711.94/1849: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State8
[Received December 7—9:55 a.m.]
1285–1289. [1.] The report contained in my 1282, December 7, 9 a.m., leads me to submit the following brief analysis of the situation as viewed by the Embassy in order to convey the picture in correct balance and perspective.
(a) The views of Mr. Y and his desire to visit the United States represent the almost despairing cry of those elements in Japan who clearly perceive the dangerous road along which the Government is now leading this country and the ultimate disaster which may lie at the end of that road. His views and proposals, however, represent a fundamental misconception of the attitude of the American Government and people and of the fact that this attitude is based upon principles deeply imbedded in the American creed and is not to be swayed by mere expediency.
It may be doubted whether even Mr. Y’s contemplated visit to the United States would enable him to grasp those basic facts, because there are probably few Japanese who are temperamentally capable of grasping those facts. Certainly the great majority of Japanese interpret American policy as a blind adherence to allegedly outmoded legalistic concepts, an arbitrary resistance to any change in the status quo and selfish determination to prevent Japan’s logical and rightful expansion. Yet many of these same people believe that Japan’s interference with the tangible interests of the United States in China constitute the chief stumbling block to improved relations and they convince [Page 462] themselves that as soon as such hostilities cease, these obstacles to good relations will be automatically removed. In these Japanese conceptions there is neither comprehension nor logic. The view has been moulded over a long period by a controlled and chauvinistic press.
(b) Ever since my arrival in this country over 8 years ago, Japanese friends of the moderate school of thought have predicted “the rainbow just around the corner” and have assured me that there existed just beneath the surface a great body of liberal opinion ready to emerge and to wrest control from the military and extremist elements if given support through some practical gestures of friendship from the United States. This is precisely what Mr. Y and his friends seek today, and it is futile to try to explain to them why the American Government and people now feel that the initiative in such a movement should come from Japan herself.
(c) That great body of moderate opinion still lies beneath the surface, but under present circumstances it is as inarticulate and powerless as ever. The present Government, which for a time was decidedly shaky, has been greatly reinforced by the recent display of support by the Ministers of War and Navy and by the inclusion in the Cabinet of Baron Hiranuma who can be counted upon to afford the strength which Prince Konoye lacks. When in due course the Government is overturned, we believe from present circumstances and indications that it will be followed by other governments equally determined to pursue Japan’s chosen course to realize in “greater East Asia, including the South Seas” the position to which she considers herself entitled by virtue of her growth in the modern world as a first class but territorially and economically restricted power.
2. Turning once again to American-Japanese relations, there can be no doubt that the initiative in the control of these relations has shifted since the announcement of our Government of the partial withdrawal of Americans from the Far East. The firm, unhurried but inexorable pace of American policy, the tempo of which has remained unchanged in the steps progressively taken since the notice of abrogation of the treaty of 1911, is beginning to have its effect in Japan. There is obvious dismay at the reaction in the United States to the action of Japan in joining the Axis and especially to the provocative statements made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister immediately thereafter. The fact that the intended intimidation of the American Government and people did not materialize is now perceived, and the American loan to the Chinese National Government as an immediate answer to Japan’s recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime furnished concrete evidence to that effect. This situation has reached a point where the Japanese realize that they must act to prevent the [Page 463] worst from taking place, yet they are obviously unprepared even to consider the fundamental reorientation of Japanese policy which alone could lead to an improvement in those relations. Indeed, any leader in Japan who had the temerity to suggest withdrawing from China and abandoning the dreams of southward advance would immediately be discredited and such a suggestion by a responsible leader would be utterly unthinkable.
The vicious circle in American-Japanese relations is complete. Admiral Nomura’s appointment to the Washington Embassy, which was accepted only after repeated and determined personal efforts by the Foreign Minister, represents what may prove to be the final effort on the part of those at present in control of Japan’s policy to save American-Japanese relations from disastrous deterioration, but that the new Ambassador will be empowered to give undertakings which would involve abandonment of Japan’s objectives in China or which would arrest permanently the southward advance would appear to be out of the question.
3. Repeating the views conveyed in our telegram No. 827, September 12, 9 p.m.,9 I believe that while the continuance of a firm policy by the United States will involve inevitable risks, nevertheless a policy of laisser faire would lead to future dangers of far greater magnitude.
4. In this general connection, reference should be made to my despatch No. 5135, November 1310 (due in Washington about December 14), transmitting an admirable report by the Commercial Attaché on the economic, industrial, financial and other current phases of the situation in Japan.