Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/1514: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, June 4, 1940—7 p.m.
[Received June 4—11:12 a.m.]

412. My 400, June 3, noon.

1. Subsequent to the despatch of my telegram under reference, a prominent Japanese who is in the closest touch with the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet, and who has been openly and therefore courageously attacking the plans for the setting up of Japanese controlled economy in China, called on me yesterday afternoon. He spoke in the strictest confidence substantially as follows:

(a) On May 24 and 25 my informant called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, [on] Marquis Kido, who has just been appointed Lord Privy Seal, [on] the Minister of War and finally on the Prime Minister. With the exception of Mr. Arita, these important personages concurred in the view that efforts should be made by Japan to break the existing dead [lock] with the United States and with Great Britain and that this could be done without modification of the principles for which the United States and Great Britain stand. A few days later my informant called on the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet who stated that Mr. Arita had recently modified his views radically, and that the four—Cabinet officers who are now meeting regularly to consider foreign policy (see our 386, May 28, 7 p.m.⁴⁷) had agreed at their first meeting to explore ways and means for improving relations with the United States and Great Britain.

(b) Although this decision on the part of the Cabinet was gratifying, the difficulties in the way of proceeding toward an adjustment of relations with the United States and Great Britain had been greatly increased by the impact on Japan of the recent German military successes. The Japanese people are becoming increasingly impatient over the failure of the present Government to achieve anything tangible and no progress is being made toward the settlement of the China conflict, Japan’s foreign relations have not improved, and no preparations are being made to take advantage of the situation which would be presented if a complete victory were won by Germany. The Government could not continue to wait and see but it had to produce results without delay. My informant did not pretend to know of the specific article the conference of the four ministers is studying but he could tell me of the plan which he presented to the Prime Minister and with regard to which the Prime Minister expressed approval.

(c) The first point would obviously be the speedy settlement of the China conflict. My informant was impressed with the possibility that the longer the China conflict is allowed to continue the greater are the chances of there developing under the stress of German pressure violent and extremist trends of thought in this country. He expressed the opinion that the United States in its own interests should be prepared to assist in that settlement. He recalled that the foreign powers were complacent over the hostilities in China, apparently counting on the eventual exhaustion of Japan, but several of these powers are now involved in war themselves. He attributed their encroachment in large part to the indifference which they had built up to the need for the maintenance of peace in any part of the world.

(d) The second point was the question of the Netherlands East Indies. He had no doubt that the Japanese Government’s statement of April 15⁴⁸ reflected the sincere desire of the Japanese Government that the status quo of the Indies be maintained. There are nevertheless many Japanese who are concerned lest Japan eventually be made the catspaw of Great Britain or of the United States or of Germany and over Japan’s being left out in the event of some future disposition of the Indies. My informant admitted that so long as such apprehension is being shown by the Japanese people, suspicion abroad of Japanese motives is inevitable. In his opinion mutual distrust and suspicion would be overcome if the Netherlands Indies could assure to Japan normal and reasonable supplies of raw materials.

(e) Cooperation by the United States is needed for the improvement of relations between the United States and Japan. A vicious circle of things set in—upon the conflict with China breaking out: Japan set about to create a closed economy in China for the benefit of Japan; the United States then countered with the abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce;⁴⁹ and many Japanese feel that if there is to be no restoration of friendly relations with the United States Japan’s only means of salvation lies in proceeding with the plans for an economic bloc in the Far East.

Naturally the United States could not be expected to make any friendly gesture so long as Japanese assurances are not forthcoming that the plans for the elimination from China of American interests are to be abandoned and that Japan will cooperate with the United States on the basis of principles to which the United States is [devoted?]. But if such assurances were forthcoming and if the United States could make known its willingness to discuss the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, and possibly express willingness to extend credits covering shipments of raw cotton and other non military supplies to Japan, the political atmosphere could be immediately cleared.

2. My informant has given me on several occasions conclusive evidence of his familiarity with official matters the secrecy of which is closely guarded and therefore I have reason to believe his accounts of conversations with members of the Cabinet. Yesterday he showed extraordinary familiarity with all the details of certain matters known to us which are not known even to the principal subordinate officers in the Foreign Office. His statements to me as above reported can, I believe, be accepted as confirmation from a most reliable source of the substantial accuracy of the analysis of the present situation as presented to the Department in my telegram under reference.

Grew

47. Not printed. The Cabinet officers mentioned were the Prime Minister and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Navy.
48. See press release issued by the Japanese Embassy April 15, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 281.
49. See note of July 26, 1939, to the Japanese Ambassador, Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. iii, p. 558; for text of treaty, see ibid., 1911, p. 315.