893.00/14566: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
360. Reference last substantive paragraph my 353, July 20, 10 a.m., expressing the view that Kuomintang concessions to Chinese Communists may have been influenced by increasing Chinese dependence on Soviet Russia.
The repercussions on the Far East of the kaleidoscopic changes wrought in the European situation in the course of the past 2 months are now becoming more and more apparent. With the collapse of [Page 407] French resistance in Europe, French influence in the Far East is virtually extinct and Indochina is now to all intents but a pawn in the game of power politics. Not only has British prestige suffered a heavy blow but British influence continues to wane in direct ratio to the concessions made to Japan. German prestige reentered and signs are not wanting that this phenomenon is influencing Japanese policy and may sooner or later affect Chinese policy.
Even at this time some Chinese leaders, apparently regarding German domination of Europe as virtually certain, advocate a strengthening of Sino-German ties in the belief that Hitler’s policy will be to urge Japanese expansion in the South Seas at the expense of the democratic powers while he sees to it that China is encouraged to develop along Fascist lines as an independent state. The Russian position in the Far East remains unshaken and Russian policy apparently unchanged vis-à-vis China and Japan. The American attitude apparently continues firm but quiescent in the face of gradual Japanese encroachment. Japan seems to be moving toward a totalitarian form of Government in a supreme endeavor not only to conclude the “China incident” but to seize the “golden opportunity” to expand in the South Seas. China, notwithstanding the closing of her two major avenues to the importation of war materials and other vital supplies and feeling of inability to gain much comfort from a United States which is regarded as more concerned with European and Latin-American problems and which is on the eve of an important Presidential campaign, seems determined however great the odds to continue resistance against Japanese aggression (see statement of Chiang Kai-shek contained in Embassy’s 349, July 17, 4 p.m.32).
He apparently decided upon further resistance as preferable to the alternative of peace on Japanese terms. It seems only reasonable to expect that China, desperately in need of certain essential commodities for the prosecution of hostilities over a long period and of the opportunity to exchange growing stocks of exports for these essential commodities, must inevitably turn to the only exit still open to her, namely Soviet Russia. We may in the future therefore expect, barring, of course, a reversal in the trend of present day Russian Far Eastern policy—an unlikely contingency at least so long as Russia is free from threat in Europe—, a further cementing of increasingly close relations existing between China and Russia and perhaps a lessening of Chinese ties with the European democracies and even with the United States. Certain Kuomintang leaders such as Sun Fo, Feng Yu-hsiang and Shao Li-tzu have for some time advocated the cultivation of closer relations with the Soviet Union apparently in the belief that Russia in the final analysis was more [Page 408] likely to become and remain a more staunch supporter of China’s struggle against Japanese aggression than any third power. The Department is aware that Soviet Russia has already granted material aid to China in the form of credits (which still remain unexhausted), in the supply of munitions and airplanes and pilots, in the purchase of Chinese goods by way of barter arrangements, the supply of military advisers, et cetera.
It may be expected that in the future these activities will be intensified and efforts will be directed toward opening and expanding means of communications with Russia and the promotion of trade between the two countries. But, however well the means of communications are devolved [developed?] between China and Russia and however capable Russia is of furnishing supplies to China, it does not seem possible that the Russian route can replace the Indochina and Burma routes in respect of quantity, time and ease of shipment.
The [As to?] Chinese and Russian political relations, it is more difficult to predict future developments. One possibility exists, however, and that is that Russia, which has hitherto been very discreet in its attitude toward the Chinese Communists and their aspirations, may feel that the present is a propitious time for active intervention on their behalf. On the other hand the Russian Soviets may feel that adoption of such a policy might result in dissolution of the so-called “united front” and the collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan. Thus the situation is delicately [balanced?].
In any event it does not seem [likely that?] Japan and England and France who have hitherto perhaps for different reasons undertaken [open?]ly to portray the threat of a Sovietized China to the rest of the world can gain comfort from the thought that it is the actions of these countries more than anything else which may be forcing China into dependence upon and cooperation with Soviet Russia.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Peiping, air mail to Tokyo.