724.3415/3746: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:15 p.m.]
98. Arms embargo proposal.
1. China and Denmark accept, no conditions stipulated. Great Britain accepts on condition of acceptance by the same states as specified last year (Consulate’s 90, May 22, 4 p.m.).
Peru confirms previous reply (Consulate’s 91, May 22, 5 p.m.)72 and adds in substance as follows: “Will fulfill its duties as member of the League with respect to what may be decided in regard to the transit of arms concerning which there exist provisions in treaties in force but hopes that logically measures concerning exportation will precede those relating to transit.”
2. Germany—no reply having yet been received from Berlin taken together with Germany’s attitude toward the League, incline Secretariat officials to believe that Germany will not make any reply to the embargo communication. They feel, nevertheless, that Germany might yet reply at least in some terms in view of the circumstances that the communication was signed by Najera and that Berlin might [Page 246] for reasons of policy wish to avoid injuring the amour pro pre of a Latin American.
[3.?] Japan—in the course of a conversation on another subject and without my making direct inquiries Yokoyama stated to me that he had had no exchanges with Tokyo on the subject of the proposed arms embargo, that he was merely waiting to note whether any other state made its action contingent on that of Japan and that in such event he would confine his action solely to notifying his Government. He added that he had no idea as to what his Government’s policy would be in such event.
4. Responsible Secretariat officials inform me that should Japan (or any other state not yet approached) be so named the procedure would undoubtedly be that a communication would be forwarded to the Government concerned of a type indicated in my 88, May 22, 2 p.m. paragraph 4(c).
5. Responsible Secretariat officials are very pessimistic respecting the successful issue of the embargo efforts on two scores; (a)—the apparent attitude of the bordering states in the matter of the “transit treaties” with the belligerents; (b)—the large number of states on whose action so many states are making theirs contingent.
With regard to the latter they see in this naming of so many other states a definite policy to avoid taking action on the embargo. They see these states as inspired by the expectation that some of the states they thus name will either reply unfavorably or make no reply and that thus the embargo plan may be killed and at the same time responsibility therefor diverted.
6. In the circumstances that seem to be developing Secretariat officials feel that the only hope for a successful issue of this matter lies in two or three of the great powers taking the position that they will institute an embargo regardless of the action of any other states and that the moral force of such a position would impel all the other powers to follow such an example. They envisage that it would facilitate the general acceptance of such a position should the pertinent statements of policy include that such action would not be regarded as a precedent but that the Chaco situation should be considered a special case, ample grounds for regarding it as such being in their opinion to be found in the Commission’s report and in the general Chaco situation.
- Not printed.↩