Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume I

Inquiry files

The Ambassador in Italy ( Page ) to the Secretary of State

Rome , November 12, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Some little time ago Mr. Henry Nelson Gay, a well known American gentleman here in Rome, who is greatly interested in historical matters here, showed me a letter¹ which he had received from Professor Charles H. Haskins, Chairman of the Research Committee [of] Inquiry, formed, as stated therein, under the direction of Colonel House for the preparation of material for the use of the American Delegates to the Peace Conference, requesting Mr. Gay to prepare such material relating to Italian interests.

Mr. Gay is the possessor of the historical library of the Risorgimento Period in which, as I recall it, Professor Thayer states he wrote the life of Cavour.

He has brought me this afternoon three copies of the first batch of material prepared by him. This relates to Italian interests and claims in Africa, and he has requested that a copy be forwarded to Professor Charles H. Haskins, Chairman of the Research Committee of Inquiry, and to the President, and I have suggested that a copy be forwarded directly to Colonel House, which copy is going to Paris in the same pouch with this.

Mr. Gay states that this present statement regarding Africa is absolutely confidential, consisting in large part, of an Italian official communication of the Government which has been made known to no other Embassy and which has been given with the understanding that the American Delegates will regard it as absolutely confidential. Because of its confidential character, I am sending it in the form of this confidential letter instead of in an ordinary despatch.

Other material relating to Italy’s claims and interests in the Adriatic and Mediterranean will be forwarded as soon as Mr. Gay is able to prepare them.

Without undertaking, in any way, to assume responsibility for these papers, I feel that they will prove of great interest and also of much use.

Always [etc.]

Thos. Nelson Page

[Enclosure]

Mr. H. Nelson Gay to the Ambassador in Italy ( Page )

Palazzo Orsini, Rome , November 12, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Page: Referring to our previous conversation, when I showed you a letter which I had received from President Charles Haskins, of the Research Committee, formed under the direction of Colonel Edward M. House for the preparation of material “for the use of the American Delegates at the Peace Conference,” requesting me to prepare such material, I would say that I am preparing a series of memoranda upon Italian interests.

Unfortunately, the request has reached me at a late date, but the memoranda will be sent out in sections as rapidly as possible.²

The present statement regarding Africa is absolutely confidential, consisting in large part of an Italian official communication of the Government, which has been made known to no other Embassy, and which has been given with the understanding that the American Delegates will regard it as absolutely confidential.

As my own views with regard to Italy’s economic requirements coincide with the general lines of the communication, my prefatory statement is favorable to Italy’s claims.

In accordance with your suggestion that a copy of this material be sent directly to Colonel House, I would be glad if you would send the material accompanying this letter to him at Paris by the first courier, and I shall be glad to avail myself of the opportunity to forward other material as I am able to prepare it.

I am sending a copy of this memoranda also to President Charles Haskins, at No. 3755 Broadway, New York City.

Believe me [etc.]

H. Nelson Gay

[Subenclosure 1—Memorandum]

Part I.—Italian Claims

foreward

The following brief official pronouncement was recently made by the Italian government to the author of these Memoranda, regarding the causes of Italy’s intervention and her purposes in the present war. No one who is intimately acquainted with the course of events in 1914 and 1915, and who understands the character of the men who are governing Italy would question the sincerity or the accuracy of the general statements which it contains. But as the application of general principles to concrete cases is not infrequently open to varied interpretation, so in the case of Italy’s purposes and interests the honest application of general principles of nationality and of international economic equity to the complex racial and economic conditions created by twenty centuries and more of civilization and human struggle, such as those prevailing in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, is far from clear, and notwithstanding the sincere desire of Italy and the Allies to establish just conditions at the Peace Conference, the delimitation of frontiers must encounter difficulties of unquestionable gravity.

Italian Official Pronouncement. “The purpose of Italy in this war is identical with that so justly set forth by President Wilson: to obtain a peace truly equitable and lasting.

In order to attain this end it is necessary that so far as possible all causes of future conflict between neighboring peoples be eliminated, particularly causes of unjust territorial possession calculated to excite hostility, and requiring the maintenance of large armaments. …³ Italy in her intervention on the side of the Allies proposed for herself no aims of imperial conquest. She entered the war in 1915 voluntarily, for ideal ends of justice and liberty. She was not threatened by either belligerent, but entered voluntarily at a moment when fortune was showing herself distinctly unfavourable to the Allies. She entered for highly moral ends that are in full harmony with the general principles of law and of liberty, namely to exercise her inalienable right of completing her national unity and to secure the just territorial conditions essential to solid national defence.

It is proper also to recall here the fact that at the very outset of the European conflict, through the declaration of neutrality which she made in view of Austria-Hungary’s violation of the spirit and the letter of the Triple Alliance^*, Italy took a firm stand against the policy of aggression and domination which inspired the Central Empires. Her declaration of neutrality freed France from all danger of attack on the south-eastern frontier, thereby liberating the French army of the Alps for service elsewhere, and rendering possible the victory of the Marne which was the first formidable blow delivered against Germany’s plans of hegemony,^†

Italy by historical tradition and as prompted by her national and juridical spirit is firmly opposed to hegemony or domination by whomsoever exercised; she aims solely to establish for herself and for others conditions of reciprocal and reasonable national safety by which disarmament may be obtained and by which a situation of equality of opportunity may be created for the moral and material progress of all nations.”

Public Opinion in Italy. The declaration of entire absence of imperialistic aims, made by the Italian government in this pronouncement, may be accepted with confidence, for any imperialistic policy would disastrously fail of support among the vast majority of the Italian people. If the Italians ever suffered from megalomania the disease was contracted from German contagion, was of brief duration and has long since been cured. They have traditions neither of Napoleonic conquest nor of British imperialism to beacon them mistakenly into paths of unjust domination. In the grave hour of peace negotiations, when the temptation to the victors of enforcing peace conditions that will sow the seeds of future conflict, the public opinion of Italy will be found to be on the side of moderation, of conciliation and of fair play. Italy herself will expect to make, as well as to receive, concessions in the Adriatic in the establishment of boundaries suitable for naval defence. In the adjustment of the economic situation in Asia Minor Italy will be ready to support the policy of the open door, but if spheres of influence are to be mapped out there she will expect fair treatment from the other Great Powers; the question for her will be not of quantity, but of proportion—that is, fair treatment calculated to maintain her proportionate power and her prestige, and to satisfy the economic needs created by her natural increase of population and by her rapid industrial development.^* In North Africa she will expect from France arid England the rectification of conditions which seem to her manifestly unjust. (Cf. Part 1., Section (c). Chapter 3.)⁴

Italy’s Attitude Toward America. The attitude of France toward Italy during the past months has been the subject of much bitter comment even among the most Franco-phile Italians; it may be due to administrative influences at the Quai d’Orsay rather than to initiative on the part of the present French government, but it is considered a logical continuation of that semi-hostile policy toward Italy which France has followed during the past half-century and which drove Italy into the Triple Alliance. As this subject will be treated in one of the Memoranda which follow (cf. Part 2, Section c).),⁵ it is sufficient at this point to note the fact that today France does not possess the confidence of Italy. Certainly one of the problems of the Peace Conference will be that of establishing so far as possible relations of mutual trust between these two great Latin peoples—such relations being indispensable as a guarantee of the future maintenance of European peace.

Toward England Italy turns with greater confidence—and it is to be noted that Italian friendship for England arouses French jealousy—but it is to America that the Italian people look for entire disinterestedness in the consideration of Italian interests. Today (November 30, 1918) America occupies a unique position in Italian public opinion. President Wilson has placed the consideration of international questions on high moral ground; American idealism is beginning to be understood in Europe; and it is the belief in America’s sense of absolute justice that has created among the Italian people the expectation that through her efforts rather than through those of any other of the Allies the Great Peace of the world can be made a lasting peace.

Italian Interests. To the superficial observer it may appear that harmony of views as to precisely what Italy’s interests require, is wanting among Italians. In reality, however, there are no differences of fundamental purpose or opinion. Italian national unity must be completed. Italian boundaries such as will insure strong defence by land and by sea must be secured. Italy’s legitimate economic interests must be protected.

Elements of anti-Italian propaganda abroad have endeavored to make it appear that Italy has changed her policy of late and reduced her territorial claims. This is entirely false—manifestly false as will appear from the following Memoranda. From the first Italy’s claims have been based upon the three fundamental considerations just stated, considerations which are based upon geographical and race conditions which are not susceptible of change. Her claims today are what they were four years ago, and the fine consistency of the speeches of Baron Sonnino, minister of foreign affairs during this entire period, bears witness to a national consistency under circumstances of widely fluctuating international fortunes, such as is possible only in a cause of which the basis is international justice. The writer of these Memoranda has interviewed at length many political leaders who have freely criticised various phases of Sonnino’s conduct of foreign affairs, but their views on the fundamental lines of Italy’s claims and interests are identical with Sonnino’s own.

The precise frontiers by which Italy’s commonly recognized rights and interests may be secured, must be determined largely by technical considerations—and their discussion demands at many points special technical knowledge.

These Memoranda have been prepared as a contribution to the understanding of these boundary interests and of political questions in the Mediterranean, and are reinforced by important unpublished Italian official statements and statistics—several of them of a technical nature.

For convenience they are submitted under classification as follows:

Part 1. Italian Claims.

Foreward.

• Section a). Completion of nationality—Claims based on race; language; history; sentiment of nationality; trade requirements imposed by geographical conformation.
  • Chapter 1). Trentino—Upper Adige.
  • 2). Julian Venetia (Eastern Friuli, Trieste, and Istria).
  • 3). Fiume.
  • 4). Dalmatia.
• Section b). Competion [of] nationality—Claims based upon necessities of national defence.
  • 1). By land.
  • 2). By sea.—Problem of the Adriatic.
• Section c). Requirements of foreign commerce.
  • 1). Adriatic Sea—Albania.
  • 2). Asia Minor.
  • 3). Africa.

Part 2. Difficulties in actuating these claims.

• Section a). Just claims of other nationalities, conflicting with the just claims of Italy.
• b). Unjust imperialistic claims of other nationalities, conflicting with the just claims of Italy.
• c). Jealousy of increase in Italy’s strength harboured by other Great Powers in Europe.

H. Nelson Gay

[Subenclosure 2—Memorandum]

Part I.—Italian Claims

section a).—completion of nationality.—Claims based on race; language; history; sentiment of nationality; trade requirements imposed by geographical conformation.

Speeches of Sonnino. Even at the cost of the repetition of some ideas already set forth in the official pronouncement quoted, it is important to review briefly Sonnino’s declarations regarding Italian interests made during the past eighteen months in speeches delivered before parliament. They will serve to refute completely any charges of mutability in Italy’s purposes, and may be considered as a proper point of departure for a detailed examination of the grounds of Italy’s claims for the completion of her national unity through a readjustment of her boundaries to the north and east. On June 20, 1917 Sonnino declared:

“If a lasting peace is to be assured, it is necessary that Italy obtain secure national frontiers—an indispensable condition for her full independence. Our national programme is the same as that proclaimed in 1859 and in 1866, namely the union and independence of the Italian people which they of their own free volition demand—and this is absolutely necessary if Italy is to prove in Europe a secure and permanent factor in the maintenance of peace and in the advancement of civilization.

Far from us be any thought of oppression or subjection or humiliation of any race of any state, near or distant, great or small. Our aim is to cooperate in the establishment of the equilibrium of power which is the condition and the guarantee of reciprocal respect, and in bringing about mutual concessions—essential elements of liberty and equity in the society alike of individuals and of peoples.

Our aspirations are, I repeat, for liberty and security, both for ourselves and for others. We have no desire to acquire frontiers that would constitute a menace to a neighbor or a peril to anyone, but simply frontiers that will serve as a bulwark to the independence of our Country and a guarantee of its pacific civic progress.”

In his speech of October 25, 1917, Sonnino again referred to Italy’s aims:

“The guarantees for the maintenance of peace must be sought in the very conditions of peace themselves—conditions of equity exhibiting all possible regard for the just aspirations of the peoples. …⁶

The Allied Nations have entered the war with the high ideal purpose of defending and re-establishing international justice and the rights of the peoples which have been so barbarously violated. But they cherish also their individual aims which, far from being inspired by imperialistic designs as has been malignly insinuated, look on the contrary toward the legitimate application of the general principles of international justice and of the rights and liberties of the peoples. France, victim together with Russia of that aggression of 1914 which has few parallels in the world’s history, seeks the recovery of the provinces which were violently torn from her in 1871. And Italy is fighting equally for the recovery of her own natural frontiers, for the liberation of her brothers oppressed under a foreign yoke, and to secure for herself in the Adriatic the conditions essential to her existence and to her legitimate defence.”

And in his speech of February 23, 1918, Sonnino further elucidates Italy’s ideals and policy:

“An underhand campaign of foreign propaganda has attempted to insinuate that Italian aspirations are inspired by conceptions of imperialism, of anti-democracy, of anti-nationalism, etc. This is all absolutely false. Such insinuations have been possible only because of an absolute ignorance of real conditions. Our revindications from Austria are based on claims of ethnography and of legitimate defence by land and by sea. The ethnographical grounds are self-evident and are consecrated by the indomitable Italian spirit of our unredeemed provinces. And the grounds of legitimate defence by land and by sea are equally clear. In considering frontiers for defence, wherever one encounters a mixed population a just delimitation can be obtained only through mutual concessions and reciprocal sacrifices; otherwise conditions will be created containing the germs of future conflicts.

It is with this conception that are inspired Italy’s revindications, which according to our firm conviction, are calculated to insure for the future that confident collaboration in the political and economic field which it is the vital interest alike of Italy and of the Jugo-Slav nationality to establish upon a solid foundation.

We aspire only to that minimum of safety on our military and naval frontiers which is a postulate essential to liberty and political independence, rendering possible both normal disarmament and the pacific development of our resources and our business activities without constant preoccupation over the danger of surprise and attempts at domination on the part of our neighbors. We ask for no privileged situation from which to attack others, but simply for those conditions which are indispensable for our own reasonable safety.”

The favorite method in discussion adopted by those who would oppose Italy’s national revindications is that of confusing the two claims which Sonnino has here clearly set forth as absolutely distinct, though both absolutely essential for the future of Italian nationality. As Sonnino says, for Italy’s national revindications “the ethnographical grounds are self-evident”; and the “grounds of legitimate defence by land and by sea are equally clear”. The grounds of defence, however, of necessity include the annexation of some territory occupied by non-Italian peoples, and it is by attacking these claims of Italian defence as if instead they were claims of Italian ethnography, that Italy is misrepresented as putting forth unjust pretensions and therefore as possessed of imperialistic ambitions. One might as well attack the occupation of the Panama Canal Zone by the United States on ethnographical grounds, ignoring the fact that America’s claims to it are based in no sense upon grounds of ethnography, but upon grounds of national defence and upon grounds geographically imposed by considerations of economic development.

The “unredeemed” European territory to which Italy lays claim may be divided for convenience of treatment into four territorial sections, of which the first comprises the Trentino and the Upper Adige. In each of the four divisions, the consideration of national defence is combined with the various other considerations of nationality, but as national defence is separately treated at length in a later section (cf. Part 1. Section b.),⁷ this consideration will be but briefly touched upon in the four divisions of the present section.

Chapter 1.—Trentino and Upper Adige.

The Upper Adige and the Trentino occupy the upper and middle basins of the Adige, an Italian river of about 250 miles in length, which has its sources in the Rhaetian Alps and empties its waters into the Gulf of Venice. The Upper Adige and the Trentino, though by Austria separated as administratively distinct, form geographically one region, of which the vital interests are geographically common. The Upper Adige covers 7,280 square chilometres, the Trentino 6,356 square chilometres. Together they contain about 600,000 inhabitants, of which some 410,000 are Italian by race, language and sentiment, and 190,000 German. By the possession of this region Austria, contrary to all natural laws, thrust a deep angular salient of its political boundaries like a wedge into the Italian territory of Lombardy and Venice, rendering impossible Italy’s sound military defence, and gravely injuring the economic interests of both of the Upper Adige-Trentino region, and of the region of the Lombardo-Veneto. Geographically the most northern point is the Vetta d’Italia (Top of Italy) 47°, 5’, 30”; the most southern the Corno d’Acquilio, 45°, 40’, 20”; to the east the Cornetto di Confine 29°, 59’, 30” (east of Ferro); to the west Monte Murterèl 28°, 3’ (east of Ferro).

The purely Italian characteristics of this region are unmistakable. On the north it is bordered by the highest ridges of the Alps, the watershed which divides the streams flowing north and emptying their waters through the Danube into the Black Sea, from those flowing south, emptying into the Gulf of Venice and the Adriatic Sea; the division delineated by Nature is clear and absolute, the division between two worlds differing in physical aspects, climate and trade interests, and inhabited by two distinct races, distinct by blood, language, tradition, character and sentiment. The impressions of the traveller crossing the Alpine summits from the German side have been well described by one of the most fervid apostles of Italy’s claims to this region: “Whether the traveller approach from France, or from Switzerland, or from the German and Slav countries, as soon as he has crossed the crest of the Alps, whether by tunnel or under the open sky, and begins to descend swiftly along the fast-flowing rivers, he feels the same certainty in his soul—This is Italy—. No sooner do the waters begin to flow to the south than the fair land discloses herself, beautiful as some supernatural vision. These are her vineyards and her flowers, her streams and her perfumes. The mountains rear themselves less loftily, the valleys descend like rays, the hills spread out towards the plain, the plain infinite and remote is lost to view as it stretches towards the Adriatic. And from this immense descent, from this flow of a thousand streams and rivers towards the Italian sea, there presents itself before ones eyes as before those of the mind, the unquestionable truth: The whole extent of the Adige is Italian territory, even though from its Alpine source to the hills of Verona the black and yellow banner of the Hapsburgs may wave above it.”

Military Defence. In the possession of this strategic region by Austria lies the chief explanation of the long duration of the Triple Alliance—which was repeatedly renewed in absolute violation of the general feeling of the Italian people. Austria, a state of about fiftyone million inhabitants, would have been, even without the advantage of this unnatural domination of Italian territory, militarily much stronger than Italy, a nation of about thirty-six million inhabitants; but by the possession of this territory of the Upper Adige and the Trentino which contain numerous mountain passes leading down into the plains of Lombardy and the Veneto, Austria held the gates of Italy, and the latter was completely at her mercy. The first sound line of defence for Italy under these conditions was the Adige, and in case of a war single-handed against Austria she would have been obliged at the outset to take up her position on this river, abandoning all of the Friuli and almost all of the Veneto, comprising altogether about 20,000 square chilometres containing 3,000,000 inhabitants—that is a fifteenth part of her territory and a twelfth part of her population. Italy, therefore, had only to choose between this perpetual peril of invasion and her position in the Triple Alliance.

The natural frontier of Italy to the north, that determined by Nature and offering the strongest line of military defence—strongest both because of its geographical conformation and because it is the shortest—is that which follows the highest ridge of the Alps, being, as has been said, the watershed dividing the German streams flowing to the north from the Italian streams flowing to the south; for the most part it is the boundary by which the Austrians have generally distinguished between the Nordtirol and the Südtirol. This natural frontier of Italy extends from Monte Murtaro (above Bormio di Valtellina) along the crest of the highest chain for a distance of about 240 chilometres to Monte Paterno and is pierced by three passes only, those of Rèsia (Reschen), the Brennero (Brenner) and Dobbiaco (Toblach)—and by five foot paths. From the point of view of military defence contrast this natural frontier with Italy’s present political frontier, which breaks from the great chain at Monte Murtaro, descends in an irregular line to Lake Garda, almost to Verona, and then rambles off to the north and east along the lower ridges of the Venetian Alps, with innumerable corrugations, until it rejoins the great chain beneath Monte Paterno. This unfortunate political frontier, which is 370 chilometres in length, is pierced by forty-two passes and foot paths, among which are thirteen important passes: the Stelvio (above Bormio), Tonale (above Edolo), Ponte Caffaro (above Idro), Garda (above Peschiera), Borghetto (above Verona), Pian delle Fugazze (above Schio), Val d’Arsa (above Asiago), Primolano (above Bassano), Monte Coppolo (above Fonzaso-Feltre), Caprile and Falcade (above Agordo), d’Alemagna and Monte Piano (above Pieve di Cadore). The reality of the perpetual menace which the possession of these numerous passes by a foreign power constituted against Italy was proved in May 1916, when Austria made her great Trentino offensive with half a million men, and barely missed breaking through into the Venetian plain in the rear of the Italian armies of the Isonzo.

Italy now claims in this region as a right her natural frontier of the great chain in the Upper Adige, which she has recovered by the valor of her armies—a frontier of 240 chilometres with only three great gates in the high Alps to defend, in place of the old insecure frontier of 370 chilometres with its thirteen great gates close upon the plain.

Under Monte Paterno this natural frontier which Italy claims, joins the existing political frontier of the Carnic Alps, and proceeds eastward towards the northern limit of Julian Venetia. For about seventy-five chilometres the existing political frontier coincides almost perfectly with the natural defensible frontier of the Carnic Alps, and only slight modifications would be required if this frontier should be retained; for the last twenty-five chilometres, however, beginning north-west of Moggio, the political frontier abandons the natural frontier (at the double pass of Meledis) and bends to the south-east leaving to Austria the whole of the upper valley of the Fella, with Malborghetto. But the discussion of this portion of Italy’s northern frontier more properly belongs to the study of Julian Venetia (Part 1, section a, chapter 2.)⁸ and to that of the general problem of national land defence (Part 1, section b, chapter 1.)⁸

It should be added here that some Italian military authorities argue that the Carnic Alps do not form the real limits of Italy, and claim that Italy’s new frontier should be fixed farther north to coincide with the high ridge of the Tauern Alps, and should include the upper basin of the Drave as far as Kreuz Ech and the Conca di Tarvis. But this question may best be considered in the general study of national land defence.

Population. Of the Italian population of 410,000 in the Trentino and Upper Adige, about 370,000 inhabit the Trentino and about 40,000 the Upper Adige; in other words the population of the Trentino is almost exclusively Italian, whereas in the Upper Adige it is today only about one-fifth Italian. The situation in the Upper Adige is therefore not dissimilar to that of portions of Alsace-Lorraine, where German immigration and violence have partially usurped territory which is geographically non-German.^* Nor have Austrian methods in the Südtirol (Upper Adige-Trentino) differed substantially from German methods in Alsace-Lorraine. It should be kept in mind that Austria has had a free hand in this region for a century and has used her domination to Germanize in every manner possible, and to eliminate Italian blood and sentiment—and she has aggravated her methods with particular violence during the past ten years. She has allowed no Italian schools in bilinguist cities and has absolutely deprived thousands of Italian children of even elementary education in many rural districts. She has violated her own constitution and prevented her subjects of Italian race from voicing their claims of redress for their violated rights. If Italy were to adopt in the Upper Adige for ten years the methods used there by Austria, during her hundred years of occupation, it is not an exaggeration to say that the German inhabitants of even the least Italian portion of that region would no longer be in a majority.

But taking the Upper Adige even as it is, Italy’s claims to it appear to be perfectly valid. Geographically—for reasons of military defence and for necessities of economic life—the Upper Adige must be considered as one with the Trentino; and so considered the population of the entire region is more than two-thirds indisputably Italian—namely about 410,000 out of a total of 600,000.

If one institutes a comparison between these figures and those of Alsace-Lorraine the contrast is striking, for after nearly a half-century of German domination in the geographically French provinces of the Rhine, only a fourth, or at most a third of the population has remained French in language and customs.

A similar comparison might also be made between the Upper Adige-Trentino region and that of northern and western Bohemia.

Language. The language of the entire Trentino is Italian. Of the 13,477 Germans inhabiting this region, 5,000 inhabit the ten villages: Provés, Lauregno, S. Felice, Senale (in Val di Non), Tródena and Anterivo (in Val d’Avisio), Luserna (on the southern boundary close to the Sette Comuni Vicentini), and Fierozzo, Frassilongo and Palú (in the Alta Valle della Férsina). These German villages are all bilinguist, their inhabitants speaking Italian as well as their German dialect. The other 8,500 Germans are scattered throughout the region, being government officials, or soldiers, or persons dependent upon them for their living.

In the Upper Adige the prevailing language is German, although in several districts it is Italian, and in others the inhabitants are bilinguist. The Italian population is thus distributed, according to statistics compiled by Antonio Toniolo and published in the Archivio per l’Alto Adige, Vol. 11: in the city of Bolzano 5,370; in the Capitanato di Bolzano 11,916; in the Capitanato di Merano 7,732; in the Capitanato di Silandro 417; in the Capitanato di Brunico 5,908—a total of 32,000. The remaining 8,000 or 9,000 Italians are not Austrian citizens and are scattered throughout the region. To these 40,000 Italian inhabitants may be added some 15,000 Italian temporary emigrants which are not included in the preceding statistics, but which, prior to the war were employed for eight or nine months of each year in the Upper Adige.

Industry and Trade. The natural commercial outlet for the Trentino and Upper Adige is the Lombardo-Venetian plain; indeed the movement of trade for this mountain region has been geographically imposed by Nature with peculiar rigor. For the Upper Adige one document may suffice to illustrate general trade conditions. In 1864 the Chamber of Commerce of Bolzano, traditionally the principal commercial organization of the whole region of the Upper Adige, voted to demand from the central government separation from the province of Innsbruck and union with the Veneto, its natural market. There was no political motive in the demand, for all the territory involved was then under Austrian rule; the motive was purely commercial and the conditions which inspired it were geographical—the same in 1864 as they are today, for geography does not change. Two years later the Venetian plain passed to the dominion of Italy, while the mountain region remained to Austria; political considerations thus entered to raise an artificial barrier—the unnatural Austro-Italian frontier of 1866—between the Upper Adige and its natural market and to obstruct commercial action and development; however, many of the products of the region, notwithstanding the difficulties artificially imposed, insisted upon finding their geographical outlet—the Veneto.

Principal among these products is lumber, which naturally follows the course of the rivers, all of them Italian rivers, on which it floats down to its geographically imposed market—the Lombardo-Venetian plain. Forests are among the richest resources of both the Upper Adige and the Trentino, covering nearly 40% of the territory of the former and 48% of that of the latter, whereas in Italy forests are relatively scarce and lumber is in great request. In the Trentino alone the annual production of lumber is valued at over four million crowns, almost all of which has been exported to Italy. Had not the Austrian government opposed obstinately every project of construction of roads and railways connecting the Trentino with the Lombardo-Veneto, production and importation could have been largely increased to the mutual advantage of both the mountain regions and of the Italian plain.

Cattle-raising, which is carried on as one of the most important interests in the Upper Adige and the Trentino, has always been closely allied with the interests of the rest of northern Italy, but during the last fifty years the unnatural Austro-Italian frontier and the grazing and commercial obstructions imposed by Austria have greatly hampered the cattle-raisers in their affairs. For centuries the graziers were accustomed in the hot season to drive their herds from the Lombardo-Venetian plain up into the mountains of the Trentino and the Upper Adige, and as the winter approached to bring them back again to the plain. By the artificial territorial division of 1866, and the consequent tariff and sanitary restrictions, Austria gravely injured the grazing interests of those regions—an injury which the annexation of the Trentino and the Upper Adige to Italy will now rectify for the future. In 1910 the Upper Adige possessed 112,000 head of cattle, 75,000 sheep, 21,000 swine, 7,500 horses; the Trentino 98,000 head of cattle, 26,000 sheep, 38,000 goats, 27,000 swine, 9,000 horses; in the Trentino at this date the number of sheep and goats was less than half that possessed thirty years earlier. Grazing in these regions can be vastly augmented.

Another great benefit which annexation will secure to the Trentino and the Upper Adige is that of industrial development. Water power constitutes a source of immense wealth which under Austrian domination has been almost totally neglected. In the Upper Adige and the Trentino it reaches 43.5 horse power per square chilometer, which is the maximum of all the territory of the Alps. In Switzerland it reaches only 36 horse power. At present only 66,000 horse power is utilized in the Upper Adige and the Trentino together, while 494,000 remains to be employed. These figures are based upon Austrian statistics. In the past the firm and deliberate policy of Austria has been to obstacle through defective means of communication and in every other way possible the industrial development of this region, to the benefit of the other provinces of her Empire. An additional reason for this iniquitous policy was the aversion of the Austrian government to the creation of industrial centres which would establish masses of workmen close to her unnatural boundaries in Italy.

An increase in resources of water-power will be of great advantage to Italy, a country in which the lack of coal has always been a serious handicap to industrial development.

The wine-growing interests of the Upper Adige and the Trentino are most important. In the Alto Adige the average annual production of wine (1902–1911) was 328,000 hectolitres; in the Trentino the annual average (1907–1910) was 942,000 hectolitres. Annexation to Italy will greatly injure these interests unless immediate action is taken by the Italian government to facilitate exportation. The wine produced in this region is in considerable part of an inferior quality which has hitherto found a good market in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, but which could not compete with the finer wines in Italy.

On the other hand silk-growing will greatly benefit by the annexation to Italy, which has always been the great market for Trentino cocoons, of which the annual production has amounted in value to ten million crowns.

Fruit-growing interests are also important and these should find a market in Italy equal to that previously enjoyed in the Central Empires.

Mining resources are considerable in both the Upper Adige and the Trentino and the improved means of communication which this region should obtain from Italy, which has nothing to fear from their construction, will certainly lead to an important revival of mining development, which was languishing under Austrian domination.

[Subenclosure 3—Memorandum]

Part I—Italian Claims

section c).—requirements of foreign commerce

Chapter 3).—Africa.

The readjustment of colonial boundaries in Africa is a subject which during the progress of the war has been excluded from public discussion in all the Allied countries, as if by common consent. This general silence upon African post-bellum problems is in itself eloquent testimony to the difficulties which their solution is certain to encounter, difficulties which the Allies have wisely preferred to face after the defeat of the common enemy; upon African problems the Powers, in view of their individual interests often conflicting, are bound to disagree, and a general settlement can be reached only by mutual concessions.

Italy’s colonial interests in Africa are in extent secondary to those of England and France, but as bearing upon her own future they are of vital importance to her; Italy’s African interests are those of national defence, of equilibrium of power in the Mediterranean, and of economic development.

Italy’s earliest ventures in African colonization were disastrous and they were so because they were in advance of their time, undertaken before the economic life of the nation was such as to require colonial expansion, before economic conditions were such as to ensure national support. Italy’s colonial policy was a policy of national foresight and of faith in the future, but thirty-three years ago this policy was beyond the economic strength of the country and in advance of national opinion. It then seemed imperialistic; it was imperialistic except to the eye of faith; and imperialism did not then, as it does not now, meet with the approval of the liberty loving Italian people.

But economic conditions have undergone a remarkable transformation in Italy within the last three decades. In the twenty years which preceded the occupation of Libya (1911) Italy made greater progress in foreign commerce than any other country in the world—the United States and Germany not excepted.

Her progress in sanitary improvements and regulations has been equally noteworthy and has, furthermore, exerted a profound influence upon social and economic conditions. In a half-century dating from 1863 the death-rate in Italy has been brought down from 3 per cent, to about 2 per cent., a decrease representing the saving of 250,000 lives annually. The natural effect of this enormous saving has been to bring about a much larger increase in the population of Italy in late years, the excess of births over deaths now amounting to about 400,000 a year.^* This increase has been such that the growth of Italy’s economic resources has been unable to meet the consequent growth of labor, and extensive emigration has been the necessary result. In 1894 emigrants numbered 225,323 according to official statistics; in the three years 1911–1913, they averaged about 675,000; emigration tripled in twenty years.^†

Italy claims that, as a nation which exports man-power on such a vast scale, she has a right to make provisions by which this current of emigration may be directed in part to territory under her own control, in order that she herself may share in the profit of her emigrants’ industry. Colonization based on legitimate emigration is sound democratic national policy—not imperialism. The laborer brings prosperity to the country to which he devotes his energies; he does not exploit the land for an absentee investor, but he himself adds to its value by his own labor.

With profitable colonies in Africa possessed of rational political boundaries that will offer guarantees of sound economic development, Italy believes that she can retain for herself a part of her emigration, thereby vastly strengthening her own economic position, while at the same time benefiting and enriching the regions of Africa that come under her control. And in the democratic character of her colonization, in the importation into her colonies of her own manpower, she will notably differentiate her colonial policy from that of France and England. The possibilities of Italian colonization in North Africa may be judged from a glance at the population of the French colony of Tunis, where there were 109,000 Italians in 1911 against 46,000 Frenchmen.

But Italy’s aspirations to a betterment of her colonial position in Africa are derived not only from necessities of emigration, but also from considerations imposed by her healthy economic development (cf. Part 1. Section c. Introduction),⁹ and from the necessity of strengthening her naval defence on the south and of maintaining the balance of power in the Mediterranean. It is to be noted that a considerable portion of Italy’s African claims calculated to secure these ends are only claims for the recovery of what she once already possessed in the earlier years of her colonial policy. The new territory requested adjoins the colonies already under her control, so that the result will be the logical consolidation of her African power. The following confidential Memorandum, which has been furnished to the writer for the use of the American peace delegates, under pledge of the strictest reserve and with the assurance that it represents not only the views of the Italian Minister of the Colonies, but also the official position of the Prime Minister and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sets forth clearly the imperative considerations of the balance of power; the figures given in this Memorandum also reveal the comparative moderation of Italy’s claims.

For England the Mediterranean is a thoroughfare by which to reach her colonies and a highway for her commerce; for France the Mediterranean coast is one of her three bases for her sea-power; for Italy the Mediterranean is all, and she must see that the balance of power is maintained there and the liberty of the seas assured, or her own independence of action is lost.

As to the character of the colony of Libya, it should be borne in mind that Tripoli lies at the very threshold of Italy. From Syracuse the distance to Tripoli is the same as that to Rome and less than half of that to Turin; from Naples the distance to Tripoli is a little more than that to Turin. If the Tripolitania is eventually widely settled by Italians, this vast African territory will become almost as integral a part of the Kingdom of Italy as the islands of Sicily and Sardinia.

The proposed readjustment of the boundaries of Libya would add some 600,000 square chilometres to that colony, and about 50,000 inhabitants; while the acquisition of Giubaland, English Somaliland (which has been neglected and half-abandoned by the English), French Somaliland and the Farsan islands would further add to Italy’s possessions 309,000 square chilometres and about 677,500 inhabitants. In all Italy would hold in Africa 2,667,609 square chilometres occupied by about 2,305,500 inhabitants. This area is little more than a quarter of that held by the French before the war; it is less than half of that held by England before the war and less than a quarter of that which England will hold if she retains possession of Germany’s African colonies captured in the course of the war; the African population of Italy’s colonies would be less than a fifteenth of that of either the English or the French colonies before the war.

Furthermore the boundaries established by the proposed rectifications are those delimitated by geographical features and by considerations imperatively imposed by trade routes, and it is claimed that they will eliminate the causes for future international disputes and conflicts.

Section c).—Chapter 3).—Confidential Memorandum.

Italy’s aspirations for a rational settlement of her colonial possessions in the revision of the map of Africa which will be made at the Peace Conference, are supported by a combination of claims closely united with one another:

1. Upon rights existing prior to the war.

2. Upon rights created by the war.

3. Upon necessities consequent upon the war.

1.

The rights existing prior to the war are based upon a series of diplomatic agreements undertaken in furtherance of Italy’s colonial programme which has been imposed by the rapid economic development of New Italy and which was first conceived by a great, clear sighted statesman, Francesco Crispi.

a). In the formation of our two East African colonies, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and in our action in Ethiopia, the first steps were taken with the convention signed on November 15, 1869 by the Sultans of Assab and by Prof. Giuseppe Sapeto for the acquisition of that territory; with the law relating to Assab of July 5, 1882; with the occupation of Massowah of February 5, 1885; with the convention of the protectorate over the Sultan of Aussa of December 9, 1888, approved by the law of April 10, 1890; with the assumption of the protectorate over the Sultans of Obbia¹⁰ and the Migiurtini¹¹ (Uadi Nogal) of February 8 and April 7, 1889 notified to the signatory Powers of the General Act of Berlin on May 16 and November 19, 1889; with the notification to the Powers on November 19, 1889 of the assumption of the protectorate over the stretches of East African coast lying between the ports recognized in 1886 as belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar (the ports of Benadir);¹² with the convention of August 12, 1892¹³ for the concession to Italy on the part of the Sultan of Zanzibar of the ports of Brava, Merca, Mogadiscio and Uarsceich (Benadir), the final epilogue of long negotiations from 1886 to 1891 with the Sultan of Zanzibar, with England and with the British Society of East Africa. These ports with the territories annexed were secured for Italy by the Italo-British accord of London of January 13, 1905,¹⁴ approved by the law of July 2, 1905.

The concluding diplomatic steps regarding Ethiopia were initiated by Italy with the signing of the treaty of Uccialli of May 2, 1889¹⁵ and with the communication of Art. 17 of that treaty providing for the Italian protectorate over Ethiopia, to the Powers who had signed the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885 in accordance with Art. 34 of that Act. The Powers duly acknowledged receipt of the notification.

These diplomatic acts were followed by the protocols exchanged between Italy and England of March 24, and April 15, 1891¹⁶ and of May 5, 1894¹⁷ for the delimitation of their respective spheres of influence In East Africa, in the regions of the Red Sea, the Sudan, the Indian Ocean (Giuba), Ethiopia and the Gulf of Aden; by these protocols the entire region of Ethiopia was recognized as within Italy’s sphere of influence.

The Italo-Britannic protocols mentioned were the result of about a quarter of a century of perseverance in colonial and diplomatic effort which had been directed to the end of bringing all Ethiopia, with the consent of England and France which had duly acknowledged receipt of our communication regarding the protectorate, within the sphere of Italy’s action, reuniting Abyssinia in a politico-economic whole with Eritrea to the north and with Italian Somaliland to the south; another objective was that of obtaining the occupation of the Sudanese province of the Taca (Cassala).

But aside from Italy’s historical claims upon this territory on colonial and diplomatic grounds, this portion of East Africa included within the line established by the above mentioned protocols from Ras Casar to the mouths of the Giuba, may well be considered Italian Africa because of the immense contribution to the knowledge of this and contiguous regions made by Italian explorers—of the regions of Abyssinia, of those of the peninsula of the Somali, of those of the sources of the Nile, of the vast regions of the Sobat, the White Nile, the Lakes Rodolfo and Stefania, and the territory to the south of Ethiopia.

It will suffice to name only the most noted: Guglielmo Massaia, Giuseppe Sapeto, Orazio Antinori, Giovanni Miani, Carlo Piaggia, Romolo Gessi, Pellegrino Matteucci, Giuseppe Maria Giulietti, Alfonso Maria Manari, Gaetano Casati, Gustavo Bianchi, Antonio Cecchi, Giovanni Chiarini and last of all Vittorio Bottego whose two great expeditions of 1893 and 1896 have solved the last three great problems of African geography which directly interest Ethiopia, namely the exploration and study of the courses of the Giuba, the Omo (middle and lower) and of the Sobat.

All this great work, colonial, diplomatic, geographico-scientific, conducted with firm faith and great sacrifices was abruptly interrupted by the unfortunate battle of Adua on March 1, 1896 which took place at the very time that Vittorio Bottego was on the Daua carrying forward the geographical conquest of the south-western regions of Ethiopia.

By the treaty of peace of October 26, 1896 with Ethiopia¹⁸ Italy agreed to the abrogation of the Treaty of Uccialli and proclaimed the independence of Ethiopia as a sovereign and independent state.

By the Italo-Egyptian convention of December 25, 1897 the fortress of Cassala was ceded to Egypt.

The agreement of London of December 13, 1906 between Italy England and France¹⁹ while guaranteeing the integrity of Ethiopia, placed it under the patronage of these three Powers which have undertaken to safeguard its interests; France its railway interests (the Gibuti-Addis-Abeba railway); England its interests on the waterways flowing into the Nile; Italy the economic development of the two Italian colonies of Ethiopia—Eritrea and Somaliland.

This is what remains to Italy after almost half a century of colonial work.

b). The Franco-British declaration of London of March 21, 1899,²⁰ supplementing the Anglo-French convention of June 14, 1898,²¹ is the epilogue of all the preceding conventions relative to the hinterland of Libya.

This declaration, dividing the hinterland between England and France to the exclusion of Italy, ignores our Mediterranean interests; and although subsequently under political necessity it has been implicitly accepted by us, nevertheless justice demands that out of regard for the economic life of our two Libyan colonies there should be re-established, at least in part, the equilibrium of interests which has been gravely prejudiced to our injury.

The declaration of London of March 21, 1899 reopened in Italy the wound, not yet healed, that had been inflicted by the treaty of Bardo of May 12, 1881,²² by which the protectorate over Tunis was given to France.

2.

It is equitable that among the nations which have borne the burdens of the war together, any advantages accruing from the war should be distributed in proportion to the contribution which each according to his own resources has brought to the common victory.

On this basis there can be no question as to Italy’s rights as derived from her conduct at the outbreak of the great war and during its progress: ex facto oritur jus. A simple outline of events will suffice. At the outbreak of the world war Italy on August 1, 1914 declared her neutrality, and on May 24, 1915 herself entered the conflict; on every occasion she has, within the limits of her power, put forth her full strength in assistance of the Allies, particularly in the most difficult phases of the war; our fleet, by preventing the Austrian fleet from issuing forth from the Adriatic Sea, has indirectly contributed to the safe transport of troops and supplies along the African coasts; the occupation of Libya carried out by Italy at a heavy sacrifice of blood and treasure and maintained in the face of a Tripolitan rebellion fomented by Turks and Germans, has prevented the enemy from manoeuvring from an otherwise secure Mediterranean base against all three of the Allies—Italy, France and England; the effective watch kept by Italy in Eritrea and in Somaliland on the confines of Ethiopia which was a centre of Austro-Turco-German agitation and intrigue, notwithstanding the coup d’état of September 27, 1917 which overthrew the Ethiopian sovereign Ligg Jasu, prevented hostile action undertaken against the Allies by Ethiopia and Arabia from having dangerous consequences—and this while France and England were fighting also in Africa in order to possess themselves of Germany’s colonies there, and while Italy had on her own borders the whole Austrian army.

3.

The grave problems which will present themselves immediately after the war should also be considered. If we wish that the peace which follows the present terrible conflict shall be just, equitable and lasting and shall correspond to the high ethical ends for which President Wilson has declared himself, it is necessary for us to foresee and avoid all possible future disagreements among the Allies of today, in order that these may remain allies of tomorrow, reestablishing upon new foundations future reciprocal good relations of peace and alliance in Africa as well as in Europe, eliminating all elements which may give rise to disagreements and conflicts.

In order to reach this end the most efficacious means is that of rendering impossible any clash of interests even between friendly and allied powers, and this may be done through the establishment of colonial possessions having clearly defined boundaries and constituting a homogeneous whole, organic and independent.

As France in the possession of Morocco, Algiers and Tunis has one uninterrupted zone in the Mediterranean which extends also to the Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea; and as England possesses a vast unbroken zone also, beginning with Egypt in the Mediterranean and extending (thanks to the English conquest of German East Africa) without interruption to Cape Colony; and as both of these Powers will still further round out their African dominions; thus it is only right that Italy also should, as well as her Allies, secure for herself an analogous, sound colonial position.

4.

Let us examine now the practical means by which Italy may obtain such a position in her African possessions.

a). The Italian colonies of East Africa, Eritrea and Somaliland (including the protectorates of North Somaliland, that is of Obbia and of the Migiurtini) are situated respectively to the north and south of Ethiopia which in itself constitutes the great economic hinterland. Contiguous to Eritrea to the south of the province is the French protectorate of the coast of the Somali (Gibuti); contiguous to Italian Somaliland (protectorates) to the north is English Somaliland (Zeila); and contiguous to Italian Somaliland (Benadir) to the south is Giubaland (Chisimajo).

In consequence Ethiopia is shut in to the west and south-west by the line of the Anglo-Italian protocols of March 24 (mouths of the Giuba-Italian Somaliland) and of April 15, 1891 (Ras Casar-Eritrea), and to the north, east and south-east by Eritrea, by French Somaliland, by English Somaliland and by Italian Somaliland. It is therefore clear that in order to make a homogeneous, organic, independent block of Italy’s possessions around Ethiopia, it is necessary only that the protectorate of French Somaliland which extends along the coast, together with English Somaliland and Giubaland be added to Italy’s two colonies, and that Ethiopia be put under the exclusive influence of Italy.

From France and England would be requested the revision of the convention of London of December 13, 1906 for Ethiopia with return to the dispositions of the Italo-Britannic protocols of March 24 and April 15, 1891 and of May 5, 1894, which put Ethiopia within the exclusive sphere of influence of Italy which would naturally respect Ethiopia’s integrity.

From France would be requested the cession of the French protectorate over the Somaliland coast (Gibuti) and of the railway to Addis Abeba; and from England the cession of English Somaliland and Giubaland.

Special agreements with France and England would fix respectively Italy’s obligations for the cession of the railway Gibuti-Addis-Abeba, for facilitations to France in the establishment of a French naval station on the route to Madagascar and to Tonkin, for guarantees to England regarding the Ethopian waters flowing into the Nile, and for the regulation of all other necessary relations between the three Powers.

France and England would find special compensations for themselves in the political readjustment of other regions in Africa.

The acquisition by Italy of the territory of Gibuti and of the only railway penetrating into Ethiopia, Gibuti-Addis-Abeba, will furnish the fulcrum of the readjustment of Italy’s colonial interests in East Africa; for Gibuti is the only port by which supplies of arms and ammunition can enter Ethiopia and it is therefore, as it has been hitherto, a permanent peril for our two colonies, Eritrea and Somaliland (especially for the first of these) and for the English possessions of the Sudan, and a perpetual cause of friction for Italy and also for England with Ethiopia itself and with France, and hence a permanent source, present and future, of disturbance in the good relations between the Allied Powers, as well as an impediment to the free development of our colonization, and to the economic growth of our two colonies within their boundaries and beyond in the territory of Ethiopia.

By the acquisition of Giubaland Italy would come into possession of Chisimajo, the only port, properly so called, on the long stretch of its possessions on the Indian Ocean from Guardafui to the mouths of the Giuba, namely about 1,700 chilometres, a port which, indeed, as early as 1886 was ceded by the Sultan of Zanzibar to Italy, but which was later lost through the complications of political events.

By the acquisition of British Somaliland, and thereby of the ports of Zeila, Bulhar and Dongareta, Italy would complete her possessions, controlling all the outlets from Abyssinia together with Gibuti, Oboe, Tagiura (now French) Massaua, Assab, Alula, Obbia and the ports of Benadir (Italian) and Chisimajo (now English).

b). Italy being one of the Mussulman Powers bordering on the Red Sea cannot remain indifferent to the question of the equilibrium of power in the Red Sea and of the political conditions of Arabia which faces Eritrea.

We ask therefore that no Power shall occupy Arabia, that commerce and commercial penetration be free, that the Holy Places of Islam in Higiaz be in Mussulman hands and that the Farsan islands upon the coast of the Asir be occupied by Italy.

c). In Northern Africa (Libya) that there may be reestablished, to a minimum degree, the equilibrium which was disturbed to the damage of Italy by the Anglo-French agreements of March 21, 1899 regarding the Libyan hinterland, and that our two colonies there be given a chance to breathe, we ask for the benefit of Tripolitania in order to establish communications between the three Italian oases, Ghadames, Ghat and Tummo, that France grant to us the principal caravan route between Ghadames and Ghat, free passage over the caravan route Ghadames-Fort Polignac-Ghat, possession of the route from Ghat to Tummo; and the right to establish consulates and agencies in the zones occupied by France.

From England we ask, for the benefit of Cyrenaica, a rational boundary line on the side of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan—a boundary starting from Ras Gebel Sollum and which shall include within the territory of Cyrenaica not only the oasis of Cufra already recognized by England as pertaining to Italy, but also the oasis of Giarabub, which is now claimed by Egypt notwithstanding the fact that it contains the Holy Places of the Senussi brotherhood which has its seat in Cyrenaica.

5.

France is a country of about forty million inhabitants occupying an area of 536,464 square chilometres; England (The United Kingdom) is a country of about forty-six million inhabitants occupying an area of 314,433 square chilometres; Italy contains about thirty-six million inhabitants occupying an area of 286,610 square chilometres. The simple statement of these figures will be sufficient to make it clear that Italy’s African possessions are altogether inferior to what she should have in proportion to her own area and population; even before the conquest of Germany’s colonies, French possessions in Africa covered an area of 9,253,084 square chilometres with a population of about 35,590,000; English possessions (exclusive of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) 5,676,679 square chilometres with a population of about 36,430,000; Italian possessions 1,758,609 square chilometres with a population of about 1,578,000.

With the addition of the new territory which would come to Italy through the acquisition of French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Giubaland and the Farsan islands and through the rectification of the borders of Libya, Italy’s increase of territory would amount to about 909,000 square chilometres with a population of about 725,500, making Italy’s African total 2,667,609 square chilometres with 2,305,500 inhabitants—figures which indicate an enormous disproportion in comparison with those of France and England. This disproportion would become even more accentuated by the annexation of Germany’s colonies by these two Powers. England by the acquisition of the Togo and of the Camerun in part, of German South-west Africa and German East Africa would, if one includes Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (and if one excludes the populations of the Camerun and the Togo which cannot be estimated) reach an African colonial area of 10,787,279 square chilometres with a population of 58,680,000.

France with a part of the Togo and of the Camerun, of which the population cannot be estimated, would reach an area of 9,975,084 square chilometres with a population of 35,590,000.

The difference in possessions in favor of France and of England when compared with Italy shows France in possession of 7,307,475 square chilometres in Africa more than Italy with 33,284,500 inhabitants in excess of those dwelling in Italy’s possessions; whereas England’s possessions surpass Italy’s by 8,119,670 square chilometres and 56,374,500 inhabitants. These figures are approximate, but very eloquent.

6.

Given these facts, and without taking into consideration the advantages to be derived by France and England through other extensions of their territories in Asia, the solution which Italy proposes—namely some slight advantages for Libya and for its free development, together with the union of French Somaliland and of English Somaliland and Giubaland to its two colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, and the exclusive sphere of influence in Ethiopia for Italy—is seen to be for the most part no more than a just revendication of long years of colonial activities and of earlier diplomatic agreements laboriously secured; it provides for a logical political and economic colonial settlement, eliminating for the future all causes of jealousy such as has been several times exhibited by France in the past, and removing possibilities of conflict and disagreement between the allied Powers in Africa; furthermore it permits Italy, a nation possessed of a rapidly increasing population, to consolidate its resources, procuring for itself the necessary raw materials, augmenting its production, acquiring its own economic independence and the military security of its colonies.

“It provides in general for a territorial settlement of Italy’s colonial dominions within the geographical limits best adapted to the economic development of its present colonies, and it provides guarantees against the territorial expansion of other Powers such as would compromise the development and safety of Italy’s colonies.”

This is the programme of Italian public opinion.

If this programme should not be realized, Italy, after her colossal sacrifices made for the war, and after the treasures of blood and of money expended in Africa, would come out of the conflict reduced in strength and deprived of the means for developing the potent energies of her national life, which counts little more than half a century but which looks with deep faith to the future.

A solution of “imperialism” with an appetite for dominion is not asked, but simply an equitable solution of equilibrium required by the necessities of life, of development, of lasting peace—a solution which will permit Italy to labor and to prosper without doing injury to anyone.

1. Ante, p. 106.
2. Only the memorandum here printed as subenclosure 3 (the section regarding Africa) is attached to the file copy of this letter; the memoranda printed as subenclosures 1 and 2 are taken from Inquiry Document No. 261; a fourth memorandum is printed on p. 442, as enclosure to letter of Nov. 15, 1918, from the Ambassador in Italy. No further memoranda on the subjects listed in the outline on p. 421 have been found in Department files.
3. Omission indicated in the original memorandum.
4. In articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, both of which have been published, the purely defensive character of the Alliance is clearly established; while the publication of article 7 places Austria’s attack upon Servia in 1914 in its true light as a breach of the pledges to Italy made in the Treaty, which was thereby wittingly annulled by Austria. Article 7 expressly provided that both Austria and Italy should use all their influence to maintain the statu quo in the Balkans; and that in case of the impossibility of maintaining it, neither should occupy new territory without first coming to an agreement with the other. By her wilful violation of Servian territory without first notifying Italy, Austria betrayed Italy with regard to both of these provisions. [Footnote in the original.]

5. The following extract from a speech made by Senator Marconi at a banquet at the Waldorf Astoria in 1917, further emphasizes the importance for France of Italy’s declaration of neutrality: “On August 2nd. 1914, three days before England declared war upon Germany, the Italian government decided for neutrality. The news was immediately communicated to our chargé d’affaires at Paris, since the ambassador was absent. The telegram arrived at one o’clock in the morning. Without delaying a moment the chargé d’affaires went to the president of the council, Viviani, at that very undiplomatic hour. When he entered, the president turned pale and started back, feeling sure that only the decision of Italy to throw in her lot with Germany would have caused the Italian diplomatist to come to him at that hour; upon reading the telegram, the president could not restrain his emotion.

   [“] In less than half an hour Viviani had already ordered the mobilization of almost a million men whom France would otherwise have been obliged to keep upon the south-eastern frontier to protect herself from a possible attack on the part of Italy. That million of men arrested the advance of the Germans, won the battle of the Marne, and saved France from being crushed under the savage heel of German militarism. Had there been the least vacillation, the least hesitation on the part of Italy, had there been one Italian statesman who attempted to do one tenth part of what Bismarck did when he altered the words of the famous telegram of Ems, by that means bringing about the Franco-Prussian war, France would not have dared to withdraw a single man from the Italian frontier, and the history of the world would be differently written. Is there anyone who, after what I have said, can doubt that this action of Italy was the decisive factor in the war?” [Footnote in the original.]

6. During the twelve years ending in 1913 Italian imports and exports both doubled. During these same years steel products septupled, chemical products nearly tripled, exports of cotton textiles quadrupled. Italy’s economic development will be dealt with at length in Part 1, Section c). [Footnote in the original.]
4. Subenclosure 3, p. 431.
5. Not found in Department files.
6. Omission indicated in the original memorandum.
7. Not found in Department files.
8. Not found in Department files.
8. Not found in Department files.
9. Interesting studies have been made upon the Latin origin and character of the older German-speaking elements (Ladini) of the Upper Adige and also of the Nordtirol, as well as of portions of Switzerland, etc. Giulio Sironi, La stirpe e la nazionalità nel Tirolo. Milano, L. F. Cogliati, 1918. Giorgio Del Vecchio. Il “Ladino” al bivio. Roma, 1912. [Footnote in the original.]
10. Cf. H. Nelson Gay. Fifty years of Italian Independence. The Nineteenth Century. January 1912. [Footnote in the original.]
11. Cf. Annuario Statistico ltaliano. Roma. 1911 (p. 22.) 1916 (p. 36.) [Footnote in the original.]
9. Not found in Department files.
10. B. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3d ed. (London, 1909), vol. iii, p. 1124.
11. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxxi, p. 133.
12. Hertslet, The Map of Africa, vol. iii, p. 1125.
13. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxxv, p. 630.
14. Ibid., vol. xcviii, p. 129.
15. Ibid., vol. lxxxi, p. 733.
16. Ibid., vol. lxxxiii, p. 19.
17. Ibid., vol. lxxxvi, p. 55.
18. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. lxxxviii, p. 481.
19. Ibid., vol. xcix, p. 486.
20. Ibid., vol. xci, p. 55.
21. Ibid., p. 38.
22. Ibid., vol. lxxii. p. 247.