711.94/1569–1573: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State16
[Received July 11—3:06 p.m.]
559–563. Department’s 243, July 4, 3 p.m., paragraph numbered 5; and my 558, July 11, 4 p.m.17 The Department’s presentation of policy and opinion in your 243 and previous pertinent instructions have seemed to me to be irrefutably sound and to call for no counter-comment from the Embassy. I, nevertheless, respectfully submit the following thoughts for soliciting [your?] consideration in formulating future considerations [policy?].
The opportunity for effecting modification of Japanese policy by discussion between the Foreign Minister and myself of principles, however satisfactorily the soundness of our position can be demonstrated, has been prejudiced by the rapidity with which Germany has conquered France and has put Great Britain in a position of great peril. In the present juncture of world developments in general and of the Far Eastern situation in particular, where the temptation to seize a golden opportunity is being encouraged in every possible way by the Axis Powers, and when our relations with Japan are [not?] amicably adjusted, discussion by way of argument and rejoinder of principles of foreign policy cannot be expected of itself alone to exert concrete effect on Japanese policy.
As I have had occasion to point out in previous reports, Japan is at present teetering on the verge of a policy of rapprochement with the Axis Powers. We believe that the present government is resisting the steadily increasing urge of public opinion, particularly military opinion, to emulate in East Asia the Nazi procedure in Europe. Whether that resistance can successfully continue or whether in one way or another the pro-Axis elements will win the day we cannot now predict with any certainty but we can at least say with assurance that the prolonged life of the present Cabinet is highly doubtful and no assurance can be given with regard to the probable policy that would be followed in the event of and after its fall.
2. My hope in initiating the current conversations was that they might at least serve to keep the door open between the two governments and that they might lead in due course to some specific step or steps which would break the impasse in our mutual relations. The respective attitudes of the United States and of Japan having become [Page 399] deadlocked, my discussions with Mr. Arita with regard to the adjustment of our mutual relations have become a vicious circle.
Our position in general terms is that improvement in American-Japanese relations cannot be expected until Japan abandons the use of force as an instrument of national policy, respects her treaty commitments and ceases interference with American rights and interests. Our position involves unwillingness to resume commercial treaty relations with Japan until the foregoing obstacles are removed. The Japanese counter by insisting that the foregoing obstacles cannot in general be removed until the hostilities in China are terminated and that the absence of commercial treaty relations between our two countries constitutes in itself an important obstacle to improved relations. They further insist that while the termination of the hostilities in China will automatically bring about removal of the foregoing obstacles a preferred position in China calculated to strengthen Japan’s economic and military strategic position will be retained.
3. Taking into consideration the foregoing elements in the situation, it would appear that the only way which contains some possibility of stemming the pro-Axis tide in Japan would be indication by the United States of its readiness to take initiative simultaneously with the taking of initiative by Japan toward an improvement in Japanese-American relations.
4. The present position is in effect that the requirement by the United States that Japan restore the status quo ante is met by the Japanese with the contention that the United States by terminating the commercial treaty with Japan has also contributed toward alteration of the situation. At a time like the present when positive inducements are being offered Japan by the Axis powers we cannot, I believe, expect Japan to restore the status quo ante without some parallel action by the United States.
5. I therefore submit once again the thoughts expressed on pages 10 and 11 of my despatch 4359 of December 1, 193918 with regard to instituting negotiations for a modus vivendi and new treaty with Japan. The announcement that we are prepared to institute such negotiations would at this juncture and under present conditions be interpreted by the Japanese press and public as a weakening owing to force of circumstances of the position hitherto maintained by the United States and an acknowledgment that we feel no longer disposed to maintain that position.
(I, however, emphasize the thought above expressed that the suggested action of the United States would not be unilateral in character, but associated with and parallel to the taking of Japanese [Page 400] initiative toward meeting our position.) On the other hand such an announcement would unquestionably afford important support to those members of the government and other influential Japanese who counted best interests of their country as dependent upon good relations, especially good commercial relations, with the United States. Such support at this official juncture might well turn the tide which according to present trends will in all probability (in the absence of counter inducements) flow toward the totalitarian camp with increasing momentum.
6. I do not advocate a surrender of principle. The negotiation of a modus vivendi either concurrently with or looking eventually toward the initiation of negotiations for a new treaty with Japan would bring us back toward the status quo ante before the treaty of 1911 was abrogated with such modifications as would tend to meet a modified situation.
- The five sections of this message, transmitted as telegrams Nos. 559–563, are printed as one document.↩
- Latter not printed; for memorandum and oral statements of July 11, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, pp. 94, 95, and 99.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, p. 604.↩