751G.92/24: Telegram
The Minister in Thailand (Grant) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 18—11:23 a.m.]
81. The Prime Minister called me to his residence this morning and, in the presence of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented me with a copy of an aide-mémoire on the Indochina matter, which, he said, had been sent by telegraph to the Thai Minister in Washington, for transmission to the Department.82 Incorporated in the aide-mémoire in question is the text of the aide-mémoire which was presented several days ago to the Vichy Government by the Thai Government, a copy of which was included in the Legation’s telegram 78, September 15, 4 p.m.83
Throughout the conversation the Prime Minister was very agreeable and manifested a very friendly attitude towards my Government. He said that since he is primarily a military man [he] long ago formed the habit of going through with matters which were awaiting accomplishment formality [without delay?] but that in the present circumstances in the matter of the Thai claims in Indochina he had adopted a policy of moderation, he was exercising restraint, and in this connection he was not unmindful of the attitude and wishes of my Government. He therefore earnestly hoped that my Government would consider sympathetically the Thai proposals to the Vichy Government and he appealed to me [to inform?] my Government of his hope. I said I would be happy to comply.
The Prime Minister went on to say that the Thai Government had adopted its present policy, as outlined in the aide-mémoire addressed to the Vichy Government, as a result of the strong demands of the Thai people of the intelligent classes residing in both Thailand and in the territory it is desired shall be returned to Thailand, that for a long time there had been a very strong feeling on the part of the Thai people concerning this matter of Thai territory which had been taken from Thailand by France. The feeling against the French had been very strong while there was no such feeling of resentment against the British in connection with the territorial changes in this area by which Great Britain had profited. The Prime Minister stated the matter was aggravated now, that Thai people in certain sections of Indochina were undergoing hardships at the hands of the French who were very much excited as the result of the collapse of their country. For instance, he said, the French authorities in some sections were arresting Thai and collecting from them one year’s taxes in advance in order [Page 123] to make up deficits in revenues resulting from the collapse of the home government. Additional Thai patrol forces, the Prime Minister continued, had been sent to certain frontier territory between Thailand and Indochina, but removed from the frontier by at least 25 kilometers, for the sole purpose of preventing trouble between the Thai and the French along the border, and not for any offensive action against Indochina.
I inquired of the Prime Minister as to whether his Government had developed a line of action to be followed in the event the Vichy Government should ignore or refuse the Thai request in the matter of the agreement as outlined in the aide-mémoire addressed to Vichy. He replied in the negative, adding that the Thai Government did not contemplate taking action by force. I then asked the Prime Minister if he would care to give assurance to my Government that under no circumstances would his Government resort to force in the matter. He replied at some length, referring to the difficult situation which exists at the present time for the Thai minority in Indochina. The Thai people in these contested areas might take matters into their own hands, the Prime Minister said. In the event of the attempt of a third party to enter the scene in Indochina, therefore, it might become necessary for the Thai Government, for the protection of its national interests, to “occupy” certain territory.
I informed the Prime Minister of the viewpoint of my Government, as outlined orally to the Thai Minister in Washington, which was incorporated in the Department’s telegram 46, September 11, 5 p.m. I also referred to the oral statement which I made to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on September 13, which was outlined in the second section of the Legation’s telegram 75, September 13, 2 p.m., pointing out to the Prime Minister that in the background of the whole question, aside from the matter of the possible use of military force, was the strong feeling of my Government that no action should be taken by Thailand or by any other government in this area which might tend to complicate an already greatly disturbed condition of affairs throughout the world. I said that personally I could appreciate the delicate situation in which Thailand finds itself as the result of the acute situation in Indochina and I could also understand the attitude of the Thai in regard to territory which they feel belongs to them, but, taking a long range view of the situation and considering the broader aspects of the question, it seemed to me that this was not the time to take any action in the matter since it might encourage aggression in Indochina by the very party while [which?] the Thai fear; that any territorial adjustments made now would likely not be permanent.