Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

740.0011 Pacific War/72

The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet (Hart) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark)⁴⁸

[Manila, November 13, 1940.]

The following notes, which might be called an “appreciation”, are submitted without attempt to judge or recommend our policy as regards intervention or non-intervention. The scope is meant to be restricted largely to our immediate relations vis-à-vis British and Dutch forces in the Orient.

There seems no doubt that Japan is resolved on a southward movement,—employing force if necessary. Her most important early objective is the oil supply from the East Indies. Obtaining actual possession of those oil fields would require some doing because of the ease with which the fields can be made unproductive for years.

In so far as it seems possible to differentiate between courses of action open to Japan, there are two:—

a. A direct jump to N. E. I., by-passing the British.

b. An advance against the British, primarily, either wholly water-borne direct against Singapore or step by step,—Indochina, Thailand, Burma and Malaya to Singapore.

The latter course, most probably, has been urged by the Axis Powers and Japan may have promised to take it. Advantages and disadvantages to Japan can be seen in either course and it seems unnecessary to attempt an evaluation herein; either one will eventually take in the N.E.I. It suffices, for the purposes herein sought, to most definitely assume that Japan is committed to their “southern advance”.

At present the British are faced with those two grave threats to their Far Eastern possessions:—The one, a direct attack by Japan, leaves her no alternative but to resist, alone, if she must, to the best of her ability; the other, a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies, leaves her with the choice of aiding the Dutch in what would almost assuredly result in a repetition of their failure in Norway, or of standing aside, knowing full well that their already precarious position would then become much more desperate. Their position in regard to opposing a Japanese attempt at occupation of the Netherlands East Indies is made more difficult by the fact that the Dutch themselves might not resist. And British Naval, Land and Air forces in the Orient are woefully weak.

Under anything approaching normal conditions British strategy in the Far East would demand that a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies, or Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies even if unresisted by the Dutch, should become a casus belli. Under present conditions, however, there is undoubtedly some indecision in the British Camp on the question of what Britain’s action should be, even if the Dutch resisted; but so desperate is Britain’s need to prevent the establishment of Japanese bases, etc., in the Netherlands East Indies that any commitment from us probably would be sufficient to embolden her to go to war to prevent such an eventuality.

The Dutch attitude, at least that indicated by their failure to send a representative to the recent conference, is understandable, but in the light of recent history hardly seems reasonable or wise. What they fear, of course, is that any consorting with the British would serve to end a Japanese indecision over the use of force against them and hasten a direct attack upon their islands. The Dutch know that British support would be only very meagre, and they may hope that by “maintaining the status quo” and showing no favorites they can escape disaster. Aside from the abundant proof of the weakness of this hypothesis to be found in recent European history, the best conclusion to be drawn from the record of the Japanese in the Far East would seem to be that the only thing that will deter them from an at tempt to seize the Netherlands East Indies will be their fear that, from one source or another, sufficient opposing force will materialize to render the venture risky; and that unless the chances of success are great, they will prefer to keep that portion of the vital markets which they now hold rather than throw them into an “all or nothing” gamble. And, as mentioned above, destruction of the oil fields must be kept in mind. Every addition to the defensive strength of the Netherlands East Indies adds something to the risks facing the Japanese; therefore it does not seem likely that the Dutch are doing themselves anything but harm in their refusal to confer with the British. Of course if the British should make their proffer of help to the Dutch conditional upon the Dutch coming to their assistance in the event of Japanese attack upon Malaya, or British Borneo, the Dutch refusal to accept is wisely taken; but apparently all the British want to discuss with the Dutch is the defense of the Netherlands East Indies. The Dutch attitude may possibly be the result of political factors under Nazi or Pro-Nazi influence, but whatever the cause, it does not appear to be one that will be likely to enhance their security.

The restraining influence which a certainty of British aid to the Dutch would have upon Japanese ambitions in the Netherlands East Indies probably would not of itself be sufficient permanently to deter them; but it would add something to the Japanese uneasiness.

With regard to our own action:—If it has been determined that it is in our interests to oppose a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies, or if there is a possibility that, for any reason, we will be acting jointly with the British or Dutch or both, then it seems essential that we should at once take positive steps to enable us to make the fullest and most effective use of our joint resources. On this station, that entails the initiation of Staff discussions covering the many points on which complete understanding and agreements are esssential to effective collaboration. That would go immeasurably further than the “exchange of information” basis on which we are now working. It should be possible, without making any political commitment, or without prejudging our final decision in each case, to proceed on certain assumptions. For instance, that in the event of a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies we will intervene if the British do, and to then carry out with the British (and the Dutch, if they are willing) the extensive “conversations” which that assumption necessitates. It is realized, however, that in practice there lies danger of certain implications of actually having made political commitments by the very fact of accepting such an assumption as having elements of possibility. Thus, if they come to be known, such conversations might have domestic complications sufficient to deter our statesmen; but from a military viewpoint the necessity for them is obvious. It can eventuate that Japan would take such conversations as a convenient excuse to charge “non-maintenance of the status quo” and thus justify their occupation of the N. E. I. That, however, has only a slightly better basis than the similar apprehension on the part of the Dutch referred to above. Naturally, all practicable precautions as regards secrecy would be taken at this end. The chances are that such precautions would be more effective with the British than with the Dutch. But “conversations” with the Dutch seem at least equally important because the Dutch have much the greater naval and air force available at present.

The question of Japanese reaction to certain of our moves tending to strengthen our position in this area, and to enable us to more effectively oppose them is undoubtedly being given much thought in Washington. As mentioned above, the possibility that such action on our part might be the catalytic agent that will crystallize the Japanese will toward a dash to the southward probably deserves some consideration.

The question of the “good will” Cruise is a case in point. If we are to trust the preservation of our interests to the good faith of the Japanese, such a cruise is not a particularly good idea. Neither does it fall into the category of good strategy if we institute such a cruise on the assumption that it will act as a check upon Japanese ambitions, if we are unprepared to carry through the measures that will be necessary in the event that assumption proves to be false. If, however, we are determined to use all our power to preserve our interests in this area, and are ready to do so, then the “good will cruise” is excellent strategy. It was difficult to advise the Department about such a cruise because of lack of information concerning our national policy. Therefore something of a middle course, such that a withdrawal could be made without loss of position (“face”), was advised.

A Japanese attack on British or Dutch possessions, or both, is a most likely development, unless the Japs are fairly certain that we will intervene. The knowledge that we will certainly do so would undoubtedly exert a heavy restraint, but the commitment to intervene | should by no means be made on the assumption that intervention will actually never be required. What then remains for us to determine is what we intend to do about it. Here again the safest assumption seems to be that the only consideration that our rights and interests in the Netherlands East Indies, as elsewhere in the Far East, will receive from the Japanese will be what we are able to force upon them; and that if we wish to maintain those interests, the occasion approaches which will be our last chance to do so except entirely on our own and starting from scratch.

48. Enclosure with letter dated Manila, November 13, 1940, from Admiral Hart to Admiral Stark, not printed. A copy was received by the office of the Secretary of State on November 26, 1940.