Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, Volume I

740.00/706

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Moffat)

[Washington,] March 18, 1939.

The Soviet Chargé d’Affaires²² in the course of a conversation said that bad as the situation in Europe was, he felt there were some bright spots. The first was the statement of Mr. Welles,²³ and the second, the changed attitude of Mr. Chamberlain.²⁴ None the less, he did not see any possibility of ultimate pacification until certain Western Powers gave up their wish thinking that Hitler’s idea was ultimately to move against Soviet Russia. Such was not the case.

The Chargé felt that the next move of Germany would be in the direction of Rumania, with a view to making certain of basic raw supplies. Thereupon he believed that Germany would turn west, chiefly against France, realizing that never again would she have as good an opportunity to strike as at present. He attached considerable importance to the fact that France was now effectively surrounded by hostile countries on three sides and that there could be no repetition of 1870 or 1914, when the Government chose to move to Bordeaux.

He repeated Litvinov’s²⁵ dictum that peace was indivisible, and said that ever since the fall of Barcelona²⁶ his Government had been anticipating a heavy German-Italian drive.

Pierrepont Moffat

22. Constantine A. Oumansky.
23. See statement issued to the press by the Acting Secretary of State, March 17, 1939, p. 49.
24. British Prime Minister.
25. Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
26. For information concerning collapse of Spanish Loyalist resistance in Catalan area, see telegram No. 1206, February 5, 1939, 8 p.m., from the Counselor of Embassy in Spain, printed in vol. ii , section entitled “The Spanish Civil War: I. International Political Aspects.”