803.00/14599: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 30—11:37 p.m.]
592. My 543, October 24, noon, and 561, November 6, 11 a.m.
1. From Communist sources Embassy obtained the text in translation of a document purporting to be a telegram dated November 5 (said to have been received in Chungking on November 26th) from the Commanders and Deputy Commanders of the Eighteenth Group92 and new Fourth Armies, reportedly in reply to telegrams dispatched [Page 451] to the Communist military leaders by the National Government in October. It would appear that the telegram from the Communist generals crossed with the message said to have been transmitted to them by General Ho Ying Chin on November 5 (paragraph numbered 1, my 561).
2. The telegram from the Communist commanders, which is couched in the customary terms of courtesy, emphasizes their desire to obey instructions and carry on a republic, expresses regret over the occurrence of recent incidents in Kiangsu and Shantung, suggests that an impartial investigator be despatched to investigate and fix responsibility, points out that the Communist armies have observed the proposals advanced by the National Government through Chou En-lai in July and August, alleges that Communist soldiers in Central China are fighting for their homes and cannot abandon them, complains that units of the new Fourth Army have been attacked in Kiangsi, Anhwei, Hupeh, Fukien, Honan and on the Kiangsi-Hunan border and describes the difficulties of maintenance of their armed forces in North China. The National Government is accordingly petitioned to permit the Communist forces to remain in their present positions on the south and north banks of the Yangtze. The telegram goes on to mention, however, that effort will be made to persuade units south of the Yangtze to comply with orders to move and asks for time to carry out this action but requests that Communist troops north of the Yangtze not be requested to move. Admission is made that the Communist armies now numbering some 500,000 men are in excess of their original strength, and it is pointed out that the Communist forces now receive maintenance for only 45,000 men—hence the organization of the anti-Japanese governments among the masses and the dependence on the people for the support of their armies. The National Government is asked to abide by its promise to recognize a numerical increase of the Communist forces and request is made for supplies of munitions, medicines, etc., none of which is said to have been received during the past 14 months. The message alludes to the unsettled conflict in regard to the number of hsien in the border region of North China, complains of the blockade of the area instituted by the National Government and of the maltreatment of soldiers and students in the Communist area and asks for a solution of these difficulties. The message concludes with a reference to external and internal intrigue and a plea for national unity, improvement of the lot of the people, abolition of corruption, etc.
3. So far as the Embassy has been able to ascertain, the Chungking authorities have not replied to the telegram from the Communist [Page 452] commanders outlined in paragraph numbered 2 above but are presumably adhering to the two demands set forth in the Embassy’s telegram No. 561. Meanwhile, the Embassy has received no information of any new clashes between forces of the Government and the Communists.
4. In a conversation with the Assistant Military Attaché on November 27, Chou En-lai expressed the view that even if the new Fourth Army complied with the instructions of the National Government to remove to North China it would probably be attacked by Government forces. In a conversation a few weeks ago with an officer of the Embassy, the Minister of Publicity said that the Government had abandoned its policy of “appeasing” the Communists.
5. It seems apparent from the foregoing that the chances of the Government and the Communists reaching a satisfactory and complete understanding is as remote as ever and that the chief stumbling block at this time to cooperation lies in the continued stationing of the new Fourth Army in the lower Yangtze valley area. But behind this and other disputes and the sporadic armed clashes of the two groups lies, I believe, the active and potent germ of mutual distrust and suspicion. The Kuomintang and the National Government are apparently convinced that the Communist goal is imposition of the Communist form of government in China, that it has been the Communist strategy to build to this goal in the course of the opportunity now presented by the Sino-Japanese conflict—the start of which may have been accelerated in part by Communist participation in the Sian incident94—and that even though the prosecution of hostilities may be impeded the Government and Party must take steps to ensure that Communist ascendency does not eventuate. The Communists for their part profess to feel that the Kuomintang and the ruling class have lost their revolutionary fervor and are hopelessly reactionary, corrupt and inefficient; that the ruling class is holding to unswerving position of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the toiling masses; that the Communists should be permitted to organize the masses in the struggle against Japan and that as a democratic principle the Communists should have the right freely to build up their own party and propagate their political doctrines in the ultimate interests of China and its people.
6. I am convinced from my observations that the aims of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists are diametrically opposed and that barring rapid Japanese victory in China the two contending groups must eventually come to grips in a military struggle for military and political supremacy. I believe that General Chiang kai-shek [Page 453] has at all times had in mind the necessity of a decisive conflict with the Communists and that he has to some extent been guided by this consideration in his military dispositions against the Japanese and I feel that his desire to transfer the new Fourth Army to North China is motivated at least in part by this consideration.
The same motive seems to have been reflected in governmental action in repressing communistic activities including the organization of the campaigns in the restrictions where practicable of Communist spheres of influence and in the sparing manner in which funds and military supplies have been doled out to the Communists. On the other hand it can be scarcely denied that the Communists have utilized also her [the Government’s?] preoccupation with the struggle against Japan to occupy and organize various areas in the occupied zones, that they have resorted to propaganda favorable to their cause and inimical to the Kuomintang where feasible and that during the past year and a half they have contented themselves more with the conservation of their strength and the augmentation of their forces than in active military operations against the Japanese. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that while the Communists are desirous of frustrating a Japanese victory in China they are at the same time equally desirous of consolidating their own position to the greatest possible extent.
7. Notwithstanding the fundamental cleavage existing between the two contending factions as I see it and as I have endeavored to portray it above, I continue to adhere to the opinion that the Kuomintang and the Communists have sufficient common ground in their desire to defeat Japan to continue during the course of the Sino-Japanese conflict as they have done for the past 4 years the broad policy of compromise, to continue, in short, the fundamental schism [which?] can not be bridged and there will be clashes of aims and policy in the internal field but it would appear that a common aim in the external field will temporarily prevail over internal dissensions. But as I have indicated above, if China is able to preserve its independence vis-à-vis Japan that common ground will likely fall away and a conflict which will result in the continued supremacy of the Kuomintang as the ruling party in China or in the succession to its mantle of the Communist party seems hardly avoidable. If such a struggle should eventuate, it would seem from present indications that the Kuomintang is by virtue of its organization and military strength in a vastly superior position to the scattered and ill-equipped Communists.
Sent to Department only.