751.65/524: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

245. Bonnet said to me today that in his opinion the Italian Government was beginning to be somewhat desperate because it could foresee the collapse of its hopes for large annexations in the Mediterranean. It was his impression that the Italian Government would welcome any sort of incident at the present moment which might put the fat in the fire and might make it appear that war was the fault of the French. In this connection he mentioned the fact that he had just received a visit of a General of Military Intelligence who had been inspecting the French line in Tunis along the border of Libya. The General reported that it appeared from Italian actions there that the Minister of Marine was attempting to provoke an incident which could be made to appear an aggression on the part of the French. The French Government was therefore taking every conceivable precaution on all frontiers where its territory was contiguous to Italian territory to make certain that no Frenchman should be provoked to any hostile act against an Italian.

Bonnet said that he felt that the French at the moment should treat the Italians with the greatest conceivable politeness and leave criticism of Italian words and acts to the British and Americans who were not at the moment objects of Mussolini’s immediate hostility. At the same time the French should refuse flatly and absolutely any concession of any nature to the Italians. If the French should carry out this policy and if Mussolini should be unable to provoke any frontier incidents it seemed certain that Mussolini would have to crawl out of the present situation by disavowing the articles demanding French territory which have been appearing in the Italian press. In this connection Bonnet called attention to the fact that no official of the Italian Government had made any demand for any concessions by the French.

Bonnet was cheerful and said he felt that although there would be anxious days ahead the revival of economic life and morale in France plus the attitude of the United States plus Chamberlain’s latest statement27 had made it probable that war could be avoided.

Bullitt
  1. In the House of Commons, February 6, 1939.