Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East; The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

893.102 Tientsin/311: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, June 26, 1939—6 p.m.
[Received June 26—12:11 p.m.]

297. Department’s 174, June 24, 3 p.m.

1. I shall set forth certain facts leading up to the proposal for round table conference before presenting my estimate and views on the points raised by the Department, in order that I might make clear my view that the position here rising out of the situation brought about in Tientsin by the Japanese military is one of quite extraordinary complexity.

2. Up to June 6 the question of the four alleged terrorists was not regarded by the authorities in Tokyo as one of special importance. In our conversation on June 19 (see our 284, June 19, 8 p.m.) the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had paid no attention whatever to the question until the British Ambassador called on June 6 and made representations with regard to the attitude of the Japanese military authorities. In each subsequent interview which Craigie has had with the Foreign Minister, the latter has stressed that the measures taken at Tientsin are for “military defense” or are “entirely in response to the military needs on the spot”. When the Vice Minister told me on June 13 that the government could not intervene, I should have realized, which I unfortunately did not until a few days later, that there was involved the doctrine of Imperial command. Thus the military in bringing about the situation at Tientsin were considered to be acting under a broad mandate from the Emperor. The Government could not therefore intervene, although as Sawada said it might “make recommendations or give advice” to the military.

3. The general officer commanding at Tientsin, who was directing the negotiations with the British, is responsible to the commander-in-chief in Peiping who in turn is responsible only to Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo. The demand on the British for a reply by June 7 and the threat of drastic action on June 14 were due to a peremptory order by the commander-in-chief who was moved to take this action by some of General Homma’s staff officers led by a Colonel Yamashita.

4. It is therefore practically certain that the situation which began to develop on June 14 was planned by the military in China and it is highly probable that the Cabinet had no knowledge of these plans before the military decided to bring matters to a head with the British, that is, prior to demand for settlement by June 7.

5. Such influence as the conservative elements within the Japanese Government have brought to bear on the Tientsin situation has been exerted, in my considered opinion, only within the last few days. The figure has been the Prime Minister (I have no reason to include the Foreign Minister as an important factor in the Japanese decision to accept the British proposal for a round table conference: in fact, the only indication which he gave me so late as June 19 of his view regarding the settlement of the Tientsin issue was that the British should give in on all points including the currency question). I am aware that on June 19 and 20 the Prime Minister’s personal adviser called on the Military Attaché of the British Embassy, who is familiar with problems at Tientsin, and through him communicated the Prime Minister’s views to Craigie, including the suggestion of a round table conference in Tokyo. This thought had already occurred to the British Embassy which had received instructions responsive to the recommendations made to London by Craigie referred to in paragraph 4 of our 274, June 15, 5 p.m. As soon as the proposal was made on June 20 by Craigie to Arfta, the Prime Minister, according to his adviser, approached the military authorities who alone had the power to decide and persuaded them to authorize acceptance of the British proposal.

6. Although I suggested as broadly as I could to Arita that the United States would not be indifferent to attempts to force the federated reserve currency on the foreign community in North China, I told the Prime Minister’s personal adviser repeatedly in the plainest possible language that the Japanese military in Tientsin would if they opened up the currency and other kindred issues bring about a situation of the utmost gravity from which it would be impossible for the United States to stand aloof. The adviser told me that he had communicated those views to the Prime Minister.

7. There is, in my opinion, no effective or influential body of opinion which stands in opposition to the National China policy, the two principal objectives of which are to assure by whatever means sources of raw materials and markets for Japanese goods. The extremists propose to attain those objectives now, by military means, and at all costs: others believe that these objectives can be attained gradually by other as well as military means. There are still others who, although not opposing continuation of conflict with China, hope that there may be brought about by international agreement a removal of the basic causes of world unrest and thus eliminate need for securing sources of raw materials and markets in China. Addressing myself, therefore, to the question raised in the first paragraph of the Department’s telegram under reference, I must observe that misconceptions are likely to arise of estimates made on the basis of appraisals of relative influence of the various elements within that government of what after all must be regarded as the attitude of the Japanese Government as a whole with regard to the Tientsin situation and future similar situations. I cannot too strongly emphasize that the military authorities have a completely free hand to bring about any situation they see fit, and that the Cabinet and other constructive elements can influence the military only by processes, persuasion and sweet reason. One strongly adverse factor in the present situation is the apparent determination of the British Government to establish an anti-aggression arrangement with the Soviet Government.^89a

8. The Department will I believe appreciate my view that the addressing to the Japanese Government of a note such as that outlined in paragraph 2 of the Department’s telegram under reference would be premature. Our immediately preceding telegram giving further details of the Anglo-Japanese conversations with regard to a round table conference will indicate that the British have informed the Japanese that currency questions are not to be excluded. I respectfully suggest that the Department may wish to express its views to the British Government before the conference begins and determine in the light of subsequent developments whether the suggested note would be useful.

9. There has been no perceptible reaction to the Secretary’s statement reported in the Department’s 167, June 19, 6 p.m. The effects on the Japanese Government of statements of foreign governments which are of concern to Japan take considerable time to manifest themselves, as was clearly illustrated in the case of President’s message of April 14 to Chancellor Hitler,⁹⁰ which it has been subsequently learned had profound repercussions in official Japanese circles.

Dooman

1. See vol. i, section entitled “Anglo-French-Soviet Negotiations …”
90. Printed in vol. i, section entitled “President Roosevelt’s Message of April 14 to Germany and Italy …”