No. 235.

Mr. Davis to Mr. Bancroft.

No. 261.]

Sir: Referring to my No. 259, inclosing a copy of Mr. Fish’s telegram of the 1st instant, instructing you to propose to the North German government a suspension of hostilities in Chinese waters, I have to say that no reply or acknowledgment has been received.

When the massacre of Tien-tsin took place, Mr. Low was of opinion that the outbreak was a local one and unpremeditated, * * * * and although the Chinese populace were still much excited, Mr. Low thought that the danger was over, that the government was sincere in its intention to prevent a repetition, and to punish the offenders, and that there was no probability of similar outbreaks elsewhere.

In his subsequent dispatches he still adheres to his original opinion that the disturbance was local and unpremeditated, and that the government at Pekin sincerely desired to prevent a repetition and to preserve peace; but he appears to have decidedly modified his opinion as to the probability that they will be able to do so. His doubts are founded on the injudicious course pursued by the French chargé d’affaires in demanding the summary execution of the Tien-tsin officials as an ultimatum, and upon the hopes the populace in the large Chinese cities derive from the state of war existing between Germany and France, which they argue will neutralize the force of those two powers. He expresses the fear that the government at Pekin may find itself too weak to resist the pressure of popular opinion in the masses, acting in harmony with the cherished wishes and purposes of the literati, and that it may be forced into war to prevent popular outbreaks.

It seemed to the President that these views coming from a gentleman so cautious, dispassionate, and prudent as Mr. Low, were entitled to more than the ordinary consideration. He therefore directed, after consultation with the cabinet, the telegram of the 1st instant to be sent to you, believing that any advantage which one belligerent might gain over the other in eastern waters would be of small consequence to the victor, compared with the preservation of peace in China.

The President does not intend to depart from the policy pointed out in Mr. Fish’s dispatch No. 148, of August 31, 1869. He does not propose to take part, nor does he invite North Germany to take part in any controversy between France and China growing out of the massacré of Tien-tsin. He only desires that so far as the impression of the neutralization of German and French influence by the state of hostilities operated to enfeeble the central government, that impression may be removed; and that should unfortunately a general war be declared by China, or should an outbreak against foreigners take place which the government cannot prevent nor punish, the several powers may be in a position to afford the fullest measure of protection.

I inclose copies of two telegrams from Mr. Motley, which would seem to indicate that the commanders of the French and Prussian fleets have come to some understanding, but it is not clear that this has been ratified at Berlin and Paris.

I also inclose a copy of a communication of the 5th instant from Baron Gerolt bearing upon this subject.

J. C. B. DAVIS, Acting Secretary.