893.102 Tientsin/398: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 27—2:35 p.m.]
1074. Personal for the Secretary. 1. Mr. Butler, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sent for me this morning to convey on behalf of Lord Halifax a message for you to the effect that he had been troubled in his conscience by a statement contained in the Washington despatch published in yesterday’s Times. The [Page 228] article in question was entitled “America and Tokyo” and the portion referred to read as follows:
“Today Mr. Hull told the press that he had had no notification from London of the Tokyo formula but that the Embassy in Tokyo had advised him of its contents.”
Lord Halifax is particularly disturbed by what he thinks is the implication in this statement that he is not keeping close contact with you in matters of vital concern in the Far East. Mr. Butler explained that Lord Halifax had given instructions to the British Ambassador at Tokyo to keep our Embassy there informed of every step in the British negotiations with the Japanese Government. He had therefore purposely refrained from communicating the Anglo-Japanese formula directly to you through this Embassy or otherwise. Mr. Butler indicated that the Secretary of State had thought the arrangements made at Tokyo would be adequate and suggested it had also been thought that it would be preferable from your point of view not to have the formula sent directly from London. Mr. Butler did not make clear, however, why Lord Halifax thought such a procedure might have been embarrassing to Washington. Lord Halifax realizes that it may be entirely incorrect to interpret the statement in the Times article as indicating any criticism in Washington of the British procedure but he fears that it will be so interpreted in other quarters in this country. Mr. Butler reiterated that the Foreign Secretary was worried about the matter and hoped that if the present instructions for maintaining current information through direct channels at Tokyo are not entirely satisfactory, you will send him some indication, as his purpose is to keep the closest contact with you on all phases of the negotiations, if [in?] any way which may be most convenient to you. Mr. Butler indicated that Lord Halifax had asked him to convey this message rather than to send for me himself as he wished to avoid giving it any appearance of formality.
2. There will be a further debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on Monday; and among other subjects to be brought up will be that of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations at Tokyo. The Prime Minister will speak first and Sir John Simon,11 or Mr. Butler probably will speak for the Government in the Far Eastern section of the debate. Mr. Butler says that there will, of course, be searching questions asked, and that Lord Halifax is particularly desirous in the Government’s replies that nothing be said which would in the slightest degree be embarrassing to you and the President. He mentioned newspaper reports that the United States has denounced the American-Japanese [Page 229] Treaty of 1911 and asked if I knew anything about it.12 I told him that I had no information regarding this other than that appearing in the press. Mr. Butler then said that if there were anything bearing on the United States attitude, which you might feel that you could communicate before the debate on Monday, Lord Halifax would be most grateful.
The Government’s statement will affirm that the negotiations with Japan will be confined to the situation at Tientsin and other areas in China under Japanese occupation; and that the negotiations do not indicate any change in British policy in the Far East. Mr. Butler referred to the situation of fact which confronts Great Britain in the Far East and the precarious means of defense for British subjects and interests which are now at their disposal. He said that it is quite impossible to send any important units of the fleet to the Far East at this time and referred to the meager military forces stationed in China as being too weak to meet any serious trouble.
3. The British Government needless to say is keenly apprehensive about the situation in the Far East and while it wishes to avoid action or words which would in any way embarrass the United States Government, there is no doubt it would more than welcome any action on our part which would involve us with Japan and therefore by so much alleviate Great Britain’s desperate plight.13
- British Chancellor of the Exchequer.↩
- See note of July 26 to the Japanese Ambassador, vol. iii, p. 558; for text of treaty signed at Washington, February 21, 1911, see Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 315.↩
- See also telegram No. 1075, July 27, 6 p.m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, vol. iii, p. 694.↩