[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in
Japan (Dooman)
I called on Mr. Yoshizawa this afternoon at the Foreign Office to
pay a final visit before my departure on leave for the United
States.
I referred to the agreeable and useful contacts we had had during
the past three years and I thanked him for the efforts which he
had made in connection with the many problems that we had had to
deal with affecting relations between our respective countries.
Mr. Yoshizawa said that in the normal course of events he would
expect to receive an appointment to the field and that it was
likely that he would have gone abroad before I returned from my
furlough.
I said that during the many years that I had lived in Japan I had
felt that I had got to understand fairly well Japanese
psychology
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and
temperament, both national and individual, but that during the
last few months there had come such a striking change in the
Japanese people that I had the sensation of dealing with a
nation and with individuals who were utterly strange to me. The
Japanese people over their long history had been guided by moral
principles which had stood them in good stead in times of need,
but it was being made abundantly clear at the present time that
the Japanese people hereafter did not propose to orient
themselves on any ethical or moral principles. The “golden
opportunity” which was today on the lips of so many Japanese,
when reduced to fundamentals, meant merely that the difficulties
in which nations, who had for many years maintained friendly
relations with Japan and with whom Japan had no quarrel, are now
involved offered an occasion for Japan to acquire benefits which
had no relation whatever to any moral or legal rights held by
Japan. With France beaten to its knees, with the Netherlands
overrun by the enemy, and with Britain fighting with its back to
the wall, the predominant thought in this country appeared to be
to exploit to the uttermost the opportunities for seizure of
privileges, if not something more drastic, in the possessions of
these European powers in the Far East. No individual, I went on
to say, could be guided only by expediency and opportunism
without ending sooner or later in disaster, and one could see no
reason to expect that Japan could hope to escape the inevitable
consequences of pursuit of policies predicated on nothing but
force.
Mr. Yoshizawa made no comment whatever. I then went on to say
that he had said to me on many occasions during the past three
years that he had consistently advised his Government that it
would be impossible for Japan to separate the United States and
Great Britain in respect of their common problems in the Far
East. Mr. Yoshizawa nodded his head in assent. I said that if
that view were true during the past three years, it is even more
true today: that the United States today occupies the same
relation to Britain which Britain until recently occupied in
relation to France. It was, in short, the weakness of Britain
which causes the growing difficulties between Japan and Britain
to have a greater effect on American attitude than if Britain
were today capable of dealing singlehandedly with Japan. The
recent arrests in Japan of British nationals, the demands made
by Japan on French Indochina, General Koiso’s statements of the
last day or so with respect to the Netherlands East Indies,40 and many other developments showed only
too clearly that a nation had only to be weak to tempt Japan to
the making of extravagant demands. It was being made abundantly
clear that Japan expected, and indeed hoped, that Germany would
be successful in its attack on Great Britain, but even
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to the Japanese there
was a slight margin of doubt; and knowing that the Japanese are
not accustomed to taking unnecessary risks, I assumed that Japan
is not making any irrevocable decision before the margin of
doubt has been removed. If, however, the German attack on Great
Britain should prove unsuccessful, I would expect to see a
marked moderation of Japanese attitude with respect to the
British Empire, the Netherlands and France; and it would have to
be realized by the Japanese that, in the contingency which I
expected, Japan, because of her present attitude toward nations
temporarily in difficulties and certain weaker nations, would
have forfeited the right to have accepted by the world on its
face value any policy of moderation which she may then
adopt.
Mr. Yoshizawa still made no comment. I said that the growing
deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations gave me great concern
with regard to the future relations between the United States
and this country. Although I could not agree with regard to the
controlling character of the arguments which the Japanese used
to put forward to defend their actions, I felt that I could,
until recently at least, understand them. Recent disclosures of
the trend of Japanese policy and the demands by the press and by
certain powerful personages for Japanese action against the
rights of Occidental Powers in the Far East show only too
clearly that neither reason nor morals are to play a part in
Japanese foreign policy, and so long as this condition is
permitted to exist, there remains no opportunity for the
employment of constructive diplomacy.
Mr. Yoshizawa turned the conversation to purely personal matters.
He asked when I proposed to leave Tokyo station, and when I said
that I was motoring down to Yokohama a few hours before my boat
sailed for Kobe on Thursday, he said that he would call at my
house early Thursday morning on his way to the Foreign
Office.
