862.20/906

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

No. 498

Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 111 of March 17, 8 p.m.,59 I have the honor to report that conjecture is rife over the course which British foreign policy is adopting towards Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviet consensus is that the forthcoming visit of Mr. Anthony Eden to Moscow will be devoid of concrete results. Indeed, the suspicion is voiced that he will exert pressure while here in an attempt to alter the character of the proposed Eastern Pact from mutual assistance to that of mere platonic consultation.

The attitude of the Soviet Foreign Office is characteristically more suspicious than the Soviet point of view encountered elsewhere. Mr. Umanski, who is not only the Chief Censor of the Foreign Office but the official therein who is closest to Mr. Litvinov,60 has in private conversation with certain foreign correspondents been actively propagating the thesis that the British Government, without question of doubt, is deliberately inciting Germany to attack the Soviet Union.

Mr. Radek,61 the foremost authority of the Soviet press on foreign affairs, whose influence with the Kremlin in matters of foreign policy is scarcely second to that of Mr. Litvinov, has, however, adopted another [Page 313] and more temperate view. In private conversation he states that British policy, instead of being devious, is on the contrary readily understandable. It was clear that Great Britain did not want war. While Great Britain was apprehensive of the growth of German military strength, particularly, in aviation, Great Britain was still more concerned over the possibility of German collapse. Were Germany to suffer an economic catastrophe or defeat in war, the disillusionment of the German masses would be profound; Germany would inevitably turn Red. The British were convinced, according to Mr. Radek, that Germany was essential to the European structure.

Mr. Mikhailski, who is well known to the Department under his pen name of “Lapinski”, adheres more to the viewpoint of Mr. Radek than to that of the Foreign Office. He believes that British policy is not Machiavellian but that the mildness of the British note to Germany and the visit of Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden to Berlin reflected pre-election anxiety and pressure from the Liberal and Labor ranks. He added, however, that British sensibilities would not be outraged by a German attack on the Soviet Union provided hostilities could be localized. The British believed that such an attack if successful might relieve pressure and, for a protracted period, concentrate German activities and interest in the East, with a corresponding détente in the West. Mr. Mikhailski, however, believed that this British point of view was entirely mistaken; war could not be localized and, were Germany to attack the Soviet Union, she would encounter effective resistance on the part of the Red Army, the strength of which was grossly underestimated abroad. Moreover, the danger of revolution in Poland should not be overlooked. Eighty percent of the population was ripe for revolt against the exploitation and the oppression of the Pilsudski62 régime. This represented a formidable obstacle to German aims.

Though Mr. Mikhailski is of Polish origin, his views on Poland tend in general to convey the impression that he is somewhat out of touch with actual conditions there.

From both Mr. Radek and Mr. Mikhailski I gained the impression that they do not attribute to Germany the deliberate formulation of a war policy; that Germany in reality wanted peace but that the aims and aspirations of Germany were such that they could only be realized as the result of a successful war. The formulation of German demands for “justice” would present a grave menace to the peace of Europe as soon as there was a conjuncture of German military preparedness and industrial efficiency.

The theory seems to be accepted in Soviet official quarters that it would take Germany at least another year to build up her new military [Page 314] establishment but that the present industrial efficiency of Germany would sooner or later decline as a result of commodity shortage and lack of foreign exchange. The years 1936 to 1938 seem to be viewed with particular apprehension as the period within which the German military and industrial factors would arrive at the aforesaid conjuncture. There seems, however, to be no real fear of an outbreak of hostilities during the present year, despite the character of the situation in Memel.

While, as reported above, concrete results are not expected from the visit to Moscow of Mr. Eden, the visit of M. Laval will, it is thought, be more fruitful. At least, “a protocol in Moscow” should result.

Respectfully yours,

John C. Wiley
  1. Not printed.
  2. Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs.
  3. Karl Radek, editor of Pravda.
  4. Joseph Pilsudski.