740.00/595½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

The British Ambassador35 called to see me this morning to make his first visit upon his return to Washington from England.

The Ambassador said that it was his impression upon his departure from England ten days ago that Mr. Chamberlain’s position in the country was very strong indeed. He said that both the extreme conservatives and the extreme radicals were continuing to belabor the Government violently because it had found itself in a position last September where Munich was possible, but that even these two elements now seemed to have come to the conclusion that Munich was preferable to a war in which England and France would both have been at a great disadvantage.

The Ambassador said that on January 24 and 25 public opinion in London and the Foreign Office in particular had been in an almost unbelievable state of excitement because of reports that Germany was planning a move in the west involving the invasion of Holland. By February 11, the day he had left London to come to the United States, opinion in general including that of the Foreign Office had swung over to a state of almost unbelievable optimism and of reassurance. The Ambassador said that he thought one state of mind was as disquieting as the other and that the nervous strain under which they were all living in England was appalling. He said that his own Foreign Office was in a very unsatisfactory condition. He said that Lord Halifax was a man of real ability and an “excellent Christian gentleman”, but that he did not seem to have any real insight into the European situation. He said that Sir Robert Vansittart36 was consulted by neither Chamberlain nor Halifax and was creating so much trouble that the Government would probably get rid of him this spring and he said that when Vansittart did go he would go with a considerable “splash”. I asked him what attitude Sir Robert was taking, and he gave me to understand that he was violently opposed to the policy of appeasement and strongly of the opinion that war was inevitable and that Great Britain should all along have taken a far stronger stand.

The Ambassador said that while he had not talked with the chiefs of the British naval or military establishments, he was nevertheless of the impression from his talks with members of the Government that the rearmament program was at last moving ahead very quickly. He said his belief was that far too much time had been wasted in laying [Page 19] the foundations for the rearmament program, such as the creation of special towns for special kinds of munitions factories, et cetera, but that now the projects which had been carried out were functioning with rapidity and successfully. He said that in his last talk with Lord Halifax the latter had said that the rearmament program was moving ahead so well that if the British Government could get safely through the next four months, he would feel assured as to the finally peaceful outcome of the present situation. The Ambassador commented that the real crux of the problem was that they ought to be in that position now and not still have to wait four months before feeling themselves sufficiently armed. He said one great step had been taken with the approval of everyone and that was the replacement of Sir Thomas Inskip by Lord Chatfield as head of the national defense program.

I told the Ambassador in general terms of Mr. Kennedy’s telegram reporting his recent conversation with Mr. Chamberlain37 and said that while I was, of course, relieved to receive such an optimistic impression of the present situation as that expressed by Mr. Chamberlain, the information which I had from other sources in Europe was all exceedingly disquieting and I mentioned the fact, without indicating its origin, that we had received reports which would tend to show that Italy was now planning for a definite showdown in March and that there were indications that Germany was prepared to back her up in that attempt. I also said that it seemed significant, in view of these reports, that the Government of Japan should at this moment have occupied the Island of Hainan. I said that it seemed to me in view of these reports we had received, all of them grave and all of them alarming, that there must be some explanation of Mr. Chamberlain’s optimism and I wondered if the Ambassador had any clue to give me with regard thereto.

The Ambassador said that his own feeling was that Mr. Chamberlain was a remarkably unemotional, very logical, and very clear thinker who was reasoning out the situation on a basis of abstract logic perhaps rather than by taking into account the human elements involved and the mercurial factors with which he was dealing. He said that he doubted whether Mr. Chamberlain’s colleagues in the Cabinet shared his feeling of reassurance, and that he, the Ambassador, knew as a positive fact that the Foreign Office was exceedingly apprehensive, although, as he had said before, in such a state of high tension that it was apt to lapse into the extremes of emotion one way or the other, varying from day to day.

I told the Ambassador that I hoped the Secretary of State would be well enough tomorrow to come to the office again and that I knew [Page 20] he would want to talk with the Ambassador, particularly with regard to the trade approach which the British Government was planning to make to the German Government.

In the course of our conversation the Ambassador handed me a copy of a secret and personal message “From Lord Halifax for the President”, a copy of which is attached.38

S[umner] W[elles]
  1. Sir Ronald Lindsay.
  2. Chief Diplomatic Adviser, British Foreign Office.
  3. Telegram No. 246, February 17, supra.
  4. See telegram to President Roosevelt, February 20, infra.