893.00/14567: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:32 p.m.]
377. 1. According to information received indirectly from Chinese Communist sources, it now appears that the information concerning an agreement with the Government as imparted by the Chinese official mentioned in the first paragraph of my 353, July 20, 10 a.m. was not altogether accurate. It now seems that negotiations have [recessed?] and that only a tentative draft agreement was reached by the negotiators mentioned in my telegram under reference. It is reported that the terms of the draft agreement have been taken to Yenan by Chou En-lai who left Chungking by plane on July 26 for consideration by the Chinese Communist authorities.
2. As to the terms, it now appears that the proposed arrangement envisages a plan whereby the area comprising the 18 hsien in central Shensi is to be governed by a regime technically appointed by the Executive Yuan, but actually composed of officials nominated by the Chinese Communists. It appears that allocation of areas respecting military operations by the Communist armies has not been fully determined, but it seems likely that they will be given roughly the areas they now occupy (practically all of Hopei, substantial portions of [Page 411] Shansi and Chahar, and relatively smaller areas in Shantung and Suiyuan), and that all other Chinese troops will be excluded therefrom. The foregoing of course excludes the new Fourth Route army in the central Yangtze area which may after all be moved to Hopei. This province would accordingly come under complete Communist military control, although civil government would at least nominally be retained under the jurisdiction of the National Government in Chungking. It also appears that the question of the size of the Chinese-Soviet army has not been settled, as the Reds want recognition, pay and supplies for 9 divisions, while the Chungking authorities are reported willing to recognize and support 6 divisions and 5 independent regiments.34
3. The Chinese Communist Party is also said to be pressing for legal recognition and political equality for the party. It seems probable that they may be granted de facto if not de jure recognition, including possibly restricted freedom of political activity.
4. The Embassy has not heard of any Soviet Russian intervention in respect of the above mentioned negotiations. It would appear parenthetically that the position of the so-called “pro-democratic” group in the National Government has been strengthened by the recent action of the American Government in extending the licensing [regulations?] in respect of certain vital export materials.35
Sent to the Department. Repeated to Peiping. Peiping please mail code text to Tokyo.
- In the Ambassador’s political review for September (telegram No. 502, October 4, 1 p.m.), he reported that “Kuomintang Communist relations remained harmonious, an understanding having been reached after long negotiations on virtually all points at issue between the two groups. It was reported that details concerning the movement of the new Fourth Army from Central to North China were yet to be worked out, although it appeared that some units of that force were already moving north.” (893.00 P. R./174)↩
- See Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 216 ff.↩