Ambassador Rockhill to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]
No. 12.]

Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith the aide-mémoire from the ministry for foreign affairs in reply to the memorandum submitted to it by this embassy, embodying the proposals contained in your cabled instructions of November 6 last for the neutralization of the railway lines in Manchuria.

[Page 249]

This aide-mémoire was received by the embassy yesterday afternoon. This morning’s newspapers contained the official communique giving the substance of the aide-mémoire. The comments of the press are distinctly divided along purely political lines, the Government and conservative organs being opposed to the general proposal, the liberal press in favor of it; while both are disposed to favor a fuller consideration of the question of Russian participation in the Chinchow-Aigun Railway.

I have, etc.,

W. W. Rockhill.
[Inclosure.]

aide-mémoire.

The Imperial Government did not fail to submit to the most serious examination the alternative proposed by the Government of the United States of America, tending on the one hand to establish an international administration and control of the railroads in Manchuria and on the other hand to engage Russian capital in the enterprise of the Chinchow-Tsitsihar-Aigun Railroad. The Federal Government sees in this proposition the best means of maintaining in their entirety the political rights of China in Manchuria and of contributing to the development of this Province by applying to it the principle of the open door.

It is with a feeling of deep satisfaction that the Imperial Government notes the just estimony borne by the United States Government to the sincere desire with which Russia is animated to support in Manchuria the policy of the open door and of equal opportunity, as well as to guarantee to China her full sovereignty there.

However, nothing appears at the present time to threaten either this sovereignty or the open-door policy in Manchuria. Consequently, the Imperial Government can not discover iii the present condition of Manchuria any reason necessitating the placing on the order of the day of the questions raised by the United States Government.

At the same time the Imperial Government believes that it must declare with absolute frankness that the establishment of an international administration and control of the Manchurian railroads as proposed by the Federal Government would seriously injure Russian interests, both public and private, to which the Imperial Government attaches a capital importance. This proposition can not, therefore, meet with a favorable reception on its part.

In making this statement the Imperial Government is pleased to hope that, appreciating at their just value the immense material sacrifices and moral efforts at the expense of which these interests were created, the Federal Government will look at this question from the same standpoint as the Imperial Government, which standpoint is equitable in every respect. The Imperial Government, believing that the interests involved in the Chinese Eastern Railway are notorious, believes that it may confine itself to stating their substance succinctly.

It is important above all to remark that at the time this immense enterprise was put into execution under extraordinary condition, the Chinese Eastern Railway Co. insured itself, for the whole duration of the concession—that is, for 80 years—both on the part of the Chinese and of the Russian Government, well-defined rights and privileges which it did not consent to relinquish unless China redeemed the whole enterprise, but in no event before the expiration of a period of 36 years. The company therefore adopted its plan of operation with the conviction of being able to realize this long period of time guaranteed to it by the very act of concession. Now 30 years still separate it from the expiration of the shortest of these periods.

It is evident that, under these conditions, to urge it to relinquish its rights and privileges would be to inflict on these interests an injury which nothing could warrant. For this the Imperial Government sees no sufficient reason.

On the other hand, the fact must not be lost sight of that, being obliged to operate in a country where European civilization does not exist, the company was compelled to make great expenditures not only for the construction of the railroad proper, but also in connection with numerous auxiliary works. It was also necessary to create and organize various kinds of administrations and services connected in one way or another with the railroad. Finally, thanks to the public confidence which was enjoyed by the company, numerous private enterprises, more or less connected with the railroad, arose along the Chinese Eastern line, very considerable capital being invested in them. It is hardly possible to enumerate the numerous interests grouped [Page 250] about this line to-day. And this is a sufficient reason why the Imperial Government deems itself obliged to use the greatest circumspection in making any modification whatever of the state of affairs which is the source of so many interests.

There is still another final consideration which still more greatly obliges the Imperial Government to observe great prudence. The development of Manchuria and the exploitation of its natural resources are not the only purposes pursued by the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The latter is of a public interest of the first order to Russia. It constitutes the principal line of communication between the Russian possessions in the Far East and the rest of the Empire; it is also the great artery by which these possessions are supplied with Russian merchandise. In this way the line is but an integral part of the great Trans-Siberian Railway, which is used by almost all of western Europe in its relations with the Far East. It is this consideration that decided the Russian Government to guarantee, at very considerable expense, the capital invested in the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and to cover the deficit resulting from its operation. It can not, therefore, be a matter of indifference to the Imperial Government whether it is an international organ that administers a line of such importance, or, on the contrary, a Russian stock company which is obliged not to fix the rates and conditions of transportation of merchandise by the Chinese Eastern Railroad without the consent of the Russian Government, and which, by the very nature of the concession obtained, is closely connected with the interests of the nation.

These are the considerations which, from the Russian standpoint, determine in a conclusive manner the attitude of the Imperial Government toward the proposition of the United States Government regarding the international administration and control of the Manchurian railroads. There are others, however, of a general character which likewise do not plead in favor of this proposition.

The Imperial Government is of the opinion that the proposition of the United States does not sufficiently guarantee that the new order of things will have a satisfactory result from a financial standpoint. At all events, the organization proposed for Manchuria is of a tentative character, which has not only never been tried in China but is unusual in itself. To decide in favor of it on so vast a scale as proposed by the Federal Government, relinquishing for this purpose a system that has been tested, would only be possible with a certainty of obtaining favorable results. The Imperial Government regrets that it does not have this certainty.

Taking up, now, the second alternative of the American proposition, the Imperial Government considers itself obliged to declare that it regards the project of construction of the Chinchow-Tsitsihar-Aigun Railroad as being of capital importance to Russia. Its accomplishment will open up a new route giving access from the south not only to the Chinese Eastern Railroad, but directly to Russian possessions at Aigun. This shows adequately the strategic and political importance of the enterprise. Moreover, the construction of this line will essentially modify the conditions under which eastern Mongolia and the north of Manchuria are served by the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Now, the Imperial Government can not realize the consequences of this proposition and decide on the attitude which it ought to assume in regard thereto unless it is informed of the basis on which it reposes. For these reasons the Imperial Government, while being willing in principle to take this question under consideration, hopes that it will be enabled to know the basis of the proposition in due time in order that it may, after a thorough examination, reach a final attitude with regard to the proposition itself as well as to its participation therein.

It is the same with any future project concerning a financial participation in the construction of railroads in Manchuria. The Imperial Government considers that it must reserve the privilege of examining every project of this kind from a double standpoint of its political and strategical interests and of the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Then only could it take a position in regard to each of the lines which might be projected.