand said that it must be clear to us that he must pretend to stand for the policy of collaboration and that he must use the pretext of the De Gaulle²² and British action in Africa as a bargaining point with the Germans. He repeated that Darlan²³ said recently at Vichy that if De Gaulle did not exist he would have to be invented. He also said that of course he has no intention of attacking De Gaulle, but he is certain that eventually the British will withdraw De Gaulle from French Africa as a disturbing factor.

10. Just as the President’s November [October] message to Pétain²⁴ supported the Marshal in his decision to oust Laval, and marked a turning point in French policy, economic support now of French Africa will strengthen Weygand’s determination to resist Axis aggression. Translated into action it would mean small shipments immediately of automotive gasoline, kerosine and gas oil to Dakar and Casablanca under whatever guarantee we wish. Such shipments would go far to counteract German propaganda and would stimulate all those in French Africa working for eventual independent action. [Murphy.]

Pell

12. Sumner Welles.
13. Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy in France, temporarily at Lisbon.
14. Gen. Maxime Weygand, Delegate General of the French Government in North Africa.
15. Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General of the French Zone of Morocco.
16. Adm. Jean Pierre Esteva, French Resident General in Tunisia.
17. Pierre Boisson, French High Commissioner in West Africa.
18. Yves Chatel, Secretary General of the Delegation General in French Africa.
19. Emmanuel Monick, Secretary General of the French Zone of Morocco.
20. Not printed.
21. Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, French Chief of State.
21. Pierre Laval was dismissed as Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 13, 1940. See telegram No. 1135, December 14, 1940, noon, from the Chargé in France, and following documents, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. ii, p. 421.
22. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French.
23. Adm. Jean Francois Darlan, French Minister of the Navy.
24. See telegram No. 636, October 25, 1940, noon, to the Chargé in France, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. ii, p. 475.