I beg to report the following remarks made to me to-day by Marshal
Joffre:
M.
Clemenceau and
the Society of Nations
“President Wilson’s
visit has proved to be a very fortunate thing, and his
influence has already made itself felt. I am told that M.
Clemenceau
himself has calmed down somewhat, and is disposed to more
reasonable views since being in contact with Mr. Wilson’s intellect and
personality. Clemenceau has never been a partisan of the
Society of Nations. England appears to be, with reserves as
to the Freedom of the Seas, and Italy also, with reserves as
to the Jugo-Slav question. Both may have cause to regret, in
the future, that their adherence was not prompter and more
complete, especially England when she sees America across
the Atlantic with a fleet larger than her own. But whereas
England and Italy are agreeable to the principle, M.
Clemenceau holds
out in the name of France, while not appearing to know just
what he wants in the stead of the Society of Nations. The
fact of saying ‘I don’t want that’ does not constitute a
very complete programme at a time like this.
The Position of the Cabinet
“M. Clemenceau’s
political position appears to have been consolidated, of
late, on the strength of his having won what he calls ‘his
war’. But there has not been an organized opposition, no
leader has come forward and contested his power. His
opponents have not disarmed, however, and it would not be
surprising if he were overthrown within the next month or
two.
“Briand24 is
the only likely successor I have heard mentioned. He is an
able, while not a really strong, man. He has the advantage
of more polished ways than Clemenceau; he never breaks out in gross
personal denunciations at awkward junctures. But he has the
defect which is unfortunately characteristic of our
statesmen—making whatever promises may be useful for tiding
over difficulties. France needs at this juncture a leader
following a clear, open policy, who will furthermore dare
say ‘No’ in the face of Parliament when he feels it right to
do so.
[Page 382]
“If Clemenceau were
appointed French Peace Plenipotentiary, as he desires, and
he were then overthrown in Parliament, strange complications
would follow.
The Premier Must Head the French Peace
Delegation
“With a Constitution and customs like ours, the Prime
Minister must head the French Peace Delegation. Clemenceau would sit not
in his personal capacity, but as the head of our Government;
so that if he were replaced as Prime Minister, he would have
to be replaced as Peace Plenipotentiary also.
“Furthermore, Clemenceau’s nature makes it impossible for
him to brook anyone else’s authority or to admit of divided
authority. He would sit only as absolute master of France’s
representatives. Perhaps this has been the cause of reports
spread to the effect that France will have but one Delegate,
strictly speaking, with official Secretaries the first of
whom would be M. Pichon, and another M.
Berthelot.25 These reports
seem to have more consistency than those according to which
France would be represented by four or five equally eminent
men. M. Bourgeois26 is an opponent of M. Clemenceau on many points,
though a sufficient degree of harmony between them might be
maintained if Bourgeois is willing to
recognize Clemenceau’s superiority. But
Briand, as Clemenceau’s chief rival
for power, could not be expected to bend before his absolute
will. I have heard Tardieu’s name mentioned as a possibility.
There has been talk of Foch, but I do not know with what degree of
likelihood. I myself have not been approached in any way,
nor do I believe that M. Clemenceau, owing to his personal hostility
towards me, would allow me to serve with him. Our views are
so different that I should be singularly embarrassed, if the
question were put to me; I should have to reserve my
independence of judgment, and Clemenceau would not admit of that from any
member of the Delegation.
Two Vital Points for the Peace
Treaty
“In my opinion, the Peace Treaty should include two vital
points. First, the Allies must not only state all that they
demand of Germany, they must foresee and mention
specifically the means they will adopt if necessary for
forcing Germany to comply to the very end. Secondly, mention
must be made of the Society of Nations, and its application
must be prepared in such respects as can be immediately
realized.
[Page 383]
The Attitude To Be Taken Towards
Germany
“I believe that the Germans sincerely want to get the
negotiations over and to sign peace as soon as possible.
While they have haggled and delayed over clauses of the
armistice, there have been genuine material difficulties in
their way. After peace is signed, they will probably haggle
and seek to delay over executing the peace conditions. But
they are eager to end the present state of affairs; and we
are in a position to make them respect the conditions they
have accepted, as well as to avert the possibility of
another war. What we want is a stable German Government to
affix its signature to the treaty, even though that
Government should last only for a time. Some clauses will
take as long as twenty or thirty years to fulfill; but we
can enforce respect of the treaty, once it has been properly
signed.
“Of the two factions now fighting for control in Berlin,
Ebert27 is preferable to
Liebknecht,28 since the partisans
of the latter are Bolshevists. But we must allow the country
to seethe without interference until it can settle down and
recover from its own unrest. We should commit the gravest of
mistakes if we were to send an inter-allied army to Berlin,
even for purposes of pacific occupation.
The Question of the Left Bank of the
Rhine
“The question of annexing the Left Bank of the Rhine ought
not to be agitated at present. Any attempt to settle the
definite status of those provinces would be not only
premature but a mistake. The Allied armies must occupy the
territory during all the years which will pass before the
clauses of the Peace Treaty are fulfilled. That alone should
be considered. To this end, it would be well for the
occupied provinces to have provisional autonomy under our
military supervision. We certainly could not allow them to
be attached to the new German State and hold elections to
send representatives to the German parliament. At the end of
twenty or thirty years, the status could be definitely
decided, whether annexation to France, or reversion to
Germany, or complete autonomy, or a protectorate. Meanwhile,
Germany could continue to claim the provinces theoretically
if she wished—as she probably would.
“I must say here, however, that only the Rhine as a frontier
can offer to France absolute security against future
aggressions. But we cannot and must not violate the
principle of the Freedom of Peoples.
[Page 384]
Two Grave Situations in France
“There are at this moment in France two situations giving
rise to the gravest concern: one is the slowness of
demobilization, and the other is inadequacy in
transportation facilities.
The Slowness of Demobilization
“We have not yet worked out any effective system for
demobilization. Early in October, more than a month before
the Armistice was signed, the Director of one of the
Divisions of the Ministry of War sent in to the Minister a
report recommending that plans for demobilization be drawn
up without loss of time. M. Clemenceau turned down the suggestion,
saying: ‘I am making war.’ The Armistice came so suddenly
that everybody was taken by surprise; and save for the fact
that a few old soldiers are being released, our
demobilization is no more advanced to-day than it was
then.
“A spirit is arising in the army which will develop to
serious proportions unless the cause is remedied very soon.
There is no insubordination as yet, but there are both
impatience and discontent. Hundreds of thousands of French
soldiers, kept on a war footing and having nothing
particular to do, see the industries of peace reviving for
others while they themselves are debarred from earning
money. They cannot understand such a condition of affairs,
and they say so in writing to their families; who, in turn,
become exasperated, lacking the support and the
companionship of the men. This is playing precisely into the
hands of the Socialists, who will not fail to make the best
of it in favor of their own agitation.
“The only remedy is prompt and effective demobilization,
which we have no reason to fear since Germany is now
powerless militarily.
The Inadequacy of Transportation
Facilities
“The second grave situation I have mentioned adds further
complications to the first. We are exposed to shortness of
food and of materials not because we lack either, for our
stocks are sufficient while not abundant, but because of
difficulties in transportation. The rolling stock is
insufficient; but far worse, there is not enough labor.
“Last July, the question became acute. The Ministry of Public
Works asked the Ministry of War to lend some tens of
thousands of men, amounting roughly to forty thousand, from
the Reserves of the Territorial Army, to help with the
railroads. While unskilled at the start, these men gradually
learned their new business, and did much towards relieving
congestion. But now they are to be released, because they
are for the most part old men belonging to the only classes
[Page 385]
which will be
demobilized. They cannot be replaced by the former railroad
men who have since been serving in the army, because those
men remain mobilized. The only solution found has been to
call for volunteers from all classes of workmen and
agricultural laborers. 30,000 have already responded; 60,000
are needed, and will probably be found. But this will be
entirely unskilled labor, the technical education of a large
number of men will be begun during a crisis when a maximum
of skilled effort is needed.
“We must have better distribution in France if we are to
avoid a very serious shortage of necessaries. In the
reconquered regions of the north and east, that shortage
already exists, and the congestion is aggravated by the
policy of using nothing but military means in the army zone.
We are also obliged to feed Germany to the extent of her
absolute requirements, though the Allies must of course come
first; by exposing Germany to want, we should expose
ourselves to many complications.
“In closing, I shall give you a homely example of existing
difficulties.
“I am short of vinegar for my household, and have had trouble
in buying it. Three months ago, my brother at Perpignan sent
me a barrelful of his own making. It did not reach me. I
wrote and inquired. At the end of a month, he shipped
another barrel to me. That did not come, so I wrote again.
He sent me a third shipment, six quarts not by freight but
by parcels post, packed according to regulations. That was a
month ago, and the parcel has not yet reached me any more
than either of the barrels.
“The story is not trivial, because there are similar
instances in almost incalculable numbers, affecting to a
greater or lesser degree the population of our entire
country, and promising to grow much worse.”
