No. 215.

Mr. Fish to Mr. Frederick F. Low.

No. 2.]

Sir: It was deemed advisable last summer to acquaint Mr. Bancroft, in anticipation of the arrival of the Chinese mission at Berlin, with the views of the present administration concerning the policy to be pursued toward China. As these instructions contain the substance of most that it is necessary to say to you before you sail to your post, I inclose a copy of them herewith and invite your special attention to them.

You will observe that the President adheres to the policy adopted in 1868, when the articles additional to the treaty of 1858 (commonly known as the Burlingame treaty) were concluded. You will, therefore, so shape your private as well as your official conversation as to demonstrate to Prince Kung the sincerity of the United States in its wishes for the maintenance of the authority of the central government and for the peaceful spread of its influence. You will make clear to the government to which you are accredited the settled purpose of the President to observe with fidelity all the treaty obligations of the United States and to respect the prejudices and traditions of the people of China when they do not interfere with rights which have been acquired to the United States by treaty. On the other hand you will not fail to make it distinctly understood that he will claim the full performance, by the Chinese government, of all the promises and obligations which it has assumed by treaties or conventions with the United States. On this point, and in the maintenance of our existing rights to their full extent, you will be always firm and decisive. While you will put forward these claims where occasion requires, with prudence and moderation, you will be unyielding in demanding the extreme protection to American citizens, commerce, and property which is conceded by the treaties, and in requiring the full recognition of your own official position to which you are entitled.

The instructions to Mr. Bancroft set forth so fully the policy of the United States toward China, the ends to be accomplished there, and the peaceful spirit which is to animate your mission, that I content myself with again referring you to them for your guidance in those respects.

HAMILTON FISH.
[Page 304]

Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft.

No. 148.]

Sir: Referring again to your dispatch No. 8, of the 4th of May last, I propose to give briefly the views of the Department as to the policy to be pursued toward China.

I am induced to do this mainly because the chargé d’affaires of North Germany has, under instructions from his government, inquired of me whether the President still adheres to the principles established by the additional articles to the treaty of June 18, 1858, which were concluded July 28, 1868. That government has, on several occasions, manifested a desire to harmonize its policy with ours in the Pacific. While I have freely communicated to Mr. Krause the views which we entertain, and have gone so far as to read to him copious extracts from the communications of Mr. Browne and Mr. George Seward from China, I thought as you are soon to meet Mr. Burlingame and his colleagues, it may be well to give you a little more in detail the views of the President on this question. The great principle which underlies the articles of July 1868 is the recognition of the sovereign authority of the imperial government at Pekin over the people of the Chinese empire and over their social, commercial, and political relations with the western powers. Although it is true that many of the Christian governments, including the United States, had before then concluded treaties with the imperial government, yet it is scarely exaggeration to say that their relations at that time were rather those of force than of amity.

The commercial foothold along the coast had been gained by conflict or by demonstrations of force, and were held in the same way. The occupation which, originally hostile, had become commercial—and so far friendly as the relations of commerce demanded a show of amity—aimed in the commencement, with some European settlers, at territorial acquisition; but this tendency had been checked by the rivalry of different nationalities, until the foreign jurisdiction, more by the tacit consent of the foreigners than from any active power exercised by the Chinese, had become limited to the essential matters of the municipal government of the communities of Europeans and the exercise of jurisdiction over their persons and properties. The communication between China and the outside world was merely confined to the trading points. With the intellects that rule that nation of four hundred and fifty millions of people, with the men who gave it its ideas and directed its policy, with its vast internal industries, with its great agricultural population, the traders, consuls, and functionaries of the ports rarely came in contact except in the contact of war. The European-Chinese policy was one of isolation, inasmuch as it only sought the development of a foreign trade at certain particular ports, and of disintegration, as it practically ignored the central government and made war upon the provinces to redress its grievances and to enforce its demands.

It is true, indeed, that by the treaty of Tien-tsin, in 1858, the privilege was secured to the United States and the European powers to maintain legations at Pekin, and that for the ten years that followed diplomatic representatives resided there. It is also true that from that residence and the contact with the higher Chinese officials there has come a better knowledge of the Chinese nation, and of the relation between its people and its government; but it is none the less true that those treaties closed a war which resulted disastrously to China; that before their ratifications could be exchanged another war became necessary to enforce them; that the concessions they contained were forced from the imperial government; that the new policy was not favored by the Chinese statesmen; that it did not measurably increase the personal intercourse between the natives and the Europeans; and that many of the wisest of the Chinese rulers honestly dreaded any increase in such intercourse, as tending to the introduction in China of the labor-saving machines of the west, which, in their judgment, would throw multitudes of people in their thickly-settled country out of employment, reduce them to beggary and starvation, and inflict irreparable woes on China. For an able and temperate statement of these views by a person who is described by Mr. Browne as a man “of acknowledged ability and commanding influence,” “who is regarded as the most enlightened statesman of the empire,” I refer you to the remarkable inclosure, marked No. 1, which I shall subsequently allude to further To say that such views are fallacious and obsolete; that they are confuted by the experience of western nations like England and Belgium, which have as great a population to the square mile as China; that they are opposed to all sound theories of political economy, does not meet the case. The facts remain that they did at one time control the policy of China, and that they are still adhered to by many of her leading statesmen; and in dealing with this question these facts must not be lost sight of.

The treaty negotiated by Mr. Burlingame and his colleagues was along step in another direction. It came voluntarily from China, and placed that power in theory on the same diplomatic footing with the nations of the western world. It recognizes the imperial government as the power to withhold or to grant further commercial [Page 305] privileges, and also as the power whose duty it is to enforce the peaceful enjoyment of the rights already conferred.

While it confirms the interterritorial jurisdiction conferred by former treaties upon European and American functionaries over the persons and properties of their countrymen, it recognizes at the same time the territorial integrity of China, and prevents such a jurisdiction from being stretched beyond its original purpose. While it leaves in China the sovereign power of granting to foreigners hereafter the right to construct lines of railroads and telegraphs, of opening mines, of navigating the rivers of the empire with steamers, and of otherwise increasing the outlets for its wealth, by the use of the appliances of western civilization, it contemplates that China shall avail herself of these appliances by reasonable concessions, to be made as public necessities and the power of the government to influence public opinion will permit. This treaty has not yet been ratified by the imperial government, and I am informed by Mr. Browne that Prince Kung “deems it advisable to defer the exchange of ratifications till the return of the Chinese plenipotentiaries.” Mr. Browne does not “infer any slight to our government from this delay, or any want of appreciation of its friendship,” and he thinks that “the true cause of the delay may be found in the peculiar attitude of China toward all the treaty powers.” “When the government of China,” he adds, “is satisfied that it will not be injurious to its interests to accept these articles, it will do so.”

The President has been disposed to view this matter in the same light, and, therefore, has not pressed for a ratification, feeling confident that, as the treaty is so much in the interest of China, the statesmen of that empire must inevitably see the propriety of authorizing the ratification to be exchanged. Rumors reach us by telegraph from Hong-Kong, by. way of London, that the imperial government have decided not to ratify this treaty, but we are not inclined to credit them, as they are opposed to the general tenor of our information. Some things have taken place, however, which, regarded by themselves, tend to lead us to the conclusion that it is possible that China may reverse her policy; and in order that you may have full information on this subject, it is proper that I should briefly state them.

Not long after the treaties of Tien-tsin, what is known as the coöperative policy of the great powers in China began; I think this dates from about the year 1863, but it is immaterial for my present purpose whether it began earlier or later. Under this policy, favored by the fact that most or all of the treaties with the western powers contained the most favored-nation clause, the Christian communities of all nationalities in China have been regarded as having a common political as well as commercial interest, to be pursued under joint counsels, and it has followed from this, that in important matters the Chinese officials have been made to see, sometimes even with a show of ostentation, that there was a substantial unity of design among all the powers. The apprehension has been expressed lest the operation of the eighth article of the treaty of July should put a stop to this coöperative policy; and I am bound to say, that so far as that policy was aggressive and attempted to force upon China measures which could not be enforced upon a European or American state by the rules of the equitable code which regulates the intercourse of civilized nations, in my judgement, that article may, when ratifications are exchanged, prevent the United States from participating in such a policy.

The question becomes a practical one from the fact that the revision of the British treaty of 1858 is under consideration. The twenty-seventh article of that treaty provided that either party might “demand a further revision of the tariff and of the commercial articles of the treaty at the end of ten years: but if no demand be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, then the tariff shall remain in force for ten years more, reckoned from the end of the preceding ten years.”

The thirtieth article of the treaty between China and the United States, of 1858, provides that “should at any time the Ta-Tsing empire grant to any nation, or the merchants or citizens of any nation, any right, privilege, or favor connected either with navigation, commerce, political and other intercourse, which is not conferred by this treaty, such right, privilege, or favor shall at once inure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants, and citizens.” Thus the United States became directly interested in the revision of the British concessions.

It being well understood that Great Britain would, when the time came, demand, among other things, the right to navigate the interior waters of the empire with steam, the right to construct and to hire warehouses in the interior for the storage of goods, and the right to work coal mines, the government at Pekin, on the 12th of October, 1867, took steps to get information from the different parts of the empire upon the subject of the revision. Among others, Tsang-Kwohfan, acting governor of the provinces of Kiangru, Nganhioui, and Kiangri, “a man over 70 years of age and of distinguished reputation throughout the empire,” received these instructions, and made, in answer to them, the able report, to the copy of which, herewith inclosed, marked No. 1, I have already called your attention.

Though the work of a conservative mind that clings to the traditions of the past, [Page 306] and sees few good results in change, it is moderate and temperate, and must be conceded to be, from the Chinese standpoint, a not unwise view of the subject. With all its conservatism it is easy to trace in it the enlarging and modifying influences of contact with the west.

In substance, however, it recommends the Emperor’s advisers not to grant the important new concessions asked for by the government of Great Britain.

In November last the expected demands were made on the part of Great Britain by Sir Rutherford Alcock, in a personal interview with Prince Kung and some of the other ministers. They were made in strong language, as necessary to the proper enjoyment of the rights conceded by the treaty of 1858, and the Chinese government was warned in advance of the probable course Great Britain would pursue in case of refusal. The American minister gave Sir Rutherford Alcock the support of his presence at the interview, and afterward received from Sir Rutherford full copies of an account of it, which was drawn up in the British legation and transmitted to Prince Kung. I inclose, marked No. 2 and No. 3, copies of these documents.

Prince Kung, on his part, soon replied in a dignified and moderate way to the peremptory demands of Sir Rutherford Alcock. He admitted the substantial accuracy of Sir Rutherford’s account of the interview. He said that China and Great Britain could not be coerced into a similarity, neither could either wholly adopt the usages of the other. He deprecated the entire submission of China to the demands of the foreign merchants. He denied that there had been willful violations of the treaty. He stated, in detail, many points in which China is prepared to make concessions, which will, he thinks, give to the foreign merchants all they ought to ask. But to admit steamers on the interior lakes and rivers, to establish hongs, and to carry on mining operations in the interior, will, in the judgment of the prince, be so distasteful to the people that it will be impracticable for the government to attempt to carry out the terms of such a concession should it be made; and Great Britain, in that case, would have just cause to upbraid China for bad faith.

To the representation that these concessions would be beneficial to China, the prince replies that a good physician ascertains the condition of his patient before deciding on the remedies, and intimates that he knows the condition of China better than Sir Rutherford Alcock does; and he closes by furnishing the British envoy with a memorandum of the basis for a revision which will be acceptable to the Chinese government. I inclose copies of these papers, marked No. 4 and No. 6.

As Mr. Browne had, in pursuance of the cooperative policy, interfered personally and in writing (see inclosure No. 5) on behalf of the British claim for a revision, Prince Kung, about the same time, addressed a note to him, of which I inclose a copy, (No. 7.)

The basis for a revision, which was proposed by the Chinese government, conceded the opening of landing stages on the Yangtse at points to be agreed upon; the working of mines in the vicinity of one or more of the treaty ports; the right of inland navigation by vessels not propelled by steam, this restriction to cease when Chinese use vessels propelled by steam; a steam-tug on the Poyang Lake; and the free right to travel throughout the land, and to hire lodgings and accommodations for produce or goods.

Mr. Ross Browne, who sympathized and coöperated with the British minister throughout the negotiations, appears to think that the points gained may become of importance as a starting point for negotiations hereafter. I inclose you a copy of his letter to Sir Rutherford Alcock on the subject, (No. 8.)

The British minister at Washington, on the 9th day of June last, notified the United States of the decision of her Majesty’s government on this subject, by which it would appear that they have decided to accept the situation and wait quietly the operation of the causes which are working in the Chinese mind. I inclose (marked No. 9) a copy of an extract from a letter from the board of trade, which has been sent to Sir Rutherford Alcock for his guidance. Such course strikes me as wiser than the more vigorous policy which Sir Rutherford Alcock seems to have contemplated. The points gained may not be as important as could be desired, yet they have been gained peaceably, by negotiation, and are yielded by China as a right flowing legitimately and necessarily from former treaties.

It certainly looks, on the face of this correspondence, as if the conduct of the Emperor’s ministers had been inspired from the first by a sense of duty, by a desire to observe good faith toward the western powers, and by a willingness to extend commercial relations with those powers, when they felt that they could do so without prejudice to their own position and without injury to the people whose government was intrusted to them.

I will not dwell upon the obvious difficulty of inoculating new ideas upon such a people, nor upon the evident fact that intelligent statesmen like Prince Kung and his associates, measure those difficulties quite up to their full value.

Every consideration, from whatever point of view, leads me to believe that it is neither wise nor just to force the Emperor’s advisers into a position of hostility so long as we have cause to think that they are willing to accept the present situation, and to [Page 307] march forward, although with the prudence taught them by a Chinese education. You will undoubtedly meet Mr. Burlingame and his associates in Berlin. You will, if you please, ascertain from him whether he has definite information as to the intentions of the ministry at Pekin. Unless it shall appear that they have already decided not to ratify the treaty of 1868, or unless you shall be satisfied that such will be their decision, and that the policy inaugurated by Mr. Burlingame is to be reversed, you will render him and his associates whatever assistance you can, in securing the coöperation of North Germany in the new Chinese policy. You will also doubtless have an opportunity to impress upon Mr. Burlingame the importance to China of an early ratification of the treaties. I have stated already that the President has no solicitude as to the purpose of the Emperor’s advisers in that respect. But he thinks it would be well to have defined in a permanent law, as soon as possible, the relations that are hereafter to exist between the United States and China.

Many considerations call for this beside those which may be deduced from what has gone before in this instruction. Every month brings thousands of Chinese emigrants to the Pacific coast. Already they have crossed the great mountains, and are beginning to be found in the interior of the continent. By their assiduity, patience, and fidelity, and by their intelligence, they earn the good will and confidence of those who employ them. We have good reason to think that this thing will continue and increase. On the other hand, in China there will be an increase in the resident American and European population, not by any means commensurate with the growth of the Chinese emigration to this country, but corresponding with the growth of our country, with the development of its resources on the Pacific slope, and with the new position in the commerce of the world which it takes with the completion of the Pacific Railroad. These foreigners settling in China, occupying the various quarters assigned to them, exercising municipal rights over these quarters by virtue of land regulations, either made by them or for them, by their home governments, cease to be an aggressive element in China, when once the principles of the treaty of July 1868 are promulgated as the law hereafter to regulate the relations between Christendom and that ancient empire. You will also say to Mr. Burlingame that, while the President cordially gives his adhesion to the principles of the treaty of 1868, and while he will, should that instrument be ratified by China, cause it to be faithfully observed by the United States, yet he earnestly hopes that the advisers of his Majesty the Emperor may soon see their way clear to counsel the granting of some concessions similar to those asked for by Sir Rutherford Alcock and Mr. Ross Browne. He will not assume to judge whether the temper of the people of China will or will not at present justify their rulers in doing so; but he thinks that he may, without impropriety, say, that when it can be done without disturbing the good order of the empire, the results must be eminently favorable to the welfare and well-being of the Chinese people. And he trusts that the statesmen of China, enlightened by the experience of other nations, will hasten at the earliest moment, when in their judgment it can safely be done, to respond to the friendly feeling and good wishes of the United States by moderating the restrictions which fetter the commerce of the great empire over whose destinies they preside. He relies upon Mr. Burlingame and his associates to impress upon their chiefs at home that the views of such men as Tsang Kevohfan, however honest, are delusive; that experience, patent before them in every country through which they travel, has shown them that the evils which seem to be dreaded by the oriental rulers do not follow the free use of steam and of the telegraph; but that, while these inventions improve the condition of all ranks in the community which uses them, their greatest meliorating influence is. felt among the laboring classes.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

HAMILTON FISH.

N. B.—Since writing the foregoing instructions, I have received from Mr. Burlingame a telegraphic dispatch dated August 31, 1869, in which he says: “I have received a dispatch from the Chinese government expressing strongly their satisfaction with, and acceptance of, the treaty negotiated at Washington.”

[Inclosures.]

228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236
[Page 308]
No. 1.

Report of Tsang, Acting Governor General, &c., of Kiangsu, relating to proposed revision of the treaties

Tsang, the acting governor general of the provinces of Kiangsu, Nganhwui, and Kiangsi, reports to the throne that, in obedience to the imperial will requiring previous consultations as to the points to be attended to in revising the treaties, he now reverently incloses a secret statement, upon which he humbly begs the sacred glance.

On the 20th of October last, I was honored by a secret dispatch from the general council, stating that on the 12th of that month the following decree had been received by the board:

“The Foreign Office has memorialized the throne respecting the desirableness of previous consultations upon revising the treaties, and requested that orders might be sent to the high military and civil officers, in whose jurisdiction are situated the coast and river ports open to foreign trade, requiring each of them to send in his views, [upon the points specified.]

“The period of ten years, at the end of which the treaties are to be revised, being near its close, the Foreign Office sent up a request that orders might be sent to the two superintendents of trade for the northern and southern ports, to select from among their ablest and experienced officers two persons to bring these several reports to Pekin in November. We accordingly gave orders at the time to the proper officers to carry it into effect. But that memorial proposed that when these deputed messengers had brought up all the plans and careful suggestions, [of the provincial officers,] their deliberation must await our decision in view of the exigencies of the whole question.

“The month of January 1868, being six months before the expiration of the British treaty, is the time when notice must be given of its revision; and the reports of all the civil and military provincial functionaries ought without fail to reach Pekin by December 1867. Then, when the several confidential orders from the Foreign Office respecting the articles to be discussed have reached their addresses, let the officers all examine this matter, in view of what the times require and our resources allow, so that everything be completely arranged, and a careful memorial be reported in reply. We shall thus be assisted in meeting the difficulties of the occasion, and they will fulfill the purpose of their offices. Respect this.”

From this I am led to look up to his Majesty’s far-reaching plans, by which he thus obtains the views and conclusions of the experienced and talented among his officers, and I have endeavored in the sincerest manner to carry out the design. The first dispatch and the secret letter from the Foreign Office have both been carefully considered in every point. The design is to firmly maintain our own views, without hazarding the safety of the present situation, connected with the desire to wipe out our shame and redress our wrongs without giving those parties reason to suspect our plans. A scheme like this is really doing what the times require and our resources allow, and I leave most painfully labored to carry out the duties committed to me.

In order to aid in the consultations respecting the revision of the treaties, as soon as I received the confidential letter from the foreign office, in May, I sent directions to the collectors of each custom-house to make careful inquiries, arranging their reports under various heads. I myself most carefully examined them, and added notes as needed, and then forwarded them from Shanghai on the 18th of September, by the expectant intendant, Sun Sz’tah, and another deputy, to be thoroughly sifted and collated at Pekin.

In respect to the various points touched upon in the decree which I have now received, I humbly beg to suggest that in all our intercourse with foreign nations the most important things to be regarded are good faith and what is right, and perhaps even above these should be placed decision. Those things which we cannot yield should, from first to last, be firmly declared, and not retracted under any circumstances; but those privileges which we can liberally yield might be made known to them in direct and plain terms. Let our words be maintained when once spoken, and let no alternate concession and refusal be exhibited, which by its aspect of indicision and weakness will only open the door for the wily propositions and arguments of the other party.

It may be said in general that, during many centuries past, the inhabitants in western lands have been striving to encroach on each other’s kingdoms; and in every case one has tried to possess itself of the profits of the other’s trade, as a preliminary to getting hold of its territory. They have established places of business throughout China, and trafficked or become carriers in all kinds of produce, simply that they may carry out their unscrupulous schemes of injury, which will end in depriving our merchants of their means of livelihood.

Since the time when we raised troops against them, our people have long suffered every grievous calamity. If we now open three or five more ports to their trade, and the entire length of the Yangtse River, it will daily add to the distress and indigence of our poor people, who, alas! are now nearly quite driven to the wall.

[Page 309]

If we listen to the proposal of the foreigners to open the trade in salt, our own trade in and transportation of the article will presently be brought to nought. If we consent to their scheme of building warehouses, [in the country,] the occupation of those who now keep the inns and depots will likewise suffer. Their demand to have their small steamers allowed access to our rivers will involve the ruin of our large and small boats, and the beggary of sailors and supercargoes. So, also, if we allow them to construct railroads and set up telegraph lines, the livelihood of our cartmen, muleteers, innkeepers, and porters will be taken from them.

Among all the various demands which they make, however, that of opening coal mines should be excepted; for by working mines in the foreign way, and employing machinery, our own country would be permanently benefited, and it appears to me therefore, worthy of a trial. The suggestions of Ying Pau-Shi (now intendant at Shanghai) upon this point, in his minutes, seem to be feasible, and I have marked some notes upon it in approval.

In regard to the two proposals of steamers going up all our rivers, and of building railroads, if foreigners are allowed to carry them on, the profits and advantages of our own country will gradually be carried off to other lands; and even if our own subjects join such enterprises, and get foreigners to conduct them, the rich and the strong will then engross the labor of the poor. Neither of them, therefore, are admissible.

In explanation of these points I have already forwarded my own observations, in the dispatches sent in care of Sun Sz’tah and his colleague, in which I have discussed each clearly in the interest of the thrift and livelihood of our own people, fortifying my positions with such arguments as cannot be gainsaid. If, however, the foreigners press for their adoption unceasingly, it will be desirable to let them know that even if they should be able to force the authorities at Pekin to consent, the provincial rulers, like; myself and others, would still resist their introduction with all our strength; and if, by some means, we, too, should be compelled to give our consent, there would still remain the myriads of common people, who, in the extremity of their poverty, would see how they could better themselves, and rise to oppose the foreigners in a manner that all the authorities in China could not curb or repress. The princes and magnates of the middle kingdom need have no lack of argument in pleading for the lives of their people; and even if our course should bring about a rupture, and we resort to force to preserve the rights and employments of our people, the struggle would not be owing to a mere empty discussion on things of no importance. On the one hand, we could appeal to Heaven, earth, and our sainted emperors, and on the other to the inhabitants dwelling within every sea, [for the justice of our cause.] We, in fact, between these parties ought to fear nothing as to the result, as after it we would have nothing to repent of.

Upon the questions of granting an audience, sending ministers to foreign courts and permitting the propagation of religion, I did not make any observations in the dispatch forwarded to Pekin.

I have humbly ascertained, however, that in the year 1676* our canonized sovereign the Emperor Humane (Kanghi) admitted the Russian Nicholas and others to the presence, but the offerings given and ceremonies then practiced cannot now be fully ascertained. Though it is certain that the Russians were then discussing the frontier between our two countries, and the conditions of trade between us and them, they were still treated as an empire of equal position, and in a manner totally different from the usages practiced toward, the Coreans and other outside tribes. The same, treatment that Kanghi extended toward the Russians has since, during the reigns of Tau Kwang and Hien Fung, been shown towards the British, French, and Americans, i. e., regarding them all as equal nations. Our sacred dynasty, in its love of virtue and kindness to those from afar, has no desire to arrogate to itself the sway over the lands within the boundless oceans, or require that their ministers should render homage; and it will be suitable if, when your Majesty yourself takes the reins of government, they request an audience to grant it. Tide suitable presents and ceremonies can be settled at the time; for, as the envoys represent nations of equal rank, they need not be forced to do what is difficult. This course, on the whole, befits best the equality admitted, and exhibits our courtesy and dignity at the same time.

In regard to sending embassies abroad, the constant intercourse between ns and other countries with whom we have amicable relations will constantly cause questions to arise. The risk of our envoys disgracing those who sent them, and the fear of involving ourselves in vast expenses, are both subjects of anxiety. It may be found best for the high officers of both our own and foreign** nations, to carefully consider the condition of affairs, and when necessary recommend those whom they would send the ability of these men being ascertained, they could await the time for employ Their official rank, [in our service,] and the period of sending them, are not required [Page 310] to be fixed beforehand. If suitable men can be found, send them; but not, if none are ready, keeping the power of doing so always in our own hands; nor should other powers, if we are unwilling to send envoys, regard it as a cause for hostilities.

I have just received the dispatch from the foreign office respecting the appointment, by his Majesty’s order, of Chi Kang and Sun as our envoys to western countries. Henceforth there will be a perpetual interchange of civilities; the affairs of diplomacy will gradually increase; and though it may be found that one or two of our agents may prove unfit for their posts, who can tell whether such envoys as Su Wu, Pan Chau, Fu Peh, and Hung Hau* may not again arise?

Seeing, therefore, that this point has for its objects the honor and prosperity of his Majesty, and the smoothing over difficulties, it seems best, on the whole, to accede to it.

In respect to affording facilities for the propagation of religion, I may be allowed to observe that the Roman Catholics began their work by tempting men to join them from mercenary motives; but latterly most foreign missionaries have been poor, and as they could not hold out so many advantages, their doctrines have not been believed. From the days of the Tsin and Han dynasties, the doctrines of Confucius and the sages have been rather obscured, so that Budhism has got gradually the ascendant; yet Budhism has been very greatly supplanted in India, its original country, by Mohammedanism. So, too, Romanism, which arose in the Roman empire, and obtained the supremacy; but subsequently Protestantism has vigorously opposed it. From these facts it is evidently plain that all these different religions fluctuate, having their rise and fall; while the doctrines of Duke Chau and of Confucius suffer no attrition during the lapse of ages, but still suffice to regulate the government of China, correct the manners of its people, and exalt the dignity and institutions of the land. If, therefore, the adherents of these other doctrines take every method to promulgate them, they will after all get but few supporters and converts. As there are many churches in the districts and prefectures in every province already erected, there can be no want for allowing them to erect any more. Should the foreigners, then, at the coming revision of the treaty, persistently press their demands on this head, it will be enough to promise them that, whenever occasion requires, protective orders will be issued in regard to this faith. It will not be necessary to add an additional article, and I think they will not ask further, or often urge it.

These latter points, whose results are not likely to be very disastrous, need not be debated so as to cause bitterness, though they ought not to be instantly granted when asked for. But the other demands for railroads, steamers going up the rivers, opening the salt trade, and building warehouses in the interior, are so disastrous to the occupations of our people that they ought to be strenously resisted. Bitter disputes need not arise about them, nor harsh language be used, but the points can be discussed good-humoredly, and fair, truthful arguments employed to convince them, at the same time, that we are decided not to grant them. Let them fully know that a regard for the welfare of the people as the means of preserving the state has been the constant principle of our ancient rulers through all ages, and also the law of all the sovereigns of our reigning family. Many affairs now demand our attention, while the foreigners are afraid of nothing; yet we cannot assent to everything they ask without any reference to its propriety, and disregard the necessities of our own people.

Should the day come when China gets the ascendant, and foreign nations decay and grow weak, we then should only seek to protect our own black-haired people, and have no wish to get military glory beyond the seas. Although they are crooked and deceitful, they yet know that reason and right cannot be gainsaid, and that the wrath of a people cannot be resisted. By employing a frank sincerity on our part we can no doubt move them to good ways, and then everything will be easily arranged to satisfaction.

These humble views are submitted, crude and immethodical as they are, for examination, that those which are deemed proper may be carefully considered.

A respectful memorial, drawn up in accordance with the decree concerning the revision of the treaty, and now sent by courier at the rate of 400 li (125 miles) a day, [to Pekin,] and upon which I humbly beg their Majesties the Empress Regents and the Emperor to bestow a sacred glance, and command their instructions on it.

[Page 311]
No. 2.

Sir Rutherford Alcock to Prince Kung.

Sir: As arranged in our interview this afternoon, I have the honor to forward the Chinese text of the communication which I made verbally to your imperial highness and the ministers of the Yamên.

The object for which I sought a personal interview is so important, and the interest dependent on the decision that may ultimately be taken in reference to the measures proposed are of such magnitude, that I deem it essential the exact tenor of the observations and statements exchanged to-day on both sides should be on record. It will further serve to prevent any uncertainty or misapprehension by giving your imperial highness an opportunity of correcting any erroneous impressions I may have carried away from what passed in conversation.

Mr. Adkins, acting as interpreter, gave as closely as possible the purport of the inclosed memorandum, and various observations were made upon the several subjects referred to in the nineteen paragraphs, both during the interpretation and subsequently by your imperial highness and other members of the board.

As I understood these, the general purport was to the following effect: the Yamên expressed a desire for progress in so far as it might be in their opinion practicable and safe, keeping in view the present state of the country, but they claimed to be the sole judges both as to the measures to be adopted, the mode of execution, and the time for their introduction. It was contended that there were very serious difficulties to be encountered in the path of progress, and in any measures involving change from old established customs and principles, and nothing sudden could be ventured upon. China had national interests at stake which must be fully considered before any innovations could be made, and foreign powers must see the necessity of this, and consent to wait until the time should arrive when the way could be more clearly seen to a good end. The object of the Chinese mission was to represent these things to the treaty powers, and as for any articles of a treaty Mr. Burlingame may have signed they had not yet received the Chinese text, but as plenipotentiary he had no authority to bind the Chinese government by anything he might do without the ratification of the Emperor.

In answer to this, I observed such was the well-understood rule in all the relations of foreign powers. No minister could bind his government by any act not subsequently ratified by the government. But as to the necessity for waiting indefinitely until the Chinese government saw their way more clearly, I called attention to the tact that it was fast approaching ten years since the treaty of Tien-tsin was signed; that during the whole of this period there had been a manifest want of execution in many of the most important clauses, and her Majesty’s government thought the time had arrived for removing the causes of this all but total failure; and more especially the obstructions created by the provincial officials, and fatal to the development of commerce in the interior, for which object mainly the treaty was entered into by Great Britain. These obstructions could not be removed without greater facilities for inland navigation and residence than had heretofore been allowed, and the effective working of coal mines under foreign supervision, with all the arts and appliances of European science. Hence my insistence on these points. For if the Chinese government claimed the right to take their own way and choose their own time as to any correction of abuses, progress, or material improvements, foreign powers had a still more undoubted right to insist upon the faithful execution of treaties without any delay whatever, and that from the first day. And the time had now arrived in my opinion when no more delay ought to be suffered to take place.

Your imperial highness I think interposed to say it was not part of the obligations of treaties for the Chinese government to take any one of these steps I had urged, to which I replied that these particular measures were not specified in any of the treaties, but in all it was expressly stipulated that trade should be allowed in the interior, exempt from obstructions from the authorities, and illegal exactions. It was enough, therefore, to show by the experience of the last eight years that there had been a failure of execution in these particulars, and that nothing short of the measures indicated could lead to any better result to give a right to any foreign power, seriously damaged in its commercial interests, to insist upon their adoption, not because they were enumerated in the treaties, but as the essential condition of the more faithful observance of treaty rights and stipulations. The right to trade in the interior, like all other rights, carries with it whatever may be necessary to its fair and full enjoyment. I no first of these necessary conditions is ready access to the interior; the second, freedom from vexatious interference, and taxation contrary to treaty; and the third, such accommodation for persons and goods as may render trade in any large sense possible. To deny these is to nullify the treaty, and to defeat its most important object.

In improvement and progress, so far as those were in the interest of China alone, the Emperor might claim an exclusive voice, but in measures needful to the execution [Page 312] of treaties, China no longer stood alone, and must of necessity adopt them, if disposed to act in good faith, and avert reclamation.

The American minister, having been present at this conference, took part also in the discussion, and no doubt will himself place on record the observations he offered for the consideration of the Yamên.

I will merely recall to your imperial highness’s memory one or two leading points as bearing more especially on the preceding. Having been appealed to on the subject of the Chinese mission and the declaration made by Mr. Burlingame, as the chief, when in the United States, he bore distinct testimony to the general accuracy of the statement contained in the fourteenth paragraph, and further added that great disappointment would be felt by the Government and people of the United States if nothing decidedly progressive were to result from the negotiations on the approaching revision of the British treaty. He reminded your imperial highness that some 60,000 Chinese subjects were residing in California, with full liberty to work and to trade wherever they pleased, whether in mines or towns, and that they had all the privileges the most-favored-nations clause could give, and equality of rights and treatment demanded reciprocity in China. Your imperial highness remarked in reply, that those Chinese were no doubt subject to given laws and jurisdiction, and if American citizens were equally subject in China to Chinese laws, they might have all the privileges of Chinese subjects also.

The American minister observed in answer that the difficulty here lay in the fact that there was no code of laws in China which could be accepted by western states, but as soon as a written code should be in existence, based on the same general principles as those constituting the law with minor modifications of the western world, the difficulty would cease. In the mean time the right to travel, to trade, and to reside as the consequence of the former, existed by treaties, though under different conditions in the two countries, and could not be refused.

Some further observations followed on my part, but as these were interrupted and left incomplete from the sudden indisposition of one of the ministers, I beg leave to state here in a more complete and connected form the remarks with which I intended to conclude.

Your imperial highness had remarked that careful consideration was needful; for, of many demands made, some were disadvantageous to Chinese interests, and could not on that account be accepted; others again would be a benefit to neither if acceded to, and for that reason ought not to be granted.

I wished, in answer to this general argument, to lay before your imperial highness strong reasons that existed for concluding that in matters of commerce the interests of China and foreign nations are identical, and what was really beneficial to the one could not be injurious to the other. Moreover, that Great Britain had not only preponderating interest in asking nothing which could inflict injury on China, but had, by deeds during the last eight years better than by words, shown unmistakably the earnest desire of her Majesty’s government to uphold the present rulers of China, and preserve the nation from falling into anarchy. Nearly all the treaty ports had, at some time or other, either been saved from falling into the hands of insurgents or recovered from them, chiefly by the aid of British forces. That, if it is said, in freely spending blood and treasure in the work, we were at the same time but protecting our own interests or the interests of trade in general, it may be quite true, but the argument only goes to prove the truth of my previous statement, that British and Chinese interests, where trade is concerned, are mutually dependent, and, to a great degree, identical. What permanently injures the one is a no less certain injury to the other. The British nation would, therefore, in their own interest, be the last to claim of the Chinese government concessions calculated to inflict an injury on the native population and trade, or even to weaken the power of the present government to maintain order and peace throughout the empire. It would be enough to show that either of these results must inevitably follow the measures now proposed to deter the British government from insisting upon their adoption. On the other hand, if this has not and cannot be shown, while it is easy to demonstrate that, without increased facilities of transport into the interior and for the storage of goods than has hitherto been conceded, no extension of foreign trade into the interior is practicable; and without effective measures for the removal of obstructions and exactions, persistently insisted upon by the provincial and local authorities, no free development of that trade is possible, as the experience of the last eight years has shown what can the refusal to adopt such measures be held to indicate but a determination to persevere in a course which amounts to a nullification of the treaty in its most important object, which, it cannot be too often repeated, was the protection and extension of trade throughout the empire. No foreign power, with large interests at stake, can be expected to submit patiently or indefinitely to so flagrant a wrong in violation of a treaty which was the last result of a costly war. If a nation incur all the expense in life and money of a great war 14,000 miles from their own coast to defend their interests and protect their commerce, it is impossible to suppose it will see that object entirely defeated by failure of execution in [Page 313] the treaty stipulations, which were the price of peace. If, as your imperial highness would seem to contend, the treaty of Tien-tsin does not stipulate for such measures as these now proposed, seeing that no trade in the interior can prosper without them, all that can be said in reply is, that were this to he admitted by her Majesty’s government it would only afford an additional reason for claiming such revision as should supply the deficiency.

But I still hope your imperial highness and the ministers of the Yamên, collectively, will see that the time has arrived for removing all just cause of complaint and placing the trading relations of British subjects in the interior on the footing of security and immunity from illegal taxation and obstruction, without which the treaty itself becomes a dead letter.

This day eight years ago Lord Elgin and the army that accompanied him left the gates of Pekin after having secured the ratification of the treaty of Tien-tsin, and, in negotiation with your imperial highness, a further convention, that, in the terms of your proclamation then issued, “Hereafter the weapons of war may forever be laid aside, and all should join together in the work of promoting peace.” In that work of peace, and by peaceable means alone, we are now engaged in such revision as may tend to remove abuses and restrictions on trade clearly contrary to the spirit of the treaty then ratified and confirmed at Pekin, and I will not allow myself to think that there can be any ultimate failure, whatever difficulties may have been experienced hitherto in coming to a mutual understanding on the important subjects under discussion.

RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.

His Imperial Highness the Prince of Kung, &c.

No. 3.

Heads of a communication made by Sir Rutherford Alcock to the Yamên, November 9, 1868.

The British minister has asked for this interview to assure himself that the prince and ministers of the foreign board clearly comprehend the present position of affairs as regards the proposed measures for the better execution of the treaty and the approaching period for a revision.

1. All the measures hitherto proposed by the British minister have been measures essential to correct well ascertained abuses and insure the execution of existing treaties.

2. These measures, if not according to the letter, are entirely in the spirit of the treaties, and, if refused, it will impose upon her Majesty’s government the necessity of determining, without delay, what further steps may be fitting to arrest their indisputable right to a full and perfect execution of all the treaty stipulations. For ten years past there has been a total failure in respect to many essential articles. Whether singly or in concert with other treaty powers, all of which have the same grounds for action, the Yamên may rest assured action will be taken. Her Majesty’s government will not accept such a decision as a final solution of the questions now under discussion, or submit to a continuance of wrong from a persistent failure of execution of the treaty for so many years.

3. It was to avoid this necessity and to conciliate all interests that the British minister suggested a Chinese commission to investigate and discuss the proper steps to be taken. To give effect to these deliberations he has subsequently entered into direct negotiations with the Yamên, hoping to convince them that he had demanded nothing which could be rightly refused; nothing that was not both reasonable and practicable, as well as consistent with the best interests of China.

4. So far it appears he has but partially succeeded, and he has determined, therefore, on this last effort, face to face, to demonstrate the necessity as well as the advantage of concession, and the danger of breaking off all further negotiations with an unsatisfactory result.

5. On many questions, and some very important ones, they have happily come to an agreement. Measures have been devised to remedy the great abuses in the levy of transit and other dues upon foreign trade; and the Yamên have equally agreed to take steps for the formation of a code of written laws and fixed rules of procedure preparatory to the establishment of mixed courts for the trial of all cases between foreigners and natives.

6. These measures are calculated to effect two great objects: The removal of grievous injuries continually inflicted on foreign trade, and the subject of complaint and demands for redress which are a constant source of danger to the government that permits them; and justice to foreigners and Chinese alike when they are at variance, thus preparing a way for the modification of ex-territorial rights and free intercourse in the interior op equal terms.

7. But in order to give these measures full effect, and to carry them out in any completeness [Page 314] and good faith, certain other conditions are essential. The foreign merchant must be able to follow his goods; carry them, if he will, in his own boats, and hire depots for their safe storage wherever great trading centers make it desirable. Hence the British minister proposed facilities for inland navigation, and the right of renting houses or godowns in the interior, under such rules and restrictions as might be found expedient.

8. The Yamên have so far admitted the necessity for these facilities that they consent to the merchants using their own boats, if propelled by oars or sails, and to their residing temporarily in the inns; but they refuse any right to rent houses or depots, and will not consent to a few steam-tugs navigating the Poyang Lake, exclusively to facilitate the foreign trade with the tea districts.

9. The British minister has now to state distinctly that, without both these points be conceded, nothing effective will have been done to carry out the treaty in its integrity or to obtain its principal object, which was to enable foreign merchants to carry their trade into the interior, free from illegal imposts or vexatious distinctions and delays. To relieve them of these and other impediments, due to the bad faith and corruption of the provincial officers at the various stations, is not possible if such facilities are refused.

10. The merchant must follow his goods to secure them from spoliation and his agents from the extremity of ill treatment, such as has quite recently occurred at Chen-chiang-pu, when the shroffs and others in the employment of British merchants have been beaten and tortured until they consented to a false declaration, to the prejudice of their employers.

11. Finally, the working of mines—those of coal more especially—by foreign engineering science and machinery has been waged as essential to facilitate the steamer traffic, both on the coast and on the Yangtse, but no less advantageous to the Chinese people and the government, which both employ or possess a large number of steamers. To this conditional assent has been given, but, as in the matter of inland residence and navigation, it has been so framed as to deprive it of all practical value.

12. These are vital points. On the favorable or adverse decision respecting them entirely depends the result of the present negotiations. If the Yamên persist in refusal, the British minister must repeat, as his final rejoinder, that effective remedy will have been provided for the abuses and violations of treaties, both in their letter and spirit, which have been too long permitted to harass the foreign merchant and prevent all free development of trade.

13. Before coming to this conclusion, the British minister trusts very earnestly that the Yamên will take the following certain results into consideration, in addition to all that has been already set forth:

14. The Chinese government has sent a mission to all the treaty powers. Their envoy has declared in the United States that this mission meant progress. It was on this understanding that the mission met with so cordial a reception in America, from both Government and people. It was on the faith of this promise of progress that the United States Government appears to have entered into an additional convention, declaring their desire to respect the independence and integrity of the Chinese empire, and to abstain from all undue pressure for sudden and great innovations. If there be any doubt in the minds of the ministers as to the correctness of these statements, let them ask the newly arrived representative of the United States, who was still in his own country when Mr. Burlingame arrived and the additional articles were signed.

15. No clearer evidence could be afforded to the Government and people of the United States that they have been misled and altogether deceived by the declaration that the mission meant progress, than the present action of the Yamên supplies. A refusal now on the part of the Yamên to grant these facilities, without which the treaties cannot be made effective, or carried into execution in their most important stipulations, cannot fail to bring the mission of the government into disrepute. Not progress, but a resolute denial of all that constitutes either progress or improvement, in furtherance of a stationary or retrograde policy, will be plainly seen to be the end contemplated.

16. That the Yamên considered what would be the natural and inevitable result of such a conviction once it is entertained by the cabinets of Europe. A refusal to listen to their envoy who attaches any faith to his representation will be the first of these. They will see that while he has been sent forth to talk in the name of the Emperor of progress to the several treaty powers of the western world, the government here have determined to resist all efforts to vindicate them, to move even within the narrowest limits, or to advance a step, and declared, by acts more significant than words, their resolution to stand fast in the old way of passive resistance to every argument in favor of progress, whether rapid or slow, improvements however gradual. They will see that nothing more is to be hoped from negotiations dictated by a spirit of peace and good will toward China; and that if execution is to be obtained for existing treaties, it must be secured by other means and arguments than those hitherto resorted to by their representatives.

[Page 315]

17. Finally it will remain for the British minister to show that, so far from any undue pressure having been resorted to, a whole year has been devoted to the patient consideration of the whole subject. So far from any demands for sudden and great changes before the government and country could be prepared having been made, many which might be desired have been altogether ignored, because they were of this character, such as railroads and telegraphs, although even in these a very gradual beginning might obviously be made, and as an experiment which could entail no serious prejudice to any national interests.

18. Even in matters of prescriptive right and undoubted expediency, such as the privileges and position of the diplomatic corps at Pekin and admission to the palace, among the principal of these, no word has been said by the British minister not because he did not deem them important, but because he knew these were subjects of discussion likely to create serious trouble and embarrassment to the Yamên at the present time, whereas a year or two hence, when the minority of the Emperor ceases, they must of necessity receive a satisfactory solution.

19. Thus, whatever was calculated to embarrass the progress of negotiations, and a satisfactory issue, if not essential to the attainment of the main object, has been carefully excluded with a thoughtful regard to the present state of affairs and the position of the ministers; and even some things in the highest degree desirable in the interests of foreign trade, such as the importation of foreign salt, have been kept out of sight, simply because they either necessarily did or might be supposed to involve more sudden and undesirable changes than would at the present moment be safely sanctioned. On the part of the British minister nothing has been left undone to secure a satisfactory solution of all difficulties. The final result of such effort now rests with the Yamên alone.

No. 4.

Prince Kung to the British minister.

The Prince of Kung, &c., &c., makes a communication in reply:

The Prince has received and read with attention the dispatch of his excellency the British minister of the 14th of November, with its inclosure.

What passed at the recent conference having been carefully embodied in that dispatch, will be on record; there need be no further reference made to it.

What the Prince has said has already been spoken after careful consideration of the general situation.

China and foreign countries have national interests to care for alike. They cannot be coerced into similarity, for neither cannot wholly adopt the usages of the other. Is only one party to be consulted when dangerous and impracticable schemes are pressed for adoption? Foreign nations treat it as a crime on China’s part when she withholds her consent to them, though were China to moot such to foreign nations, (England,) Ms excellency the British minister would probably not agree to them. The same rule should hold good for both sides.

England and China alike wish to be benefited by the revision of the treaty, and to secure permanent advantages in the interests of true progress. Both sides should consider existing emergencies, be mutually conciliatory, and treat the matter exhaustively.

If the behests of the foreign merchants were absolutely fulfilled, without consideration for her difficulties, China, while seeking “progress” for the foreign merchant, would, contrary to all rights, be working her own retrogression. The Prince is very sensible of this, and on his part, therefore, though native merchants have interested his action on several points, he has declined to bring them before his excellency the British minister, fearing to cause difficulties with his excellency in dealing with ex parte statements, (on the Chinese side.) Since the signing of the treaties, indeed, China has never prevented any of their provisions from taking effect. Breaches of regulations and mistakes have been once and again committed by the local authorities. These the Yamên have at once set right. The foreign merchants cannot all have suffered damage and losses, nor is there any actual decadence in trade.

Ten points have been conceded by the Prince, viz.: Reduction in duty on certain articles; free import of stores by dock companies; the trial of the bonded warehouse system; the substitution of a bond for each payment of the half duty deposit; payment of drawbacks in cash, when the goods are exported within three months; the adoption of one uniform touch for sycee at the various custom-houses; the selection of an additional port, either at Ta-tung, Au-ching, or Wu-hu; the substitution of Wenchow for the hitherto unopened port of Chiung-Chow, (Haiman.) A new set of rules has also been discussed, which will put the native trader on the same footing as the foreign merchant, when trading in foreign produce in the interior; while another set of rules places the foreign merchant, who buys native produce inland for reëxport or [Page 316] ale at the next port, on the same footing as the native trader. Two proclamations have been framed. One, addressed to (the officials in charge of) the various customhouses, will put a stop to unauthorized levies, and will compel restitution when its provisions have been disobeyed. The other, which enjoins the people generally not to molest the foreign merchant who proceeds to the interior, will promote the extension of trade.

All the concessions made will enable the foreign merchant to obtain the advantages of inland commerce, secured to him by treaty, and will prevent him from suffering loss and injury. The reimport of native produce; its sale, when duties on it have been paid, at, the first port; the [establishment of] bonded warehouses, the arrangements for drawbacks, the opening of ports, (literally custom-houses,) are all new advantages, conceded extra treaty, and give proof of China’s “progress,” where treaties are concerned, while the tender care for foreign merchants evinced thereby cannot but be considered complete and satisfactory.

Every course of action should be anxiously considered in regard to its permanent result. Promises are readily made—their fulfillment is not so easy. It often happens that he who undertakes a matter finds it impracticable when called upon to put it in action, and. has to regret his want of caution in the first instance. Just so is it with the proposal of his excellency the British minister to admit steamers on the lakes and rivers, to establish hongs, and carry on mining operations in the interior. He, the British minister, desires to give the foreign merchants residing in the interior all the privileges of a native, without his being subject to any Chinese code. This would cripple the executive authority of China, and in practice be alike difficult and dangerous. Were the Prince constrained to concede these points, and they were found to be as prejudicial to the government and people of China as to be absolutely impracticable, it would be open to the British minister to upbraid China for her bad faith and incapacity. In declining to accede to them, therefore, the Prince has in view the preservation of harmony and good faith.

The expression of his excellency that the things proposed would be of benefit to China is evidence of friendly interest in her welfare. But it seems to the Prince that during his administration he has not failed to adopt any measure which was of advantage to China and which would leave her independent, and be without prejudice to her sovereign power; as, for instance, in the establishment everywhere of schools for languages, and arsenals, and the building of steamers, she has made use of foreign appliances to her own advantage, and that without any pressure from foreign ministers. But the above points differ from steam traffic on the lakes and rivers, the establishment of warehouses and mining, where the advantage to be gained is problematical, and injury to China’s sovereign power inevitable.

The physician who has to administer medicine to an invalid must, if his treatment is to be effective, first ascertain the constitutional conditions of his patient. These conditions vary, and it may be that the drug, which is a specific in one case, will be valueless or even hurtful in another. Thus it is that the Prince declares to be impracticable that which his excellency urges, to be beneficial, though still recognizing the good intentions of the British minister.

The Prince thinks that his excellency will fully appreciate these arguments. The treaties were concluded from a desire on the part of China to increase, her friendly relations with foreign powers, and the present revision is now being conducted by the Prince in a like spirit.

The inclosure, (in the dispatch under acknowledgment,) in nineteen paragraphs, is fairly identical in meaning with memoranda previously received, and a categorical answer is embodied in the accompanying memoranda, (No. 1.) The points in the other separate, memoranda (No. 2) will be for discussion by the Prince and his excellency the British minister. The Prince begs his excellency to consider it carefully, and. to favor him with a reply upon it, and upon the two memoranda sent in on the 27th of June.

The Prince has received a dispatch from his excellency the American minister, to which he need not here allude, as he is about to reply to it.

A necessary communication, &c., &c., &c.

No. 5.

Mr. Browne to Prince Kung.

Sir: On Monday last, at the joint interview of the British minister and myself with your highness and members of the Tsung-li Yamên, I took occasion to submit a few considerations in connection with the growing intercourse between the citizens of the [Page 317] United States and China, upon a clear understanding of which I think important results depend.

It was scarcely practicable in a desultory conversation, and with the difficulties of verbal interpretation, to make every point as intelligible as the gravity of the subject demands; and I now, agreeably to promise, submit my views in writing.

The present seems an opportune occasion for a candid interchange of opinion, since some of the changes proposed in the British treaty, now under consideration, cannot fail to affect the interests of the United States.

The policy of my Government is doubtless well understood by your highness. It is the policy of peace, based upon reason, justice, and humanity, seeking no advantage inconsistent with the general welfare, its cherished object is to promote fraternal intercourse between nations.

Influenced by a natural interest in the oldest of living nations, hitherto deemed the Most exclusive, it was with extreme gratification the Government and people of my country learned, near the close of the last year, that the government of China had determined upon sending am embassy to the western powers.

The reception of this embassy in the United States may be regarded as an epoch in the history of diplomatic intercourse. From the day of its arrival at San Francisco, to the day of its departure for Europe, demonstrations of respect and honor were lavished upon its members. Its approach was heralded by the press of the country as a great advance in the march of modern civilization; and its arrival was the signal for generous expressions of welcome from the statesmen and orators of our land.

The President of the United States received the embassy with marked cordiality, and expressed his appreciation of the sagacity with which the enlightened Chinese government had responded to the amicable policy adopted by Christian nations.

Both Houses of Congress gave your embassadors an enthusiastic official reception. The Speaker of the House of Representatives availed himself of the occasion to say that this embassy, which had attracted such universal attention, had been hailed throughout our land, not only as marking an onward step in the world’s history, but as being of peculiar interest to the republic.

These friendly sentiments, officially expressed, may be regarded as the unanimous voice of the nation.

Considering the growth of American commerce with China, the rapid extension of our Pacific steam navigation, the approaching completion of our great transcontinental railroad, and the enterprising character of our people, this gratifying movement on the part of a great nation with which we have such important relations could have but one interpretation. Everywhere and by all classes, with singular unanimity, it was understood to mean the abandonment by China of its former exclusive policy, and the substitution of one more in accordance with the progressive spirit of the age.

Reference is made to these facts to indicate some of the grounds upon which a liberal policy in the future may reasonably be anticipated.

Upon a perusal of the correspondence and minutes of proceedings in connection with the proposed revision of the British treaty, I find every point upon which differences of opinion exist fully considered.

It is extremely gratifying to observe the courtesy, intelligence, and ability with which the propositions of the British minister are discussed by the members of the Tsung-li Yamên. Before a final decision, however, is rendered upon the questions still at issue, it is earnestly to be hoped that the government of China will not permit so favorable an opportunity to pass without placing upon record a substantial guarantee of its disposition to make a forward movement. Future misunderstanding may be prevented by a distinct declaration of policy at this time.

So far, the few points conceded are of minor importance, and can scarcely result in any practical good, either to natives or foreigners, without those substantial concessions upon which the prosperity of commerce and all mutual advantages of intercourse depend.

The abolition of interior transit passes and institution of an increased import duty will not, I apprehend, prevent those abuses which now form so serious an impediment to trade. The course of proceeding necessary to secure indemnity for illegal taxation is liable to give rise to vexatious delays by opening new fields for litigation.

Undoubtedly, the true solution of this problem lies in the removal of unnecessary restrictions upon foreign merchants. If permitted to reside in the interior, rent or purchase warehouses, and carry on their business without unnecessary checks and hinderances, they would soon come to a good understanding with the mandarins and people; mutual prejudices would gradually be removed, and confidence established. If the trade continues, it must come to this sooner or later; and the question for the consideration of your highness is, whether it is well to prolong indefinitely existing causes of dissension.

There can be no equality among nations without mutual advantages of intercourse. At this time there are sixty thousand Chinese on the Pacific coast, who are engaged in almost every branch of industry open to our own citizens. They are permitted to [Page 318] travel or trade, rent or purchase houses, wherever their inclination may lead them. Local prejudices, which, from want of knowledge of their true character, formerly existed against them, are rapidly disappearing; and they are now regarded by intelligent classes of the community as an orderly, industrious, and valuable part of our population. Might not similar good results attend the extension of increased facilities for intercourse to the few foreigners in this country? Those who seek to trade and purchase, or rent property in the interior, are generally men of responsible character, who have large pecuniary interest at stake. No better guarantee could be given against lawless and disorderly proceedings.

On this point it was understood to be remarked by several members of the Yamên at the interview of Monday, that the Chinese in the United States are under American law, and that if Americans would consent to subject themselves to China law in this country, they might reasonably expect equal privileges.

This question has been discussed for many years, and it is unnecessary now to repeat the argument advanced. When the government of China shall deem it expedient to establish a code of laws based upon principles of justice, recognized and accepted by the comity of western nations, and to which the Government of the United States can safely give its assent, then this cause of complaint will doubtless be removed.

An important question, upon which no agreement has yet been reached, is the proposed extension of steam navigation on the inland waters. All experience has demonstrated in Europe, America, and India, and to some extent in the waters of China, that without the use of vessels and machinery propelled by steam, no extensive systems of trade can now be carried on, in any country, with profit. In Mexico, Central and South. America, and other countries through which railroads have been constructed only to a limited extent, steam navigation on the coast and inland waters is now making considerable progress. These countries, however, are still very far behind the times, and the consequence is they are poor, and their trade is small compared with their capacity for production.

The use of small steamers, or even steam-tugs on the upper waters of the Yangtse-kiang, on the Poyang Lake, and on the Pei-ho River, from Tien-tsin to Tung-chow, would greatly facilitate the transportation of merchandise and domestic products, and would dispense with unnecessary and unprofitable labor, which could well be devoted to the opening of coal mines, building of roads and other works of internal improvement. This need not be done so rapidly as to produce distress among the laboring classes, who now earn a subsistence in the old way; but if any change is contemplated, what advantage is gained by indefinite postponement? Why should not a beginning be made now as well as a half a century hence? The people cannot adapt themselves to a new condition of things before anything new is attempted. If they were now undergoing a course of preparation, some definite results might be anticipated; but merely to hold back when all the rest of the world is advancing, is to invite that foreign interference which is so much deprecated.

If the employment of a large number of men, where a few only are necessary to do the work, could be regarded as advantageous, then there would be good reason why the freight boats, now hauled by hand up many of the rivers, might be dispensed with, and the cargoes carried by coolies. But such a course, although it would furnish employment to many who probably need it, would not increase the means of subsistence. It cannot be denied that freight boats have already dispensed with much unprofitable labor, and small steamers or steam-tugs would only be another step in the same direction.

A similar argument may be used in reference to railroads. Nearly all the land transportation is now carried on by means of coolies, camels, wheelbarrows, and small wagons. No system more difficult, tedious, and expensive could be devised. It is a draft upon labor without adequate result. Nevertheless, it could not be expected, much less desired, by a friendly power, that sudden and extraordinary changes should be made. An experiment on a small scheme, say from Taco, Tien-tsin, or even Tung-chow to Pekin would test the advantages of railroads, where the work could be directly Tinder control of the government. There are private capitalists who would be willing to take all the pecuniary risk, and receive their compensation upon any equitable basis that might be agreed upon as not injurious to the interests of China. Even a tramway from the coal mines in the vicinity of Pekin to the city walls, or to the river, would be a reasonable beginning. The supply of coal now depends upon the growth of grass, for in bad seasons the camels starve, and coal becomes scarce and dear. This is a very uncertain dependence for so indispensable an article.

It is earnestly to be hoped that this great empire, abounding in so many natural resources, and with a people so industrious, so skillful in mechanics, so peculiarly qualified in all respects to avail themselves of modern inventions, will not oppose all experiments in this direction. Already ample proof has been furnished that the laboring classes of China, constituting so large a proportion of the population, are not inimical to these new contrivances for saving time and making labor profitable. Ten thousand Chinese have aided in building the great central railroad across the continent of North [Page 319] America; and there is not an instance in which they have refused to work for fair compensation, because of any prejudice or superstition. The arsenal at Shanghai, in which seven hundred native workmen are employed, presents conclusive evidence of their readiness and ability to perform any kind of mechanical labor, even to the manfacture of engines and building of steamers, which they have already done with complete success.

The commerce of the vast interior might be greatly increased by these new methods of communication. Agriculture has been carried to great perfection, and now yields very nearly its maximum. But so dense a population cannot derive a subsistence from this source after an enlarged foreign intercourse has once commenced. New demands are made, new wants are created; and a greater diversity of pursuits becomes necessary. Mining, manufactures, and various internal improvements furnish additional and profitable occupation; and nations become rich and prosperous as they adopt the use of steam and improved methods of labor, while all countries in which these have not been introduced, find it difficult to maintain an existence.

The question of opening the coal mines has been considered without any satisfactory result. No real concession has been made. There is a great demand for coal at the principal commercial marts on the coast. It is well known that coal seams of great extent and richness exist near the banks of the Yank-tze-kiang and in the province of Shantung, also in the vicinity of Pekin. Mr. Raphael Pumpelly has fully demonstrated this in his report recently published. By the use of proper machinery for working the mines, and suitable improvements for transportation, there can be no doubt this indispensable article, could be delivered at the ports for less than half its present cost. This would be a source of large revenue to the Chinese government, and a great advantage to commerce; yet objections are made to the only means by which either natives or foreigners can avail themselves of this natural resource. A willingness is expressed to try the experiment of working certain mines by means of foreign machinery, under official direction and on government account. It will be of very little avail to get the coal out of the mines unless some cheaper methods of transportation are adopted. The cost of carrying it to the place of consumption is now the principal item of expense. Besides, no mining enterprise has ever been known to succeed in this way; and failure now would be very discouraging to all parties. Governments cannot, from the precarious nature of the pursuit, work mines successfully. It is for individual enterprise to make them profitable. In all countries where mining of any kind is carried on extensively it has been found expedient to allow the mines to be worked by private companies or individuals, who either purchase them in fee simple, as in the United States, or pay a share of the proceeds to the government. This has been done to promote individual effort without subjecting the public revenue to unnecessary risks; and it has always been found most conducive to the development of the natural resources of the country.

To lease the coal mines, or a few of them, by way of experiment to whomsoever may offer the best terms for the privilege of working them, would seem to be a very reasonable way of making a beginning, and avoiding all risk by leaving the matter of success or failure to those individually concerned. It would not throw any of the laboring classes out of employment, or introduce a large foreign population. The work would be done by Chinese under proper direction; and thus a new field for native industry would be opened, while commerce would be greatly benefited.

At the interview of Monday, it was understood to be argued in response to some of these suggestions, that the government of China sees quite clearly the advantages to be derived from the introduction of foreign improvements, but that the country is not yet prepared for such changes as those recommended; that different interpretations may be given to the word “progress what is thought “progress” in our country, might be something very different in another; that here there are great difficulties in the way of changes; they must be gradual and based upon a sure foundation; that all progress which is not voluntary, or which comes from others, is spurious and must fail to be beneficial. In short, it was contended that China is willing to advance, but must do so in her own way, and at her own discretion.

Nothing can be more reasonable than this, as a fundamental principle. No friendly power can desire to impair the self-respect or detract from the independence of another. The government of the United States simply adheres to its established policy, in disclaiming any right or intention to interfere in the administration of the domestic affairs of China. The best possible proof of the soundness of that policy, and of its thorough appreciation by the Chinese government, can now be given to the world. In entering into the family of nations, it is impossible that China can postpone, indefinitely, all responsive movements upon which equality and friendly intercourse depend, without disregarding an essential element in the compact. Modem enterprise has penetrated the exclusiveness of this ancient empire, and it now becomes a question for the consideration of your highness, whether progress, as understood by western nations, can be arrested by arguments, however specious, or by governments, however pacific in their intentions.

[Page 320]

There can be no question as to the object of the commercial world. It desires an extension of trade; but no trade with any nation can be profitable or enduring which is not of mutual advantage. It is a fallacy, therefore, to suppose that because foreigners may be governed by motives of self-interest, all the facilities and concessions they ask must be injurious to China.

I have thus frankly and in a spirit of true friendship stated my views. Results of inestimable magnitude and of profound interest to the welfare of this empire depend upon the action taken at this time. It is manifest to my mind that steam on the navigable waters, the proper working of coal mines, residence and all the rights of trade in the interior, and the gradual establishment of telegraphs and railroad systems, are essential measures of modern intercourse, and that some earnest of beginning, without unnecessary delay, would avert much future misunderstanding. An irresistible spirit of progression is effecting great changes-everywhere. Modern nations under the general impulse move rapidly, and will not be likely to leave the work of the present generation to posterity.

I have the honor to be, sir, with consideration and respect, your imperial highness’s obedient servant,

J. ROSS BROWNE.

His Imperial Highness Prince Kung, Chief Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

No. 6.

Bases of revision of the treaty of Tien-tsin, accepted by the Chinese government.

I. In respect to tariff and trade, or customs regulations:

1. To adopt a system of transit for articles entering into the export and import trade, which shall exempt them from all charges under whatever denomination of taxes, and whether in foreign or Chinese hands, the payment of a transit due of 2½ per cent, on all imports being secured at the port of entry by payment to the maritime customs, and by this means relieving them of all liability to the payment of Peking taxes, either at the ports or elsewhere, and to make the same known by imperial edict or proclamation.

2. To free all ship and dock stores, and any others for personal use, or exclusively foreign consumption, under certain rules calculated to attain the end.

3. To repay drawbacks in money during any current quarter.

4. To establish bonded warehouses at the ports where desired.

5. To reduce the tariff on same twelve articles enumerated in the memorial.

I. To this the Yamên are still anxious to attach a condition of general revision, so as to equalize all duties to an average of 5 per cent., if her Majesty’s government declines to consent to the duties being doubled on tea, silk, and opium.

6. To abolish coast trade tea-bonds at the revenue ports.

7. To facilitate and equalize the payment of duties by fixing, as far as practicable, the touch of sycee at each port, as suggested in some of the memorials.

II. In greater facilities for trading operation and transport of goods in the interior:

8. To erect landing stages at certain points, to be determined upon on the Tangtsze.

9. To open one or more new ports on the coast, as may be hereafter determined.

10. To work in the vicinity of one or more of the treaty ports coal mines, with the aid of foreign skill and machinery, and all the necessary facilities for cheap transport to the points of shipment.

11. To give the right of navigation on the inland waters to foreign vessels and boats not propelled by steam, the restriction to hold only so long as the Chinese merchants themselves do not employ steamers on the same.

12. To place a steamer tug on the Poyang Lake, to aid the rapid transport of foreign-owned goods or produce.

13. To adopt a written code of commercial law, and fixed rules of procedure and practice, and a better constitution of mixed courts for its administration in all mixed cases of civil suit between foreigners and natives.

14. To issue a proclamation recognizing the right of foreigners to travel freely in the interior for purposes of trade, and to hire lodgings and accommodations for their produce or goods.

[Page 321]
No. 7.

Prince Kung to Mr. Browne.

Prince Kung, chief secretary of state for foreign affairs, herewith makes a reply:

I have had the honor to receive your excellency’s dispatch of the 27th ultimo, in which you inform me that when the three high ministers sent from this government as envoys to the treaty powers reached the United States, they were received by the President with great consideration and gratification, and that both Houses of Congress greeted them with marks of respect, that had not before been accorded to other ministers, while the people at large likewise showed them the utmost cordiality and regard.

From all this it is evident that the officers and people of the United States, without regard to rank or station, alike cherish a sincere friendliness toward the middle kingdom, and this assurance gives me, on learning what you have now informed me, the most gratifying pleasure, for which I now desire to express my thanks.

The various points which you have, in the dispatch under reply, urged this government to consider, in connection with the revision of the British treaty, likewise prove the earnest wishes which animate your excellency in aiding those consultations, and your suggestions and reasonings are every way good and reasonable. But in the conduct of its affairs it behooves every kingdom carefully to watch the times and their tendencies, in order that its own power suffer no detriment, neither in the prerogatives of the throne, nor in the power exerted over the people; but if these conditions be maintained, improvements (or new things) can be adopted. This principle is no more applicable to China than to every other country.

The advantages which your dispatch sets forth as certain to attend the adoption of those improvements, have constantly been brought forward by the foreign ministers who have lived in Pekin, in their frequent interviews. Some of their suggestions were such that we saw no insuperable difficulty in adopting them; but there were others which could not be adopted, and some which could not yet be accepted. We must carefully watch the times, and see whether to accept or refuse to do a thing now, or defer it to a subsequent day.

The former British minister, Sir Frederick Bruce, and indeed all the resident ministers in Pekin, were and have been well aware of these principles of action; but among them all no one better appreciated their force than the former minister from the United States, whom his Majesty has now sent as his envoy extraordinary to the treaty powers. Nor have I the least doubt but that, in succeeding to the post formerly held by Mr. Burlingame, your friendly feelings and clear comprehension of the situation are similar, for both are shown in the present dispatch in all the matured plans and excellent suggestions with which you have favored this government. I beg to thank you for the interest you have thus shown in whatever will benefit us.

I suppose that you are already aware of the present position of the negotiations with the British minister, and know all the arguments which have been used in discussing the various points; and I therefore deem it unnecessary to repeat them here, but content myself with these general remarks upon the whole question, and this expression of my sincerest thanks for the trouble you have taken.

No. 8.

Mr. Browne to Sir Rutherford Alcock.

My Dear Sir: I have received, through the hands of Mr. Vlangaly, the Russian minister, your letter of the 7th instant, transmitted to him for communication to myself and colleagues, containing the basis of a revision of the treaty between Great Britain and China.

Allow me to congratulate you upon the prospect of an early termination of your labors. You have had an exceedingly arduous duty to perform. The diversity of interests iuvolved on the one hand, and the prejudices to be overcome on the other, must render negotiations of this kind more difficult in China than in any other country. As one of the foreign representatives, I beg to tender you my thanks for the frankness and courtesy with which, so far as the common interests are concerned, you have conducted these negotiations.

While I cannot see in the result any positive evidence of a disposition on the part of the Chinese government to recede from its policy of exclusiveness, I nevertheless believe [Page 322] that great good must grow out of your labors, more, in fact, than appears from the few and comparatively unimportant concessions made.

Since these negotiations commenced the ruling authorities of China have been placed in possession of a large amount of practical information respecting the necessities of the commercial world and the objects of the treaty powers. At no period since the beginning of foreign intercourse has there been so thorough an investigation of all subjects upon which differences exist, or such an amicable interchange of opinion. Questions of mutual interest have been considered in a candid and equitable spirit, and although the arguments advanced by you and your colleagues have failed to carry conviction to the Chinese mind, yet such is the power of truth that it must eventually penetrate the understanding of this peculiar people, and achieve its own triumphs over their prejudices.

I think there is more reason to hope for a change when they find it unavoidable, than to look for it in any voluntary movement. If the Chinese government can be brought to the conviction that there is no alternative but to advance; that procrastination will not avail to ward off threatened evils; that the time for mere argument is passing away; I have no doubt the means of progress indicated during your protracted discussions will be found entirely feasible. At all events, the more consideration given to them, the less formidable they will appear.

It seems to me that the dangers of any direct and positive movement, or radical change, are greatly overrated, not only by Chinese statesmen, but by many foreigners long resident in the country.

No such evils as those anticipated have ever resulted from the introduction of steam and improved systems of labor in other parts of the world; and the reasons given to show that the experience of mankind elsewhere is inapplicable here, strike me as utterly unfounded. If such a line of argument as this were to prevail, it would forever exclude any advance. Urged in the apparent interest of the Chinese, it really sustains their prejudices and strengthens them in a course of resistance to innovation, which, if continued, must inevitably result in their ruin. Besides, it conveys a reflection upon their common sense, mechanical ingenuity and capacity for improvement not warranted by facts. It is a timid policy which hazards all in attempting to hazard nothing. That you do not share in these opinions is sufficiently manifested in your earnest and persistent appeals to the Yamên to make a practical beginning in the introduction of steam and other foreign improvements throughout the interior. I am, therefore, free to say that I consider all arguments having such a tendency as unworthy the age in which we live. For my part, I see more danger in protracted delay than even in the most sudden and radical of innovations. An acquiescence in the Chinese view would lead to retrogression; and in that there are elements of far greater disaster to China than any contained in the proposed changes. In concentrating the attention upon the difficulties of an advance movement, the accumulating dangers of delay are too apt to be forgotten.

Having already, in my letter to his imperial highness Prince Kung, dated November 23, (of which you have a copy,) expressed my views on most of the points referred to in your summary of results, it is unnecessary now to recapitulate them. I shall therefore confine my remarks, in this connection, to a few important considerations suggested by your communication.

1. As to right of residence, with the privilege of renting or purchasing warehouses in the interior.

This, I think, is absolutely an essential step toward any thorough or practical reform. Without it we remain on the outer edge, and never touch the reason or intelligence of the great mass of the people. What is done at the ports comes to them diluted or perverted through hostile channels.

It is quite hopeless to expect, in the absence of a newspaper press, that they will ever get at the truth or form a correct estimate of foreign character without direct personal intercourse with foreigners; nor is it easy to conceive how the greatest of all impediments to free intercourse, ignorance of a common language for intercommunication, can be diminished by restricting foreign merchants in their right of residence to the ports. Few of them thus restricted ever learn to speak Chinese, and their servants and coolies, who acquire a smattering of foreign languages, form a distinctive class who rarely intermingle with the natives of the interior.

The main objection urged by the Chinese government against foreign residence in the interior is, that the treaty powers are not willing to relinquish exterritorial privileges. The humiliating spectacle, they contend, would, if this were permitted, be presented to their own people of a foreign population, in the heart of their own country, exempt from the operation of its laws. Such a state of things, they conceive, would bring their authority into contempt, and sooner or later subvert their sovereign power, and result in their denationalization. This argument is natural enough from the Chinese standpoint, but if we accept it as conclusive, why make any further effort to force our civilization upon them? It all has the same tendency unless they rise to our standard. The exact line of distinction between the amount of injury already inflicted [Page 323] upon their amore propre and that which may be necessary in order to advance them to a higher civilization, and a more enlightened estimate of the destiny within their reach, is doubtless very difficult to define, but surely the necessity for exterritoriality will not be lessened by limiting foreign intercourse to the ports. There must be a fixed code of laws and a radical change in the system of administering justice in this country before exterritorial protection can find a substitute in native courts, and the only way to bring that about is by increased intercourse. Hence, to expect a change for the better, where the means are rejected, is to look for an effect without a cause.

The establishment of a mixed court at Shanghai for the trial of petty offenses is a movement in the right direction, but even in that there is a manifest determination to adhere to Chinese usages. Instruments of torture are insisted upon as essential to the administration of justice. It is a beginning to be sure, but not at a point likely to effect marked or beneficial changes in the interior. A partial concession may, by diverting attention from material measures of progress, tend rather to retard than advance those substantial and comprehensive reforms so earnestly pressed upon this government. Nevertheless I sincerely entertain the hope that the mixed court may lead to something better.

2. The opening of coal mines, by leasing them to foreigners, or allowing them to be worked in accordance with the general mining laws of other countries.

This is rejected, and it is agreed that some mines shall be worked by foreign machinery under official direction. However much the government may desire the experiment to succeed, I fear this principle of working mines can never prove successful. It has not succeeded in other countries where surrounding circumstances were much more favorable. Something, however, will be gained by such an experiment. If unsuccessful, the means of success will be practically demonstrated. If successful, the government Will have proved beyond controversy the beneficial effects of innovations which it now so strenuously deprecates.

3. Navigation of the interior waters by foreign steamers beyond the points now permitted.

On this subject it is useless to multiply arguments. All has been said that could have been expected to remove existing prejudices, without any effect so far, except the promise to place a steam-tug on the Po-yang Lake. An enterprise of this kind, conducted by native authorities, hostile to the objects contemplated and ignorant of the means by which it may be profitably conducted, must after all depend for its success upon foreign skill and energy. How far existing scruples on that point may be overcome remains of course to be seen. The good that may be expected from this concession, limited as it is, lies chiefly in the fact that such a beginning, however it may be designed to operate, has in it a forward tendency. As remarked in reference to coal mines, even its failure under Chinese auspices will bring into consideration the causes and the means of success. It will at least accustom the people to the appearance of a steamer in an unfrequented locality.

On these three points I have thus frankly given you my views. With respect to the minor concessions made, I am unable to form a very accurate estimate of their value. Much will depend on the good faith in which they are carried into effect, and something upon inherent difficulties arising from what has been rejected.

I am clearly of opinion, however, that you have accomplished all that can possibly be achieved at present by diplomatic means. While I cannot but regret that the government of China adheres so persistently to its policy of exclusion, I have great confidence in the results that must accrue from your labors, and feel assured that there is promise in the future.

J. ROSS BROWNE, United States Minister.
No. 9.
[Extract.]

The Secretary to the Board of Trade to Mr. Hammond.

In reply to your letter of the 4th March, I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to request that you will inform the Earl of Clarendon that they have carefully considered the various questions raised in the correspondence transmitted to them by his lordship on the subject of the commercial relations between this country and China, more especially in connection with the proposed revision of the treaty of Tien-tsin.

Two distinct and conflicting lines of policy are presented for the consideration of [Page 324] her Majesty’s government on the occasion of a revision of our treaty relations with China:

1. To insist not only upon the effectual execution of existing engagements, but also upon new and important concessions with a view to what is called “opening up” China to foreign trade, and introducing western civilization into the empire.

2. To confine the present negotiations to the assertion of admitted treaty rights essential to the gradual progress of foreign trade, to the removal of such defects in the Chinese administration affecting foreign trade as the Chinese government is willing and able to undertake to remedy, and to the acceptance of some spontaneous concessions.

It appears to my lords, after reading this correspondence, that if any doubt at any time existed as to the impossibility of obtaining at the present time, except by force, the larger concessions which are called for by the mercantile body in China, such as the right of residence in the interior and of working mines, the introduction of railroads and telegraphs and inland steam navigation, such doubts can no longer be entertained.

Sir R. Alcock, who at some stages of the transactions under review, especially at the date of his dispatch No. 70, of 10th November, 1868, seems to have been to a certain extent under the influence of his more sanguine and less responsible diplomatic colleagues, and of the order of ideas inspired by the display of force at Yang-tchoo, arrives, at the close of the correspondence, at the conclusion that the results of the labors of the mixed commission, reported in his dispatch No. 72, of 6th December, 1868, are all that can be obtained by negotiation at the present time; and that unless her Majesty’s government is prepared to resort to other means than those which he has felt authorized to employ, and with a clear contingency of war for the attainment of the main points insisted on by the merchants and by his colleagues generally, as alone important and essential to all effective progress, they must be content with much less, and with the somewhat vague hope of gradual progress.

This view is expressed even more emphatically by Mr. Hart in his very able letter to Sir R. Alcock of December 4, 1868: “Of course, force will wrest anything from China; but wherever there is action there is reaction; and as sure as natural laws continue to act, so sure it is that appeals to force in one age will give to the men of a later day a heritage of vengeance—the Europeans of some future day may wish that their forefathers had not sown the seeds of hatred in the bayonet-ploughed soil of Cathay.”

My lords believe that this view is moreover shared by Sir. Wade, with whom, in accordance with Lord Clarendon’s suggestion, they have conferred upon this subject, and by many other persons whose opinion is deserving of great consideration.

It is true that the memorials which have been addressed to her Majesty’s government and to Sir R. Alcock by the British mercantile body in China are generally in favor of what is termed a more vigorous policy, and that the language of the foreign representatives at the court of Pekin, and especially that of the United States minister, Mr. Ross Browne, (although even that gentleman himself admits in his letter to Sir R. Alcock of 17th December, 1868, that “all has been accomplished which can at present be achieved by diplomatic means,”) lead to the inference that they incline to the same view.

It is unnecessary for my lords to observe that they have every disposition to give due weight to the representations of those who are more directly interested than any other class of her Majesty’s subjects in the question under discussion, but they cannot forget (as is stated in Sir R. Alcock’s dispatch No. 76, of 23d December last) that “our position in China has been created by force—naked physical force; that any intelligent attempt to improve or maintain that position must still look to force in some form, latent or expressed, for the results;” and the responsibilities and sacrifices involved in the exercise of force must fall upon the British nation, and not upon that section of its people which is engaged in the trade with China.

The same remark applies with scarcely less weight to the case of the representatives of other countries at Pekin. Any policy which led to the interruption of peaceful relations with China would be attended with far greater danger to British interests than to those of other nations, and in advocating a course liable to such contingencies both merchants and ministers are urging on a policy in the fruits of which, if successful, they would largely share, and in which the consequences of failure would fall chiefly upon other interests than those which they represent.

The course, therefore, which my lords would recommend for the consideration of her Majesty’s government under existing circumstances is as follows:

1. To endeavor to arrive at an understanding with the government of China by which the formal revision of the treaty of Tien-tsin may be deferred until the majority of the Emperor, which Sir R. Alcock states will take place in 1872 or 1873. Such a postponement of the revision is, in my lords’ opinion, desirable for three reasons:

(a.) There will then be a “personal and tangible” power with whom to deal.

(b.) It may be hoped that hi five years there may exist a greater disposition to extend oreign trade and relations than at present.

(c.) The claim for revision will then coincide in point of time with that of the last [Page 325] reaty power entitled to prefer it, and it may be hoped that the simultaneous action and coöperation of all those powers may then be secured.

2. That in the mean time, and pending such general revision, Sir R. Aleock should be instructed to obtain, if possible, the consent of the Chinese government to such arrangements as they have already expressed their readiness to adopt in view of an immediate revision, such arrangements to be effected either by a short convention, if this be necessary, or by independent action.

These arrangements are stated at page 172 of the printed correspondence in Sir R. Alcock’s dispatch No. 72, of the 6th December, and are the result of the negotiations conducted by the mixed commission which was appointed at his request to arrive at a preliminary understanding as to the bases of revision.

My lords will enumerate them in order, and whenever necessary make such remarks upon them as occur to them in connection with the questions to which they respectively refer:

1. Transit dues.

This proposal is nothing more than the literal fulfillment of existing stipulations in the treaty of Tien-tsin, and involves no new concessions whatever.

The question of transit dues is stated by all the authorities on this subject to be the next important point in connection with the present negotiations. A considerable difference of opinion exists in different quarters as to the precise nature of the claims which, in virtue of the seventh supplementary treaty rule, in execution of Article XXVIII of the treaty of Tien-tsin, her Majesty’s government is equitably entitled to assert.

My lords entertain no doubt that the view expressed in some of the memorials, and even at one time by Sir R. Alcock himself in his correspondence with Mr. Hart, viz.: that the payment of the transit dues ought to be held to exempt the goods upon which it has been paid from all subsequent internal taxation, and to insure the sale of the goods to their ultimate consumer with no enhancement of cost derived from taxation, save that represented by the import and transit duties, is a view which cannot be entertained by her Majesty’s government. There is nothing in the terms of the treaty which appears to my lords to justify such a sweeping demand, and in view of the internal taxation to which native goods are subject in China, it would be in their opinion both unjust and inexpedient to enforce such a demand, even if it were warranted by the terms of treaty stipulations.

All that her Majesty’s government can claim in this respect appears to my lords to be that in the treaty ports the importer shall have the right to sell his goods in the market, after payment of the customs duties stipulated, and that he shall have the right to send goods to any internal market which he may select, free from any other charge than the customs duty on importation, and the stipulated transit duty; but that, both at the port and at the internal market, when once the goods have passed out of his hands, they must take their chance in common with native goods, and bear whatever impositions the rapacity or necessities of Chinese administration may inflict.

It must also be remembered that the imperfect execution of the treaty of Tien-tsin in this particular is due not alone to the weakness or inaction of the Chinese government, but also to the fraudulent evasion by British merchants of the obligations and conditions which it imposed.

My lords refer to the sale of transit certificates to the Chinese, by which malpractice the difficulties in the way of a just administration were greatly increased. A stricter execution of the stipulation on the English side should be, if possible, enforced, as well as on the part of China.

Under these circumstances my lords are of opinion that the arrangement which, after much discussion and correspondence, appears to have been considered satisfactory by Sir R. Alcock, may be approved by her Majesty’s government. The terms accepted by the Yamên seem in themselves perfectly equitable, and entirely in accordance with what my lords believe to have been the intention of the stipulation to which it relates. It is to be hoped that the renewed adhesion of the Chinese government to the principle therein asserted, and the measures which they propose to take with a view of making known and enforcing the provisions of the stipulation, will operate in diminishing and restraining, if not in removing, the obstructions caused to the circulation of foreign-owned goods in the interior by the exactions of the provincial governments.

The general character and principles of this arrangement are summed up by Mr. Hart, in his letter to Sir R. Alcock of 25th July, 1868, as follows:

“1. To allow all foreign goods to circulate freely on payment of import duty and transit due together.

“2. To enable all Chinese produce to get to foreign markets, after payment of transit due and export duty simply.

“3. To place native produce, with the exception of government monopolies, such as [Page 326] salt, to be traded in, in China, on the same footing as it is when traded in, in China, by Chinese.”

These general principles appear to my lords to have been observed in the arrangements ultimately proposed by the Chinese government, and they think they should receive the approval of her Majesty’s government, subject to any modifications of the details which further experience may have led Sir R. Alcock to deem desirable.

2. Free admission of ship and dock stores, etc.

By the second rule of the agreement of Shanghai of the 8th November, 1858, under the head of ‘‘duty-free goods,” foreign clothing, household stores, ship stores, personal baggage, &c., are exempted already. It is proposed to extend this exemption to dock stores and to all articles destined for foreign consumption exclusively, and not for sale to Chinese. This is a very liberal concession.

3. The repayment of drawbacks in money during any current quarter.

Sir R. Alcock appears to have done his best to obtain a longer term for the repayment of drawbacks in specie, but the Chinese government decline such extension on grounds which are plausible, and as the concession is proposed without any limitation of the time during which certificates of drawback may be received in payment of import duty, it is a new facility accorded to foreign trade, and is so far satisfactory.

4. The establishment of bonded warehouses at the ports where they are desired.

This measure will greatly diminish any inconveniences resulting from the regulations with respect to drawbacks, and afford, it is hoped, valuable facilities to trade. Sir R. Alcock is fully alive to the importance of establishing such warehouses on a proper system, and with the coöperation of Mr. Hart my lords have much confidence in the probable results.

5. The reduction of tariff on certain articles.

My lords gather from the correspondence, and especially from the “memorandum on tariff revision for communication to Tsungli Yamên of the 5th of September, 1868,” by Sir R. Alcock, that he is of opinion that a general revision of the tariff is at the present time undesirable, and that as the Chinese government will not consent to a reduction of duty on the twelve articles enumerated in the memorials, except on this condition, that it will be better to leave this question of tariff revision at rest for the present.

My lords are much disposed to concur in this view; but they would have been glad of more information as to the incidence of the export duty on tea.

The Foo-chow memorial declares the average amount of the tax to be 10 per cent., and the Amoy memorial estimates it on common kinds at 35 per cent.

On the other hand it has been made a subject of discussion between Sir R. Alcock and Mr. Hart, whether the export duties on tea and silk might not be equitably raised in the interest of the Chinese revenue; and as this is a question of very great importance, as affecting in a vital manner our commercial relations with China, it is essential that there should be no hesitation as to the language which should be held on the subject by her Majesty’s representative in China.

The price of China tea in bond in the United Kingdom has arisen from 1s. 2½d. in 1856 to 1s. 7 1/8d. per pound in 1866; owing, no doubt, in a great degree, to the stimulus given to consumption by the reduction of the British import duty.

If any attempt were made by the Chinese government to impose heavier export duties on this article it would entirely neutralize the policy of her Majesty’s government in their endeavor to relieve the English consumer from taxation in an article of primary necessity, and transfer a profitable revenue from the British to the Chinese treasury.

On the other hand, the position of her Majesty’s government on this question is one which cannot be defended on any ground of reason or equity. To insist on the Chinese government confining their tax on tea to 5 per cent., in order that the British government may be enabled to impose 30 per cent, on its importation into the United Kingdom, is a course which could only be taken with a government which yields to force and not to argument.

But, nevertheless, an increased export duty on tea in China would be equally injurious both to our fiscal and commercial interests; for as tea constitutes the most important of the two only articles of trade largely exported by China to this country, and as the value of the goods exported from the United Kingdom and from British India to China exceeds already the value of the goods exported by China to the [Page 327] United Kingdom and to British India, a still greater character of inequality and uncertainty would be imparted to the China trade than that which even now exists.

Any discussion, therefore, at present, which is calculated to raise such a question, should, in my lords’ opinion, be deprecated.

An increase in the export duty on silk, though not involving the same fiscal difficulty, would, on commercial grounds, be scarcely less unfavorable; and as this is a question in which France and other countries are equally interested, her Majesty’s government stands in a less invidious position with respect to it.

It is to be regretted that the Chinese government persist in their refusal to liberate the trade in salt; but as no effort has been spared on the part of Sir E. Alcock in urging it upon them, nothing more can be said.

6. The abolition of coast-trade tea bonds at the riverain ports.

This appears to have been urged by the Hankow chamber of commerce, and will, it is presumed, be regarded with satisfaction by the commercial interest which it concerns.

7. The equalization, as far as possible, of the payment of duties by fixing the touch of sycee at each port.

The advantage of this measure is evident.

8. The erection of landing-stages on the yang-tse.

The object and utility of this concession is fully set forth in the correspondence. My lords observe, however, that the Yamên are only willing to make provision for three additional landing-stages between Ching-kiang and Hankow, and evade the concession of them at points above Hankow. It may be hoped that if the general revision of treaties takes place a few years hence this system may be extended higher up the river, as there would appear to be no direction in which trade can be extended with less risk than by steam communication along the Yang-tsze and other great rivers.

9. The opening of one or more new ports.

The policy of urging on the Chinese government this measure is one upon which very different opinions are entertained. The mercantile body in China, as represented in the memorials are, on the whole, rather unfavorable to any great extension of the number of treaty ports; but as such a measure would have for its object rather the creation of new openings for trade and the introduction of new competitors into the field of enterprise than the benefit of existing interests, my lords are not surprised at the attitude of the memorialists on this question.

This opinion is, however, shared by Mr. Winchester and Mr. Robertson, and other persons of experience in China, and is supported by many arguments which appeal to my lords to possess much weight, both on political and commercial grounds, to which they will advert further on.

Mr. Hart, on the other hand, as representing the interests of the Chinese revenue, as well as on other grounds, expresses the strongest opinion in favor of a considerable extension of the treaty-port system. Mr. Wade, whose opinion is entitled to even greater weight, has expressed the same view, and attaches very great importance to this measure, which he evidently regards as the soundest and most legitimate method of increasing and consolidating our commercial relations with China.

Sir R. Alcock holds a middle course between these opposite views, and evidently thinks that much may be said on both sides.

My lords are of opinion that if it were held to be desirable to endeavor at the present time to extend materially our treaty relations with China, it is in this direction that such efforts should be made; and they think it probable that by the creation of well-selected new ports a certain expansion of foreign trade would be produced.

Such a policy, however, appears to my lords to be attended with so much doubt at the present moment, and the interest of the Chinese government is so clearly in the direction of taking the initiative in its adoption, that they are indisposed to recommend that any pressure should be placed on the government at Pekin by her Majesty’s government on this question, so that the responsibilities attendant upon such a measure should thus be made to rest upon the Chinese themselves.

If new ports are opened to foreign trade at the instance of her Majesty’s government it will probably be found necessary to create consular establishments at them, whether these are really essential in the interests of British trade or not; and although it may be desirable under the present conditions of foreign trade in China that, as a general rule, consuls should be stationed at all open ports, this may not always be the case, and will probably become less and less important as the function of distributing foreign goods in China passes more and more into the hands of native merchants.

[Page 328]

On every ground it will be better that the hands of her Majesty’s government should be kept perfectly free in this respect, so that in the extension of the consular system in China they may be guided by the proved, and not by the anticipated, requirements of British trade and shipping.

It is beyond the province of government to détermine beforehand the places which the future course of trade may enable to assert a claim for consular establishments, and the only safe and just principle to be observed in providing new consulates is to create them only in places at which experience has shown that the trade both demands and justifies them.

10. The working, in the vicinity of one or more of the treaty ports, of coal mines, with the aid of foreign skill and machinery, and all the necessary facilities for cheap transport to the place of shipment.

This proposal is a very judicious one in every way, and its adoption is one of the few matters which can be urged on the Chinese government without any fear of other than beneficial results, but it seems to be hardly of a kind to be made the subject of an international agreement.

11. The concession of the right of navigation in inland waters to foreign vessels not steamers. this restriction to cease when the chinese merchants employ the latter themselves.

My lords are inclined to think that the immediate necessities of foreign commerce in this direction will be adequately met by this concession, and they are even disposed to believe that it would have been safer not to accept it. It will, in their opinion, be necessary that any British vessels which may engage in this trade should be placed under strict guarantees for good behavior, and subjected to penalties for any breach of the law. A system of licenses will probably be the best method of securing this result. They would strongly deprecate the introduction of steam navigation in inland waters by foreigners under treaty rights, until the Chinese are more familiar with these modern agencies, and the native merchants are themselves prepared to adopt them.

My lords are quite unable to share the views of the memorialists and the foreign representatives, and even of Sir R. Alcock, on this subject. They believe that the unrestrained introduction of foreign steamers into inland waters, in the present condition of China, is a measure which would be attended with considerable risk, and when it is recollected that the coast trade of the United Kingdom was only opened to foreign ships in 1849, and that in one of the most civilized countries in Europe, and in the United States of America, foreign ships, both sail and steam, are excluded even from the coasting trade, they think the language held on this question toward the Chinese government quite unreasonable, and they are disposed to regret the pressure which has been placed upon them by her Majesty’s minister.

12. The introduction of a steam-tug on the po-yang lake.

There appears some divergency of opinion as to the value of this concession, but as the beginning of a system of inland steam navigation it may be useful.

13. The adoption of a written code of commercial law, and fixed rules of procedure and practice, and a better constitution of mixed courts for its administration in all cases of civil suit between foreigners and natives.

This is a matter of very great importance. A written code of law. to which both nations can appeal as a guide in disputes, will remove a fruitful source of misunderstanding and difficulty; while this and mixed courts of justice in civil actions cannot fail to be productive of unqualified good in placing our commercial relations on a sounder footing, and raising the standard of commercial morality.

The Chinese government appear to have intimated their intention to depute a competent officer to confer on this subject with Sir E. Hornby at Shanghai, and my lords would suggest that Sir R. Alcock should be instructed to call upon that gentleman to submit to her Majesty’s government, with as little delay as possible, a statement of his views as to the best method of giving effect to these arrangements.

14. The issue of proclamations recognizing the right of foreigners to travel freely in the interior for the purposes of trade, and to hire lodging and accommodation for their produce and goods.

This is an act of Chinese administration, with a view of enforcing the observance of engagements under existing treaties, and calls for no observation from my lords beyond the expression of their belief that, if effectual, the rights herein recognized are [Page 329] quite sufficient for present purposes in the interest of peaceful and permanent relations with China.

Having thus commented on the various points upon which the Yamên have expressed their readiness to entertain proposals, my lords will offer a few observations on the principal questions raised in this correspondence, upon which it has been found impossible to induce the Chinese government to yield to the British representations.

These are—

1. The right of residence by foreigners in the interior, with that of renting stores and godowns at great internal centers.

2. The introduction by foreigners of railroads and telegraphs, and of steam navigation on lakes and inland waters.

3. The right to work mines in the vicinity of ports.

While giving full credit to Sir E. Alcock for the general moderation of tone, and for the great patience, care, and ability which he has displayed throughout these difficult negotiations, and bearing in mind the strong pressure which has been placed upon him by his colleagues and countrymen in China, my lords are unable to regret his failure in obtaining concessions from the Chinese government on these points.

They believe that the first of these, viz., right of residence in the interior of China, accompanied, as it must at present be, by “exterritoriality” would be attended with grave political danger and very doubtful commercial advantage, even if the former did not ensue.

The case might be more easily dealt with if China were treating with only one foreign power, although even here my lords would have advised that efforts in this direction should have received no assistance from her Majesty’s government; but with England, Russia, the United States of America, France, Germany, and other countries all in the field and all claiming exterritorial privileges, and all with their own ideas of policy and administration, it appears to them that nothing could be more directly calculated to bring about anarchy and confusion.

Even at the ports where foreigners are under the immediate control of their own officials, their “exterritoriality,” as Mr. Hart justly observes, exercises, in some respects, a harmful, because disintegrating, influence; and my lords think that there is much force expressed in the opinion of that gentleman that, “if China consents to this demand she will have sown the seeds of a wrong principle, which must grow in strength, and that strength and the new life thus given to the exterritorial idea in the interior will bring weakness for the nation and death for its government, and must eventuate in greater anarchy than has yet been seen.”

My lords cannot believe in the expediency of the introduction of railroads and telegraphs by foreigners under treaty right. All that could, as they think, be properly attempted in these respects would be to obtain permission, under very strict limitations aud conditions, to make experiments of this nature in particular districts, in such a manner as to afford a reasonable belief that they would lead to their adoption by the Chinese.

But in these matters, as well as in the case of steam navigation in inland waters, to which they have already referred, my lords believe that any general scheme of such improvements and innovations should be, at all events nominally, conducted by the Chinese themselves.

Similar objections apply, with more or less force, to the right of working mines by foreigners, and my lords would not recommend that any renewed attempt should be made at present to obtain privileges of this description.

Baron Gerolt to Mr. Fish.

The undersigned, envoy and minister plenipotentiary of the North German Union, has the honor to transmit to the Hon. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State of the United States, the contents of a confidential dispatch from the chancellor of the North German Union, Count Bismarck, wherein he urges the importance of combined measures on the part of the maritime powers for the extermination of piracy in the Chinese waters.

The undersigned begs the Hon. Hamilton Fish to be pleased to inform him whether the executive power of the United States would be inclined to take part with the government of the North German Union, and with [Page 330] other maritime powers, in carrying out combined measures for the purpose aforesaid.

The undersigned begs the Hon. Hamilton Fish to accept the renewed assurances of his most distinguished consideration.

BARON von GEROLT.

Hon. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure.]

Count Bismarck to Baron Gerolt.

The dangers to which maritime commerce with China is exposed by reason of the piracy which is so boldly and adroitly carried on in the Chinese waters, years ago induced the maritime powers, as your excellency is aware, to send war vessels to cruise in those waters, whose task it was to protect commerce against pirates, and to exterminate piracy. The two corvettes cruising in those waters which belong to the war navy of the Union have, moreover, been furnished with the necessary instructions for an active participation in enterprises directed against piracy. They will be reinforced by several vessels of light draught, peculiarly adapted to the pursuit of piratical junks, which will probably be able, at no very distant day, to sail for their place of destination.

These matters have led to the consideration of the question whether it would not be for the common interest of the powers engaged in the China trade to inaugurate a plan of combined action, to be settled by previous arrangement between the various governments, or between the commanders of the several squadrons. The representative of Great Britain in China proposed such a plan in 1868, and the unsatisfactory results of the system hitherto followed seem to speak in favor of this plan. It has, however, not been put into execution.

I therefore most respectfully request your excellency to make inquiry, confidentially, with regard to the inclination of the government of the United States of America to participate in the realization of this idea, and to be pleased to communicate the result to me.

The chancellor of the North German Union.

VON BISMARCK.

His Excellency the Baron von Gerolt, Envoy of the North German Union, Washington, D. C.

  1. No. 1.—Report of Tsang, acting governor general, &c., of Kiangsu, &c., &c., relating to proposed revision of the treaties.
  2. No. 2.—Sir Rutherford Alcock to Prince Kung, November 9, 1868.
  3. No. 3.—Heads of a communication from Sir Rutherford Alcock to the Yamên. November 9, 1868.
  4. No. 4.—Prince Kung to the British minister, December 5, 1868.
  5. No. 5.—Mr. Browne to Prince Kung, November 23, 1868.
  6. No. 6.—Chinese basis for revision of British treaty, December 8, 1868.
  7. No. 7.—Prince Kung to Mr. Ross Browne, December 17, 1867.
  8. No. 8.—Mr. Browne to Sir Rutherford Alcock, December 17, 1868.
  9. No. 9.—Secretary of the board of trade to Mr. Hammond, May 19, 1869.
  10. No embassy from Russia is recorded in Du Halde as having come to Pekin this year: that of Ysbrandt Ides was in 1689, but an envoy also came into Pekin the year before. Who is here referred to by Nicholas is not clear, but the date in the text is probably wrong.—Translator.
  11. This word is not found in one copy.
  12. These are four distinguished envoys. Su Wu was sent, in the year B. C. 100, to a tribe of the Scythians; Pan Chau, in A. D. 87, attacked an army beyond the great wall, with whom he made a favorable peace; Fu Peh, in A. D. 1042, was sent to resist the Kitans, who had occupied districts south of the wall, and made them retire; and Hung Hau, in A. D. 1143, returned to Hangow from an embassy to Mongolia.