Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

793.94/15849: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, May 4, 1940—noon.
[Received 1:47 p.m.]

304. The following is the substance as reported in the press of remarks made by the Foreign Minister at an anniversary dinner of the Japan International Association last night.

“In our relations with third powers about the same phenomena were seen immediately after the outbreak of the China war as after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident. Immediately after the Manchurian incident some people advocated ‘taking China now that we’ve got Manchuria’. Also irritated by the Stimson statement,³⁴ the same hotheads cried ‘punish America’. Now such utterances are sheer stupid blustering that cannot be permitted to circulate for one second. The foreign policy at the time was centered on the settlement of the Soviet-Japanese issues and regulations of relations with Britain and the United States. Then came the China war. Despite the local settlement policy of Japan, hostilities spread and friction with other powers arose. The same sort of hotheads cried that war should be waged also with the Soviet Union or that Britain and the United States should be punished. But such reckless proposals as pointing to war with third countries are utterly untenable as part of diplomatic policy. The primary object of Japan’s diplomatic policy is to settle the China war by avoiding friction with other powers as far as possible. This is only what is reasonable in the present circumstances but I regret to see that it is not thoroughly understood by the people. Japan is striving to expand productivity while carrying [on] the holy war but this is no easy job. But Japan must regulate its relations with other powers while pushing such policies at home. The Soviet Union while it was carrying out its expansion program advocate [d] the doctrine of peace on the outside and concluded nonaggression pacts with its neighbors. This is because it would not have been to its advantage to go to war before it became sufficiently strong. So it cried peace whenever it had any occasion to speak. At any rate our policy is to regulate relations with the Soviet Union and other powers. Especially important are American-Japanese relations. Just now they are pretty bad. It will be my task not to aggravate them even if we lack a treaty of commerce and navigation by which to guarantee the amity.³⁵ I think the American Ambassador to Tokyo is of the same mind. Japan must support the Wang Ching Wei regime to the last and crush the Chungking regime by armed force as quickly as possible, tnereby securing an early peace. Now there are not lacking those who are spreading the gloomy view that the Wang Ching Wei Government is incompetent. But it is dangerous merely to look at its defects and pronounce it unworthy of Japan’s support. We have no better plan at present than to safeguard the Wang regime and push our settlement of the war. In the European war the position of the neutrals is being ignored. Japan because of its geographical position has hardly any experience of having been a neutral while neighbor powers fought around it. Thus the people are lacking in training as a neutral. They are for this reason apt to fly off the handle over an affair like the Asama Maru incident.³⁶ In the present European war there have been many infringements of the rights of neutrals by belligerents. Japan will have a hard time protecting its right as a neutral. At this time it is essential that the people should realize the exact nature of the situation and deal with difficulties calmly and with good judgment.”

Shanghai please repeat to Peiping and Chungking.

Grew

34. On January 7, 1932, Secretary of State Stimson stated the nonrecognition-doctrine policy in identic notes for Japan and China; see telegrams No. 7 to the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 76, and No. 2 to the Consul General at Nanking, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iii, p. 7.
35. See also pp. 625 ff.
36. On January 21, a British naval party removed 21 German seamen from the Japanese trans-Pacific passenger ship Asama Maru, 100 miles out from Yokohama.