Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, December 6, 1875, Volume I
No. 16.
Mr. Osborn
to Mr. Fish.
Buenos Ayres, June 24, 1875. (Received August 2.)
Sir: As an extra steamer leaves here this morning direct for New York, I take the opportunity to inform you that a dispatch has just been received that the Paraguayan government has rejected the late treaty, concluded by Dr. Tejedor and Senor Sosa, at Rio de Janeiro, and that Senor Sosa has been dismissed by his government. How reliable this dispatch is I cannot now say, but it is credited here.
I have also the honor to transmit with this a translation of the statement of Dr. Tejedor’s reply to the reports, and rumors, and charges of the Brazilian press, that his mission was an imposition and a farce, inasmuch as a treaty had already been made with the government of Paraguay by the Argentine Republic before Dr. Tejedor left for Rio de Janeiro, and that his conduct while there, and the manner of his leaving Rio de Janeiro, was not proper or courteous to the Emperor or the ministry.
I am, &c.,
Dr. Tejedor’s mission.
Our readers will be grateful to Dr. Tejedor for his history of the recent negotiations at Rio Janeiro; it is divided into 12 chapters, which we condense as follows:
1. Preface.—In giving this narrative to the public, I am not yet aware what results [Page 38] the treaties I concluded at Bio Janeiro with the Paraguayan minister may have had at Asuncion. My object is neither personal nor for sake of party in making this manifesto, since I simply followed my instructions; but it is necessary that all the circumstances be elucidated for those who come after me, to maintain, the rights of the country. The alliance with Brazil may have terminated, but not the questions arising therefrom.
If Paraguay approve the present treaties, the evacuation of the country will follow, as stipulated. If she repudiate them, we can then either proceed to make new treaties, or leave the question for arbitration, as Brazil proposes, for a remedy. Mean time I am not animated by rancor in the following narative:
2. Argentine foreign office.—When General Mitre’s mission failed, the Argentine government trusted that time would do it justice; but Brazil had already concluded the Cotegipe treaties, and found it inconvenient to keep up an army and naval division in Paraguay at great expense. The Paraguayan government at the same time found their commerce hampered till some arrangement would be arrived at. Hence Brazil and Paraguay wished for a solution. Baron Araguaya proposed to renew negotiations on a basis of leaving Villa Occidental for arbitration; whereupon I signified that we would give up all claim to that place if Brazil consented immediately to evacuate Paraguay and hand over to us the island of Cerrito. This was approved of by President Sarmiento, and Baron Araguaya privately conveyed the intimation to his government. After fifteen days he showed me a reply from Viscount Caravellas, minister of foreign affairs, that he had spoken to the Emperor, and that if I were to go to Rio all would be arranged instanter. At the same time the Brazilians induced Paraguay to send a plenipotentiary (Sr. Sosa) to Rio to make separate Treaties with me about limits and a joint arrangement with Brazil for evacuation. Suddenly the September revolution ensued, and hence my note of September 24th, suspending negotiations.
3. Mission to Rio.—The revolution being extinguished, President Avellaneda offered me the mission to Rio, and after several cabinet councils I drew up the basis of my instructions. I felt reluctant to sacrifice Villa Occidental, and even arbitration would be inconvenient, as it would delay indefinitely the evacuation of Paraguay and surrender of Cerrito. I simply repeated the views I had expressed at the conferences of 1871 and during the Quintana and Mitre missions at Asuncion. As I saw there was very little probability of success on these bases, I told Mr. Fleury, Brazilian chargé d’affaires, how things stood, that he might inform his government. At the same time I sent a note to President Avellaneda, with the draught of my instructions, telling him the mission was sure to fail on such bases, but that I would do my duty. Before my departure Mr. Fleury showed me a letter from Viscount Caravellas about the surrender of Cerrito Island, and repeating that if I went to Rio ail would be settled. My knowledge of men and diplomacy told me how fallacious was such promise, but I resolved to go anyhow.
4. The Brazilian diplomatists.—Before the close of the Paraguayan war the Argentines seized Villa Occidental, as they had done Missiones, by right of conquest, and the triple alliance. No objection occurred about Missiones, but Brazil from the first objected to our hold of Villa Occidental, and suggested for us to be content with the Pilcomayo line of frontier. Baron Cotegipe insisted on this in the Quintana negotiations, and Baron Araguaya likewise during the Mitre mission.
The same policy has guided Azambnja, Gondin, and Leal, showing that Brazil has always urged Paraguay to resist our demand in the matter.
5. The Paraguayan diplomatists.—Paraguay, before the war, was jealous of Brazil, and this sentiment is no less strong now. We must not, therefore, believe all we see on the surface. When Barrias passed through here en route for Rio, he was accredited also to this government, but he was always afraid of the Brazilian minister seeing him enter my house. After him was Loyzaga, who had signed the Cotegipe treaties, and brought letters from President Jovellanos that Paraguay wished to free herself, yet he neither spoke nor moved without first consulting the Brazilian minister here, who was Baron Araguaya. When Mitre went to Asuncion, he found Araguaya guided the Paraguayan plenipotentiary, Miranda; and when the Mitre mission burst up, President Jovellanos sought either to come personally, or send an agent to arrange secretly with us, but found it impossible. All this shows that Paraguay has not been unfriendly to our claims.
6. Plenipotentiary Sosa.—On my arrival at Rio, Mr. Sosa was not among the first to call on me, but, finally, he came on a dark night, so as not to be seen. When we became more intimate after the first two conferences, he told me some things that convinced me the mission must be a failure. His government had not sent him funds, and he was forced to borrow $2,000$ f. from the Brazilian government, of which he repaid the half. During his stay of seven months, not one of the cabinet ministers returned his visit. When my appointment was known, he was requested to write to Asuncion, and ask the government of Paraguay to beg the Brazilians would not evacuate. Before each conference he was instructed what position to assume. At the same time his powers were so limited that he could only make arrangements ad referendum, and, in every case, must previously place himself in accord with the government of Asuncion.
7. First conference.—At the first conference, on April 28, I proposed to arrange the [Page 39] programme of our discussions, observing that evacuation was the sine qua non of my two solutions, and that this was the sole purpose of the three powers represented at the conference, as I could make a treaty of limits myself with the Paraguayan envoy.
The Brazilian plenipotentiaries objected on the grounds of the treaty of November 19, and the conferences of 1871, but I pressed my case, as I wanted to see if they were in earnest about giving up Cerrito Island. They declared Brazil would evacuate Cerrito the same time as Asuncion, but not hand it over to the Argentines till the title was arranged with Paraguay, adding that probably the Argentines would wish to fortify it. Thus I saw had vanished all hopes of arrangement. I replied that Cerrito had been occupied in name of the allies, and the war being over, Brazil should either hand it over to the Argentines or Paraguayans or simply evacuate it; that as Brazil had forts in Matto Grosso, and Paraguay had command of the river at Humayta it mattered little whether we fortified Cerrito, especially as we had Martin Garcia, the key to all the rivers. Here the conference ended.
8. Second conference.—This was held on the 4th of May, and at the request of the Brazilian representatives I submitted the following basis for evacuation:
“It is hereby agreed that if the Argentine Republic arrange with Paraguay about the limits, the evacuation shall take place within three months. But if it be agreed to leave the limits for arbitration, then the Brazilian force at Asuncion shall not exceed that of the Argentines at Villa Occidental pending the arbitration. The island of Cerrito to be meantime given up at once to the Argentines.”
Viscount Rio Branco insisted that as the-disputed territory was neither Argentine nor; Paraguayan, neither power should occupy it; adding that my proposal argued a want of confidence which he regretted. I replied that I had always declared the evacuation to be a sine qua non; that any want of confidence was caused by the prolonged Brazilian occupation; that we wanted deeds instead of words; that we hail mutual points to arrange as regards the debt and occupation; that I could singly arrange the limits with Paraguay; that the Argentines faithfully adhered to the triple alliance; that Paraguay had not yet recognized the war debt to my country as she had to Brazil, and that nothing could restore harmony between all parties, unless an engagement by Brazil to evacuate, seeing that the garrison exercised undue influence at Asuncion, while our forces were on the Chaco side of the river.
The debate was unnecessarily long, but my adversaries would only consent to admit the principle of evacuation in whatever way we should arrange by treaty or arbitration.
Finally, without receding from my point of evacuation and reduction of forces, I drew up this protocol as the result of the conference: “It is hereby agreed that whether Paraguay and the Argentine Republic make a treaty of limits or agree upon arbitration, the evacuation will take place as may be agreed on in respective protocols.”
9. Third conference.—As requested in last conference, I presented, on May 10, my programme of arrangement, Mr. Paranhos assuring me the Emperor was anxious to see the business settled. What, then, could interfere if I settled the limits with Mr. Sosa? I therefore proposed two solutions:
- First. Paraguay to cede us Villa Occidental and Cerrito Island.
- Second. The question of limits to be left for arbitration, and the’ is land of Cerrito to be meantime handed over to us, on signing the present convention.
I prefaced my demands by snowing that Brazilian evacuation must be the first step, as agreed on in treaty of November 19. I added that we could not give up Villa Occidental without arbitration, as we had so many titles to it; that the triple alliance gave the Argentines all the west bank of the river Paraguay, as high as Bahia Negro, according to our titles, ever since 1810. Moreover, that Argentine and foreign interests were staked there which, Mr. Sosa admitted, Paraguay would be unable’ to answer for; that all we wanted was to hold guarantee for the navigation of the Bermejo and Pilcomayo. I urged, that, in any event, there was no excuse for delaying the surrender of Cerrito Island; that, if I had foreseen any difficulty on this point I should never have come to Rio, and that I would rather return to Buenos Ayres empty-handed, than bearer of a treaty which my government or Congress would have to reject.
Mr. Sosa was surprised at my proposals, which seemed exactly to meet his instructions. He asked me if he was to consider both proposals together, and as I answered affirmatively, he said:
“That the partial or total evacuation of Paraguay would never be with his government a cause for rupture of negotiations.
“That some difficulty might occur by making the upper branch of the Pilcomayo the boundary, since it was not navigable, whereas the lower mouth in front of Villeta was.
“That he preferred to settle the boundary right off, without arbitration or pretext for delay.
“That, as regarded smuggling from Villa Occidental, his government could employ river-police to prevent it.”
Thus, everything was settled. But Mr. Paranhos, after hearing Soga’s declarations, said it was impossible to arrive at once at a decision on the proposed bases; that they [Page 40] seemed incompatible with the triple alliance, and that at the next conference he hoped the Argentine and Paraguayan envoys would arrive at a complete understanding: adding, that Mr. Sosa had only given his private opinion, since he admitted his instructions did not go so far.
Mr. Sosa replied that he accepted the arrangement as suitable to Paraguay, not as his individual opinion, but in his quality of minister. The conference was suspended, the Brazilian representatives requiring time to consider the matter.
10. Final conference.—This was on May 19, and when I pointed out the line which gave Villa Occidental to the Argentines, Viscount Rio Branco made a long speech, suggesting rather to leave it to arbitration, but not in the form I had proposed. He was, however, no longer of opinion that the cession of Villa Occidental would be contrary to the triple alliance, and if Paraguay ceded all the territory up to Bahia Negro there would be no objection made by Brazil, provided always that Paraguay paid the debts to the allied powers evenly.
He added that it would be difficult to draw a frontier line across unknown deserts, or along a small stream; that arbitration removed every difficulty, and there need be no delay if we at once named the arbitrators and gave them a fixed period for their sentence.
He said he would not treat of the basis of arbitration as the Argentine plenipotentiary’s terms were impertinent. (!)
Hereupon Mr. Sosa said a third time that he accepted my terms, and while we were describing frontier lines, the Brazilian plenipotentiaries aided us; viscount Caravellas remarking that he was always in favor of such an issue, dividing the territory of Villa Occidental. The Brazilian plenipotentiaries simply required us to sign a protocol that my treaty with Paraguay was not by their advice. I then proposed that Sosa and I should agree on the limits and notify the Brazilian representatives, so that Mr. Paranhos might himself draw up the protocol to his liking. Mr. Paranhos then asked me what we had arranged about the occupation, and I at once proposed the following protocol: “The Brazilian forces shall evacuate Paraguay within three months after the ratification of this treaty;” to which Mr. Paranhos added, “as agreed on in treaty of November 19.” The repugnance of the Brazilian plenipotentiaries to the treaty was beyond question, but far from indicating the opposition which arose afterwards.
11. Treaties of May 20.—On this day Mr. Sosa and I met at the Hotel de Estrangeiros and arranged the treaty of limits, of which I sent a copy in Sosa’s handwriting to Mr. Paranhos, as also a separate protocol about indemnities. The same day I learned at Maua’s that the Emperor had been summoned by telegraph, and had held a cabinet council. Next day (21) I went out to Petropolis, and, feeling unwell, returned suddenly on Sunday, 23d. I sent my secretary to procure the signature of the Brazilian plenipotentiaries to the protocol of the third conference, as I was about to leave Rio on June 2. The secretary returned with news that Messrs. Rio Branco and Caravellas had been two hours conferring with Sosa. The latter just then arrived looking very strange, and his story filled me with astonishment. They upbraided him with having separated from them, said they had not supposed he ceded Villa Occidental but only a piece of ground behind, adding that they could not consent to it; that the war debt remained to be settled, and if even the treaty were ratified, Brazil would not evacuate. Mr. Sosa simply replied that the treaty was signed and sealed, and very advantageous to Paraguay. I heard nothing from Rio Branco or Caravellas, who left me in silence and replied to my applications about signing the protocol that Mr. Paranhos was too busy to revise it.
As regards the affair at Petropolis, I sent my secretary to tell the Empress that my wife wished to pay her respects to Her Majesty, and I hoped she would excuse us for not going in court dress, as we had none. Her Majesty sent me answer that the princess was unwell, but I could attend the public reception next day, Sunday, after mass. As I was unwell, I returned to Rio without that ceremony, meeting and shaking hands with the Emperor at the foot of Raiz de Serra, as he was going up to Petropolis. On May 27, (feast of Saint George,) the Emperor and family came to Rio for the season. I was in the house of deputies when a son of Mr. Paranhos handed me a note that the Emperor and Empress would receive me at Cristobal that evening, or at the ball next night. The Emperor conversed with me most amicably, and the Empress with my wife, and I told His Majesty, as the conferences were over, I intended to leave on June 2. He told me of all the pretty places about Rio. After half an hour we separated, the Emperor saying he would see me later at the ball. When I sat down by him, the conversation turned on the conferences. I again told him I was going to sail on the 2d, and asked him what he thought of my treaty. He spoke of the jealousy between the two countries, the arming of Martin Garcia, and said Paraguay would not approve my treaty, adding that arbitration was the best way to settle it. I merely answered about the jealousy of Brazil and the Martin Garcia question, and could see the opposition to Sosa’s treaty arose with the Empror. He took leave of me cordially, saying, I must go and converse with somebody else, because the guests will think we have grave matters in hand, when we have nothing,” I had received a note from Viscount Rio Branco [Page 41] for an interview next morning (29th) at the foreign office. He told me he regretted my treaty would amount to nothing, and that, if I now consented to arbitration, Brazil would at once hand us over Cerrito. I told him his words surprised me, as the documents were in his possession whereby Villa Occidental was given to the Argentines, and that what he asked me was an act of madness. We parted very friendly.
12. My farewell.—I had gone on a special mission and had no letter of recall to present at court. No diplomatic usage required me again to call on the Emperor, as I had seen him at the palace on the 28th, and my secretaries on the 30th. Besides, private audiences with crowned heads are not always advisable, since, whenever they like, they refuse to talk of business. The Emperor is indeed an estimable man, and why should I offend him? On returning to my hotel, I sent Viscount Rio Branco a note that I was to sail on the 2d, and would leave the legation in charge of the consul-general. On Sunday, 30th, I called to take leave of the ministers and others, but did not find Viscount Rio Branco at home. Next day I wrote to him to say I was going, and received his reply. My farewell was not congratulatory, but I felt that I had received much kindness.